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This dissertation is comprised of five independent essays on the theme of the nature and roles 
of knowledge. The essays are intended to be free-standing pieces of work and should be read 
as such. This introduction first surveys the contents of each essay, before placing them in a 
broader context and discussing some connections between them. It closes with 
acknowledgements. 
 
 
The Essays 
 
 
The first essay, 'An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment', offers an argument, 
conditional on fallibilism about knowledge, for the view that there is pragmatic encroachment 
on knowledge - that is, that whether or not S knows that p depends not only on broadly truth-
related factors, but also on facts about S's practical situation such as how much is at stake for 
S about being right about p. The argument seeks to force a dilemma on those who wish to 
deny pragmatic encroachment whilst retaining fallibilism; fallibilists who wish to deny 
pragmatic encroachment will either have to have to impute massive error on our part about 
what kind of warrant is needed for an error possibility not to stand in the way of a course of 
action being justified, or they will have to deny some of the central tenants of Bayesian 
decision theory. Unlike others found in the literature, this argument doesn't appeal to any 
universal principles linking knowledge and permissible action, but rather relies only on an 
existential claim. Pragmatic encroachment theorists, it is suggested, should prefer this 
argument to those appealing to universal principles because it relies on a logically weaker 
premise, and in doing so nullifies a number of objections to which previous arguments have 
been vulnerable. §1 surveys the terrain of the debate. §2 presents the new argument. §3 shows 
how the denial of pragmatic encroachment faces the dilemma, and discusses some possible 
responses. §3 concludes that insofar as one wishes to defend pragmatic encroachment, the 
argument given here provides superior grounds on which to do so, and that possible responses 
to the dilemma incur substantial theoretical costs. 
 
Recent epistemology has largely turned away from the project of attempting a 
decompositional conceptual analysis of knowledge and towards investigation of the normative 
and metaphysical roles that knowledge might uniquely play. To this end, on the normative 
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side it has been argued that knowledge is, variously, the epistemic norm of belief, assertion, 
and practical reasoning. On the metaphysical side, Timothy Williamson has argued that one's 
total evidence consists of only those propositions that one knows to be true, and John Hyman 
has argued that the fact that p can be one's reason for Φ-ing only if one knows that p. The 
second essay, 'Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The Metaphysical Roles Of 
Knowledge', focuses these two claims about the metaphysical roles of knowledge and argues 
that they have not been sufficiently well motivated. In both cases, it is argued, the positive 
arguments for the claims fall short because they conflict with the results delivered by 
environmental luck Gettier cases. §1 introduces the views of interest and suggests that there 
are reasons to think that they will stand or fall together. §2 discusses Hyman's thesis linking 
reasons and knowledge, and argues that it conflicts with the verdicts delivered by 
environmental luck Gettier cases about the conditions under which S can Φ for the reason that 
p. §3 discusses Williamson's thesis linking evidence and knowledge, and argues that his two 
arguments in favour of the E→K direction of the link are undermined by environmental luck 
Gettier cases. §4 concludes that more work will need to be done if we are to be persuaded by 
Williamson and Hyman's claims. 
 
The third essay is entitled 'Might The Simulation Heuristic Influence Knowledge 
Attributions?'. People's knowledge attributions display some intriguing patterns. One of these 
is that people tend to be less willing to attribute knowledge-that-p to a subject when specific 
unrealized metaphysical possibilities of error are mentioned, and so made salient, than they 
are when such possibilities are not mentioned and not made salient, but are present 
nevertheless. This phenomenon, which I call the 'error-salience phenomenon' has been 
appealed to to motivate contextualist theses about the semantics of 'knows', and appear to 
pose a challenge traditional invariantist approaches to the word's semantics. What 
psychological processes, if any, might explain the error-salience phenomenon? The question 
has recently generated considerable interest, with Timothy Williamson and John Hawthorne 
speculatively suggesting that it might be the result of the influence of the availability 
heuristic, Jennifer Nagel making the case that it is the result of epistemic egocentricity, and 
Mikkel Gerken arguing that it is the result of epistemic focal bias. Each of these authors has 
appealed to their proposal to attempt to undermine the force of the apparent challenge that the 
error-salience phenomenon poses to invariantism about 'knows'. This essay makes a 
preliminary case that the influence of the simulation heuristic may partially explain the 
phenomenon. §1 introduces the topic. §2 sets the scene by introducing the evidence - both 
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intuitive and empirical - for the existence of the phenomenon. §3 introduces the simulation 
heuristic and some of its interesting properties, and makes the case that the phenomenon can 
plausibly be explained by the hypothesis that knowledge attributions are influenced by the 
heuristic. §4 compares and contrasts this hypothesis with those offered by Williamson, 
Hawthorne, Nagel, and Gerken. §5 discusses the implications of the proposed psychological 
explanations on the debate about the semantics of 'knows'. Some pessimistic remarks are 
made about the prospects of defending invariantism with such psychological explanations. §6 
concludes. 
 
The forth essay, entitled 'Excuses and Epistemic Norms', steps into a debate in current 
epistemology about the epistemic conditions under which it is permissible to employ p as a 
premise in one's practical reasoning (or, equivalently, permissible to treat p as certain in one's 
decision making). It has been argued that it is epistemically permissible to employ p as a 
premise in one's practical reasoning only if one knows that p (the 'knowledge norm of 
practical reasoning'). This proposal has faced fierce criticism, with it often being suggested 
that there are counterexamples to the claim in the form of cases where subjects act on the 
misleading appearance of conformity with the norm. Those who defend the knowledge norm 
of practical reasoning attempt to shore up their theory against these would-be 
counterexamples by appealing to the distinction between being justified and being excused. 
Subjects who act on the misleading appearance of conformity to the knowledge norm may not 
be blameworthy or criticisable, it is argued, but this does not show that the relevant norm does 
not hold, for such subjects are merely to be excused for their transgressions, and excusable 
transgressions are not counterexamples to the norm. This 'excuse maneuverer' has also met 
with considerable criticism, and those who reject it take the would-be counterexamples to 
motivate weaker epistemic norms of practical reasoning demanding, for example, only that 
subjects reasonably believe that which they act on. Yet it has been suggested that these weaker 
norms will face would-be counterexamples of precisely the same kind, and thus also require 
an appeal to the justification/excuse distinction. Do they? This essay explores this question 
and answers it in the affirmative. The essay is divided into three parts. In §1 the knowledge 
norm is introduced, the alleged counterexamples it faces are surveyed, and the appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction is discussed. It is argued that extant objections to appealing to 
the distinction to defend the knowledge norm of either unpersuasive or inconclusive. In §2 the 
weaker proposed norms are surveyed, and some important common features are drawn out. 
Following this, two ways of arguing for parallel would-be counterexamples to these weaker 
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norms are presented. Considerations from cases where subjects have misleading higher-order 
evidence, and considerations from Williamsonian anti-luminosity arguments, are explored as 
potential generators of would-be counterexamples. It is argued that those who endorse the 
weaker norms will indeed also have to appeal to the justification/excuse distinction, and that 
this fact undermines the force of their objections to the knowledge norm. However, it is also 
argued that we have nevertheless as yet been given no motivation for preferring to draw the 
distinction at the level of knowledge, rather than somewhere else, and vice versa. 
 
The fifth essay, entitled 'From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And 
Beyond', attempts to do two things. Firstly, in §1, to argue that knowledge is the norm of 
belief in the sense that it is epistemically permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p. 
And secondly, in §2, to give an account of why knowledge, rather than something else, is the 
norm of belief. The argument of §1 departs from the assumption that it is irrational to believe 
Moorean conjunctions of the form 'p, but I don't know that p'. From this, it is argued, it 
follows that it is irrational to believe that p if one knows that one does not know that p. I argue 
that, given this latter fact, it follows that it is impermissible to believe that p if one does not 
know that p, because it is only when one has an excuse for believing that p without knowing 
that p - the excuse being that one did not know that one was doing so - that it is rational to do 
so, and were it permissible to believe that p without knowing that p, one would not need an 
excuse in order to rationally do so. I conclude that it is permissible to believe that p only if 
one knows that p. Since it is uncontroversial that it is permissible to believe that p if one know 
that p, it uncontroversially follows that knowledge is the norm of belief in the sense that it is 
permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p. With the knowledge norm of belief in hand, 
§2 addresses the 'why?' question - why it knowledge, rather than something else, the norm of 
belief? One promising answer to this question, I suggest, can be found from the conjunction 
of the views that knowledge is fallible safe belief, that belief is a functional kind with 
constitutive connections with decision making dispositions, and that we employ a heuristic of 
often treating uncertainties as certainties for the purposes of decision making. Taking 
uncertainties as certain in one's decision making introduces a kind of epistemic risk to the 
actions that result from that decision making. Lest the epistemic norms of belief license 
foreseeably unhelpful decision making procedures, it is argued, we should expect there to be 
restrictions on when it is permissible to take uncertainties as certain. Conforming to a rule that 
states that one is permitted to believe that p iff one knows that p (and thus, given the 
constitutive connections between belief and decision making dispositions, permitted to treat 
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uncertainties as certain in one's decision making iff one knows that p), is, I argue, a good 
policy to have, given our needs and limitations. And this explains, at least in part, why it is 
permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p. §3 considers and replies to objections. §4 
concludes. 
 
 
The Broader Context 
 
 
The publication in 2000 of Timothy Williamson's 'Knowledge and Its Limits' has proven to be 
a landmark event in contemporary epistemology. I have heard it remarked that prior to the 
publication of that book epistemology had acquired a reputation for being a rather stagnant 
area of philosophical theorizing, obsessed with a degenerative research programme of 
offering ever more convoluted analyses of knowledge in terms of more basic constitutive 
parts in an effort to solve 'the Gettier problem'. Whether or not that is a fair characterisation, 
the novelty of Knowledge and Its Limits was to turn this approach on its head. Knowledge, 
Williamson argued, is not to be understood in terms of more basic constitutive parts, but 
instead to be taken as a primitive in our theorising, and other philosophically interesting 
phenomenon understood in terms of it. This 'knowledge-first' inversion of the traditional order 
has resulted in a proliferation of work exploring new avenues of epistemological thought, and 
several of the essays in this dissertation can be seen as efforts to contribute to this ongoing 
exploration. Most obviously the essays 'Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The 
Metaphysical Roles Of Knowledge', 'Excuses And Epistemic Norms', and 'From Moore's 
Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond'. Each of these essays focuses on 
questions about what normative or metaphysical roles knowledge might play - on the 
normative side as providing the conditions for permissible belief and practical reasoning, and 
on the metaphysical side, as being the condition under which one has p as evidence, and can 
Φ for the reason that p. As the reader will see, I am rather more optimistic about the normative 
role of knowledge than I am about the metaphysical roles.  
 
Not all the work in this dissertation can be traced back to discussions inspired, or 
reinvigorated, by Knowledge and Its Limits. The impetus for answering the question of what 
psychological mechanisms might explain the error-salience phenomenon, discussed in 'Might 
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The Simulation Heuristic Influence Knowledge Attribution?', finds its origins in debates about 
the semantics of 'knows' that have been ongoing since early in the second half on the 20th 
century. Debates which have, in turn, been largely driven by a desire to answer sceptical 
concerns about the possibility of knowledge first posed by Descartes. The view defended in 
'An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment'; that knowledge is pragmatically 
encroached upon, also first came about, at least in part, as a result of this debate (though the 
early development of the view by Fantl and McGrath doesn't fit neatly into this conception of 
history).  
 
These five essays are some of many written over the course of the last four years I have spent 
grappling with epistemological issues. The earliest of them - 'An Existential Argument For 
Pragmatic Encroachment' - was largely written across late 2010 and early 2011. In contrast, 
the most recent - 'From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond' - 
was written almost entirely in late 2014. Although the reader may occasionally get the 
opposite impression, I have very few, if any, settled opinions about the matters that this 
dissertation discusses. The essays are best viewed as a series of snapshots of an ongoing 
process of investigation. Of course, one of the disadvantages of such a diachronic series of 
snapshots is that it is liable to reveal tensions between one's earlier and more recent thought. 
Here I mention three. 
 
I express some pessimism towards (if not outright rejection of) the equation of evidence and 
knowledge in 'Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The Metaphysical Roles Of 
Knowledge', yet I also argue that knowledge is the norm of belief in 'From Moore's Paradox 
To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond'. But there may be reason to think the former 
motivates the latter. It is rather odd to think that one could have p as evidence without being 
epistemically permitted to believe that p, and similarly odd to think that one could be 
epistemically permitted to believe that p without having also having p as evidence for further 
inquiry. This is one of many lines of thought that I have been unable to pursue in the 
dissertation, but hope to in future work. Another tension might be thought to exist between the 
argument I offer in favour of pragmatic encroachment, and the explanation I give of why 
knowledge is the norm of belief. The former relies on some tenets of traditional Bayesian 
decision theory that the latter, one might think, gives us reason to be suspicious of.  This too is 
an issue I hope to investigate in future work. Lastly, in 'Excuses and Epistemic Norms' I 
suggest that we have thus far been given no reason to draw the distinction between justifiably 
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employing p in one's practical reasoning and excusably doing so at the level of knowledge, 
rather than mere reasonable belief. But if it is permissible to believe that p iff you know that 
p, then given certain plausible conceptions of the nature of belief, it follows that the 
distinction should in fact be drawn at the level of knowledge. Again, I hope to investigate this 
issue in future work. 
 
No doubt there are other tensions that I have failed to recognise. Nevertheless, I hope that 
these essays manage, in a small way, to push forward some lines of epistemological inquiry. 
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I. Pragmatic Encroachment 
 
 
 
A traditional view in epistemology has it that whether an individual's true belief that p counts 
as knowledge or not depends only on truth-directed factors such as evidence, sensitivity to 
truth across possible worlds, reliability of belief forming process, and coherence consideration 
such as whether the individual has doxastic defeaters. On this view, considerations from the 
domain of practical rationality have direct no bearing on the possession, or otherwise, of 
knowledge. The traditional view has recently been challenged. Jason Stanley (2005), John 
Hawthorne (2004), and Jeremy Fantl & Matt McGrath (2002, 2007, 2009) have all argued that 
there is 'pragmatic encroachment' on knowledge. That is, whether an individual knows that p 
is determined, in part, by practical facts about the individual such as the consequences for 
them of being wrong about p. Thus far, pragmatic encroachment (hereafter 'PE') has been 
primarily defended by appealing to 'knowledge-action principles'.1 Such principles purport to 
capture important connections between epistemic states and practical rationality in the form of 
epistemic norms of practical reasoning. A number of different principles have been proposed. 
What they all have in common is that each claims that knowing that p is either a necessary or 
sufficient condition (or both) for a subject to be epistemically justified in acting on p, or 
relying on p in their decision making. Stanley (2005) and Hawthorne (2004) argue that 
knowledge is necessary, Fantl and McGrath (2009) argue that knowledge is sufficient, and 
Stanley and Hawthorne (2008) argue that knowledge is necessary and sufficient. Another 
thing the principles have in common is that they all make universal claims; each principle is 
claimed to hold for all subjects in all worlds at all times. 
 
These authors have used their knowledge-action principles to argue for PE. Fantl and 
McGrath (2009) argue that if fallibilism is true - if a subject can know that p even though p 
has an epistemic probability, for the subject, of less than 1 - then PE must also be true. The 
                                                 
1 Another way that pragmatic encroachers have argued for their view is to present pairs of cases where the 
subject has the same evidence in each case, but much more is at stake for her about being right in one case 
than the other. They then argue that, intuitively, the subject knows that p in the low stakes scenario, but not 
in the high stakes scenario, and infer PE from this. This sort of argument can be found in Stanley (2005), 
amongst others. I won't have anything to say about such arguments here, except to note that empirical 
investigation has not yet returned a settled view on the claims about intuitiveness made in the course of the 
arguments. See, e.g. Schaffer & Knobe (2012), Stanley & Sripada (2012) et al. 
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argument goes like this:2 if fallibilism is true, and it is true that as the practical stakes rise a 
subject needs a stronger epistemic position with respect to p in order to be justified in acting 
on p, then there exist case pairs which differ only in the stakes in which a subject knows that p 
in the lows stakes scenario, but is not in a good enough position with respect to p to be justify 
in acting on it in the high stakes scenario. Given that knowledge that p is sufficient for a 
subject to be justified in acting on p, it follows that the high stakes subject does not know that 
p. Since the low stakes subject does know that p, and the only difference between the high and 
low stakes subjects is in the practical stakes, it follows that knowledge depends, in part, on 
practical stakes, and hence that PE is true. Brown (2013) suggests that one can also argue for 
the same conclusion using a necessity direction knowledge-action principle. In this case the 
argument will be abductive, claiming that the best explanation of why the subject's warrant 
for p is not good enough for her to be justified in acting on p is because she fails to meet a 
necessary condition on being so justified; she does not know that p. This sort of argument 
may be at work in Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005). 
 
These arguments have generated a great deal of discussion, much of it negative. Jessica 
Brown (2008), Ram Neta (2009), Baron Reed (2010), Stephen Schiffer (2007) and Mikkel 
Gerken (2011) all argue that the relevant knowledge-action principles are subject to 
counterexamples, and hence false. Their falsity, it is claimed, significantly undermines the 
case for PE. PE theorists have offered responses to the apparent counterexamples, and there is 
an ongoing debate over their status.3 What seems to have gone largely unnoticed so far, 
however,4 is that one needn't appeal to universal knowledge-action principles to defend PE. 
PE theory does not claim that practical consequences always affect knowledge, but rather that 
they can sometimes do so. As long as there are at least some possible cases of practical 
consequences affecting knowledge in the relevant way, PE is true.5 In theory, the view can be 
defended with an existential argument. I'm going to claim that, in this case, what is true in 
theory is also true in practice.6  
 
                                                 
2 The reconstruction of Fantl and McGrath's argument that I'm about to present is borrowed from Brown 
(2008). 
3 This issue is discussed in detail in the forth essay of this dissertation - 'Excuses And Epistemic Norms' 
4 An exception is Weatherson (2011, 2012) 
5As Weatherson (2011) points out, one could hardly claim that practical consequences always affect 
knowledge, since when one has no evidence whatsoever for the truth of p one will not know that p, 
irrespective of the practical circumstances. 
6 The argument of this essay isn't one that can motivate invariantist PE theories over contextualism, or vice 
versa. But it is compatible with both. 
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If I'm right, and PE theory can be defended with an existential argument, this has important 
ramifications for the debate. Much ink has been spilled arguing for and against the proposed 
knowledge-action principles. However, whilst the question of just what epistemic norms 
govern practical rationality is an interesting one in its own right, for the purposes of 
establishing the truth or falsity of PE the debate is unnecessary. Let the proposed knowledge-
action principles all be false, or let there be no universal knowledge-action principles; this 
doesn't imperil the case for PE when it is argued for using an existential. Counterexamples to 
the universal principles don't affect the existential argument: provided that there is at least one 
case of stakes affecting knowledge in the relevant way, PE is true. Moreover, the kind of 
existential I will use to argue for PE is entailed by, but does not entail, the knowledge-action 
principles Fantl, McGrath, Stanley and Hawthorne defend. In defending PE theory using 
universal principles, these authors take on additional theoretical commitments that are 
unnecessary to establish their conclusions. Insofar as these additional commitments are 
controversial, extant arguments for PE have been needlessly mired in controversy. 
Accordingly, PE theorists ought to prefer arguing from the existential to arguing from 
universal principles. In doing so, they rely on a logically weaker, and so dialectically stronger, 
premise. One that isn't subject to the criticisms found in the literature. 
 
 
 
 
II. An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment 
 
 
 
 
So, suppose that there are case pairs that differ only in the stakes that have the following three 
features: (a.) the subject knows that p in the low stakes scenario. (b.) if she knows that p in the 
high stakes scenario, then p is warranted enough to justify the subject in Φ-ing the high stakes 
scenario, and (c.) p isn't warranted enough to justify her in Φ-ing the high stakes scenario.7 If 
                                                 
7 The locution 'p is warranted enough to justify Φ-ing' is borrowed from Fantl and McGrath (2009). A 
proposition is warranted enough to justify you Φ-ing, according to Fantl and McGrath, when no weakness 
in your epistemic position with respect to p stands in the way of p justifying you in Φ-ing. That is: your 
epistemic position with respect to p is strong enough that p can justify you in Φ-ing. That doesn't 
necessarily mean that p will justify you in Φ-ing. When there isn't an appropriate connection between p and 
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such case pairs are possible, then PE is true. The low stakes subject knows that p. Given that, 
if she knows that p in the high stakes scenario, p is warranted enough to justify the high stakes 
subject in Φ-ing, if p isn't warranted enough to justify her in Φ-ing in the high stakes scenario, 
it follows that the high stakes subject doesn't know that p. Since the cases differ only in the 
stakes, and there is a difference in knowledge between the low stakes subject and the high 
stakes subject, it follows that practical consequences can affect knowledge in the relevant 
way, and that PE is true. Notice that the previous arguments given for PE in the literature - 
those that argue from knowledge-action principles - entail that such case pairs must be 
possible. But the converse does not hold: the possibility of such case pairs does not entail that 
the relevant knowledge-action principles are true, or that those arguments succeed. In this 
sense, the existential claim that such case pairs are possible make for a logically weaker, and 
hence dialectically stronger, premise in an argument for PE. 
 
Could such case pairs exist? I think they could. In the proceeding argument, I'm going to 
assume that a particular kind of fallibilism is true of knowledge; that a subject, S, can know 
that p when p has an epistemic probability of less than 1 for S. So the conclusion of the 
argument is going to be a conditional: if fallibilism is true, then so is PE. Of course, some will 
reject the antecedent. It's not feasible to get into the fallibilism/infallibilism debate here. But 
fallibilism is a widely enough held view that the conclusion ought to be of considerable 
                                                                                                                                                        
Φ-ing, your warrant for p, even if it is strong enough to justify you, won't justify you, because p isn't the 
kind of thing that can justify Φ-ing.  'Φ-ing' includes believing, doing, preferring, wanting, liking, hating, 
and intending, amongst other things. Roughly speaking, anything one can do that can be evaluated in terms 
of it's rationality. One might wonder just what it means to say a subject is justified or unjustified in Φ-ing. 
Fantl and McGrath (2009) conceive of things as follows: just as it makes sense to ask whether someone's 
belief that p is justified or unjustified, so it makes sense to ask whether you are epistemically justified in 
doing some action, or having some attitude, Φ. If someone believes that p without any evidence then their 
belief is epistemically criticisable: they lack sufficient warrant to be epistemically justified in believing that 
p. Similarly, if someone performs some action, or holds some attitude Φ, their motivating reason for Φ-ing 
being that they believe that p, if they have no evidence for the truth of p, then their action or attitude is 
epistemically criticisable: they lack sufficient warrant for p for it to justify them Φ-ing. Here's an example. 
Suppose an onlooker sees me selling my lottery ticket to a friend for 10p. The onlooker may ask why I am 
selling my ticket. If I cite my belief that my ticket will lose as my motivating reason for selling the ticket, 
then my belief in the truth of the proposition 'my ticket will lose' becomes open to epistemic evaluation in 
connection to my action of selling the ticket. Suppose I've got no evidence that my ticket is a losing one. 
Then one way the onlooker can criticise my action - my selling the ticket - is by pointing out that I've got 
no good reason to believe that my ticket will lose. If they do criticise me in that way, they are offering an 
epistemic criticism of my action - they are pointing out that I am not well enough epistemically positioned 
with respect to the proposition 'my ticket will lose' for it to justify me selling the ticket for 10p. 
Equivalently, p isn't warranted enough for me to justify me selling the ticket. Conversely, if I somehow 
know that my ticket will lose (say I know that the lottery is rigged), then I can respond to the onlooker's 
criticism by saying: 'actually, I know that my ticket will lose', and thereby nullify their criticism. When I am 
in a sufficiently good epistemic position with respect to a proposition p, p is warranted enough to justify me 
Φ-ing. And if p is the kind of that can conclusively justify Φ-ing, then p justifies me Φ-ing.  
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interest nevertheless.8 
 
So consider the following: Sarah is told by Rosanagh, who is an honest woman, and a reliable 
testifier on such matters, that the scheduled date of the next Nico Muhly London concert is 
April 10th (hereafter let 'p' mean 'the scheduled date of the next Nico Muhly London concert 
is April 10th'). Sarah doesn't care whether p is true or not, and isn't planning to do anything 
with the information. Nevertheless, she knows that Rosanagh is honest and a reliable testifier, 
so she forms the belief that p. It turns out that p is true, and that Rosanagh knows that it is. 
Given these things - and assuming, as we are, fallibilism about knowledge - it is reasonable to 
think that Sarah knows that p. We are often happy to ascribe knowledge to people who form 
their beliefs on the basis of reliable but fallible testifiers, and this is what Sarah has done. 
Fallibilists should accept that, ceteris paribus, Sarah can know that p. Denying this would 
have unappealingly sceptical ramifications. 
 
Now suppose that Eleanor has the same evidence as Sarah for the truth of p - Rosanagh also 
told her that p - but that her practical situation is different. Coincidently, just before she spoke 
to Rosanagh, Eleanor ran into a friend who is fond of low-stakes gambling. The friend offered 
Eleanor a gamble on whether p. She hasn't decided whether to accept it yet, and now that she 
has Rosanagh's testimony in hand, she can still do so. Eleanor's stakes are as follows: if she 
takes the gamble, and p is true, she wins 10p. But if she takes the gamble and p is false, she 
loses £5. I think the following two things are true of Eleanor (I'll defend them in the next 
section by arguing that denying them has unpalatable consequences). Firstly, p is not 
warranted enough for Eleanor to justify her accepting the gamble. Secondly, although 
Eleanor's stakes are not great, nor are they extremely unfavourable, so it is plausible that, 
were Eleanor to know that p, p would be warranted enough to justify her accepting the 
gamble. If these two things are true it follows that Eleanor doesn't know that p. 
 
So I think the following three things are true of Sarah and Eleanor's case: 
 
  (1) Sarah knows that p 
   
                                                 
8 Fantl and McGrath (2009) likewise offer this conditional as their conclusion. Stanley (2005), and 
Hawthorne (2004) both develop their arguments for PE from within a Williamsonian infallibilist 
framework. I believe that the argument I provide in this essay can be adapted for a Williamsonian 
epistemology, but it isn't feasible to undertake this project here.  
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  (2) If Eleanor knows that p, p is warranted enough for Eleanor to justify her 
  accepting the gamble 
 
  (3) Given her stakes, p isn't warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the 
  gamble. 
 
The conjunction of (2) and (3) entails that Eleanor doesn't know that p. By (1), Sarah does 
know that p. As their respective situations differ only in the practical stakes, if these three 
claims are true of Sarah and Eleanor, then the case pair instantiates the state-of-affairs I 
described at the beginning of this section (albeit on an interpersonal level), and PE is true. 
 
 
 
 
III. The Traditionalist's Dilemma 
 
 
 
 
I'm going to take it as a given that (1) is true. We are assuming fallibilism, and on fallibilism it 
ought to be unproblematic to think that Sarah knows that p - her's is a perfectly normal case of 
fallible knowledge, if there is such a thing. So traditionalists will have to deny that the 
conjunction of (2) and (3) is true. They can either deny that knowledge that p would be 
sufficient for p to be warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the gamble. ('option 1'), or 
deny that p isn't warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the gamble ('option 2'). Both 
options, I will argue, incur substantial costs. Let's look at them in turn. 
 
Option 1: Deny that knowledge is sufficient for Eleanor 
 
The first option for traditionalists is to argue that even if Eleanor knows that p, given her 
stakes, p still isn't warranted enough to justify her accepting the gamble. If this is right then 
the case pair doesn't entail that Eleanor doesn't know that p, and hence doesn't force the 
conclusion that practical stakes can affect knowledge. I don't think this is a promising option 
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for traditionalists, simply because the claim is implausible. Some commentators (e.g. Brown 
(2008)) have presented cases where knowledge that p seems to be insufficient for p to be 
warranted enough to justify a subject in Φ-ing. But these cases involve stakes that are far 
higher than those Eleanor faces. In one of Brown's cases Liz wins £1 if she is right, but loses 
her home if she is wrong. In another a surgeon saves a few seconds if she is right, but runs the 
risk of doing irreparable harm to, or even causing the death of, a patient if she is wrong. 
However, whilst it would be unfortunate for Eleanor to lose £5, and whilst such a loss is more 
substantial than a gain of 10p, the loss of £5 couldn't by any stretch of the imagination be 
called significant (assuming, as we will, that Eleanor isn't very poor). Eleanor's situation does 
not have the grave character of those of Brown's subjects. Brown's examples might show that 
knowledge that p is not always sufficient for p to be warranted enough to justify a subject in 
Φ-ing, but they don't motivate the claim that knowledge is not sufficient for Eleanor. 9 
Moreover, we can provide a positive case in defence of the claim that knowledge would be 
sufficient for Eleanor by considering others cases. 
  
Firstly, there seem to be many cases where the negative consequences of being wrong are 
much greater than they are for Eleanor, but where knowledge is nevertheless intuitively 
sufficient. Consider: Sarah is running late for lunch date so she needs to drive faster if she is 
to get there on time. She is approaching a speed camera at 60mph. If she is caught speeding 
by the camera she will receive an £100 fine. It seems reasonable to say that if Sarah knows 
that the speed limit is 70mph, she is in a good enough position to go ahead and accelerate. 
Were her passenger to later criticise her for accelerating, she would be well within her rights 
to defend her behaviour by pointing out that she knew that the speed limit was 70mph. It 
would, I think, be unreasonable for her passenger to respond to this by saying 'Yes, you knew 
that the limit was 70mph. But nevertheless, you shouldn't have taken the risk'. Her passenger 
is too cautious. Here is another case: Rosanagh is working on her laptop in the library. She 
wants to go outside to smoke a cigarette, but she doesn't want to have to take her laptop with 
her, so she asks the girl sitting next to her to look after it while she's away from her desk. 
Rosanagh knows that this girl is trustworthy because they made this arrangement in the past, 
and everything went fine. It seems perfectly in order to say that if Rosanagh knows that the 
                                                 
9 Brown does provided another apparent counterexample to the knowledge-is-always-sufficient claim in 
which the stakes are not high, but rather the consequences are very heavily weighted. Liz faces a bet with 
the following pay-off structure: if p is true, she gains a million millionths of a penny. If p is false, she loses 
£3. Brown claims that intuitively, even if Liz knows that p, she would be irrational to accept the bet. I don't 
share this judgement, but even if Brown is right, this case hardly imperils the claim that knowledge is 
sufficient for Eleanor, since Eleanor's consequences are nowhere near as heavily weighted as Liz's. 
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girl will look after her laptop and won't steal it, she is in a good enough position to go ahead 
and leave on the desk while she goes out to smoke. And this is true despite the fact that losing 
her laptop will be financially costly for Rosanagh (to the tune of, say, £500), and the benefit 
gained from not having to carry it around is very minor. It seems unreasonable to criticise 
Rosanagh on the grounds that knowledge isn't enough.  
 
If it is true that as the practical stakes rise, a subject needs a stronger epistemic position with 
respect to p in order to be justified in acting on p, then it is also true that as the practical stakes 
decrease, a subject needs a less strong epistemic position with respect in order to be justified 
in acting on p than they would were the stakes higher. Accordingly, if knowledge is sufficient 
for the subjects in the above cases, then we should expect it to be sufficient for Eleanor too. 
Moreover, many cases where the stakes are roughly equivalent to those that Eleanor faces 
seem to deliver a clear-cut judgment that knowledge is sufficient. For example: 
 
 Cafe Case 
 
 Rosanagh is reading in the cafe. She wants to go outside to smoke, but she doesn't 
 want to have to take her book with her. Rosanagh asks the girl sitting next to her if she 
 will watch her book. Rosanagh would rather not take her book outside, but it will be a 
 minor inconvenience if she has to.  
  
  Q: If Rosanagh knows that the girl next to her won't steal her book, is she okay 
  to leave it? Or should she take it with her anyway? Or should she seek more 
  evidence? 
 
 Toll Road Case 
 
 Rosanagh is driving to a friend’s house. She knows a shortcut that will shave a few 
 minutes off her journey time. There are lots of toll roads in the area that charge £5. 
 But Rosanagh knows that the shortcut road isn't one of them. 
 
  Q: If Rosanagh knows that the shortcut road isn't a toll road, is she okay to take 
  it? Or should she take the longer route just in case? Or should she seek more 
  evidence? 
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 Downloading Case 
 
 Rosanagh is thinking about downloading a music file. She wouldn't pay more than 10p 
 for it were it not free, but she does want to listen to the song. If the file has a virus on 
 it, her sister will charge her £5 to disinfect the computer. Rosanagh knows that the file 
 is virus-free. 
 
  Q: If Rosanagh knows that the file is virus-free, is she okay to download it? Or 
  should  she not take the risk? Or should she seek more evidence? 
 
In each of these cases, it seems clear that if she knows, Rosanagh is okay to act on that 
knowledge. She is okay to leave the book, take the shortcut, and download the file. 
Furthermore, it would be perfectly normal for Rosanagh to defend her behaviour in each case 
by citing the relevant item of knowledge as her justifier (e.g. 'I knew she was trustworthy, 
that's why I left it with her'; 'I know the shortcut isn't a toll road, so it's fine to take it'; 'I know 
the file is virus-free. That's why I'm downloading it'), and it would be unreasonable for 
someone to criticise her on the grounds that knowledge isn't enough. The stakes just aren't 
high enough to justify such caution. 
 
Given that in each of these cases Rosanagh faces comparable stakes to Eleanor, if knowledge 
is enough for Rosanagh, then it should be enough for Eleanor too. It is counterintuitive to 
maintain that knowledge that p is not sufficient for p to justify Eleanor accepting the gamble. 
So the traditionalist who takes option 1 will have to defend counterintuitive verdicts about the 
circumstances in which a proposition is warranted enough to justify a subject in Φ-ing. Now, 
it may be that the theoretical benefits of the traditional view are weighty enough that, in the 
balance, these counterintuitive verdicts are a cost that should be borne. But they are a cost 
nevertheless, and, it seems to me, a fairly substantial one. 
 
Prima facie, though, there seems to be a couple of ways for traditionalist's to resist this 
argument. One possible objection is that the intuitions I describe relating to this option aren't 
as clear-cut as I suggest. I have claimed that intuitions quite clearly support the claim that 
knowledge that p would be sufficient for p to justify Eleanor in accepting the gamble. I cite 
some cases in favour of this judgement where, I claim, the intuition is that knowledge is 
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sufficient, and the stakes are the same or less favourable. However, one might think that we 
can easily adjust the cases to pump intuitions in the opposite direction. So for example, 
consider Sarah and her passenger. Sarah's passenger says to her: "You shouldn't have risked it, 
even though you know that the limit is 70mph. It's not worth the risk when the fine is so 
high". Is it really so clear that the passenger is being unreasonable here? Arguably not. Insofar 
as it is unclear, the case for knowledge being sufficient is partially undermined. Similarly, one 
can imagine Rosanagh's mother chastising her upon hearing that she leaves her new laptop in 
the hands of strangers. Perhaps she is right to do so. The fact that we can seemingly make 
adjustments to the cases such that intuitions pump in the other direction arguably shows that 
intuitions can't be trusted when it comes to the decision Eleanor faces. Her's is not a clear-cut 
case where knowledge is sufficient, as it would be were she to face stakes of, say, p is true: 
win £1000, p is false: lose £1. Accordingly, I haven't posed a serious problem for the 
traditional view. My argument relies on hazy intuitions. 
 
I think there are a couple of things that can be said in response to this objection. Firstly, even 
if it is true that intuitions are unclear in the first two cases, the potential loss for Eleanor is 
much lower than it is in these cases. Were a friend to criticise Eleanor's decision to accept the 
gamble by saying something like "I know that you know that p, but you shouldn't have taken 
the risk" it seems quite clear the friend is being overcautious. Eleanor would be well within 
her rights to defend her decision both by citing her relevant knowledge, and also by pointing 
out that there wasn't that much at risk - £5 isn't a lot of money. Furthermore, the three cases 
with comparable stakes to Eleanor's do seem like clear-cut cases where knowledge is 
sufficient.  
 
Secondly, there is empirical work supporting my claim that, intuitively, knowledge is 
sufficient for Eleanor. Angel Pinillos (2012) has run experiments testing how much evidence 
the folk think is needed for knowledge in a variety of stakes-shifting cases. One such case 
involves John, and whether he knows that his term paper has no typos. The high-stakes 
situation is one where John cannot get an A for his paper unless there are no typos. He needs 
an A on the paper to get an A in his class, and if he doesn't get an A in his class he will lose his 
scholarship and have to leave college, which will be devastating for himself and his family. 
Separate groups of test subjects were asked the following two questions (1.) How many times 
does John have to check his paper before he knows there are no typos? And (2.) How many 
times should John check his paper before he submits it? If, in the eyes of the folk, knowledge 
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that his paper has no typos was insufficient for John to be justified in submitting it, given his 
circumstances, we would expect test subjects to offer a higher number in response to (2) than 
in response to (1). But Pinillos found no statistically significant difference in the answers 
given. This suggests that the test subjects were treating knowledge as sufficient for action in 
John's case. Given the comparatively minor disutility of having to check his paper relative to 
having to leave college, John's stakes are clearly far less favourable than Eleanor's. 
Accordingly, one would expect knowledge to be sufficient for Eleanor to accept the gamble in 
the eyes of the folk. This lends support to my claim that we can take it as common ground that 
knowledge would be sufficient for Eleanor. 
 
There is another way of resisting the objection that epistemic certainty, or near epistemic 
certainty is necessary for Eleanor to be justified in accepting the gamble. There are not many 
things of which we are epistemically certain. Yet, there are many behaviours humans exhibit 
in day-to-day life that, when they are considered as bets, have a small positive pay-off if p is 
true, and a large negative pay-off if p is false. For example, suppose a friend asks me to run an 
errand in return for £10. Running the errand involves driving my car from A to B. Before 
deciding whether to take on the errand, I start thinking about the unpleasant possibility of 
being in a fatal car crash whilst driving from A to B, and I start thinking about whether I'm in 
a good enough epistemic position with respect to the proposition I won't be in a fatal car crash 
between A and B to be justified in accepting the errand. I need to factor the potential gains 
against the risk involved. Now, I'm not epistemically certain of the truth of the proposition I 
won't be in a fatal car crash between A and B - how could I be? - and perhaps I don't even 
know it. But I am pretty confident of it - after all, I'm a careful driver, and fatal car crashes are 
relatively rare. I decide that the possibility of a fatal car crash is small enough that I shouldn't 
worry about it. I go ahead and accept the errand, and everything goes fine - I don't die, and I 
gain £10. Now, the pay-off structure of the truth/falsity of I won't be in a fatal car crash 
between A and B is very negatively weighted - far more so than Eleanor's gamble, on the 
assumption that being in a fatal car crash is far worse than losing £5. So, should I decline to 
run the errand because I don't know that I won't be in a crash? According to the objection we 
are considering - and according to the traditionalist who takes option 1 and is consistent - if 
Eleanor shouldn't accept the gamble even if she knows that p, I ought not run the errand 
either. That seems wrong. Worse, according the traditionalist taking option 1, even if I know 
that I won't be in a crash, that still doesn't mean I should accept the errand. I should only do it 
if I am epistemically certain, or nearly epistemically certain that I won't crash. This seems 
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very much like the wrong result. We don't criticise people who get in their cars to run errands 
for risking death. Even though they don't know that they won't be in fatal car crashes.  The 
traditionalist who takes option 1 will have to claim that such everyday behaviour is 
normatively defective. But, there is nothing special about the errand example. It is comparable 
to myriad behaviours humans exhibit every day. So the traditionalist who takes option 1, and 
is consistent, will have to impute massive, and highly counterintuitive, error in our 
judgements about what it is rational to do, and what kind of warrant is needed for a possibility 
to not stand in the way of a given action being justified. Insofar as we want our epistemology 
to cohere with common sense judgments, that's not a good position for them to be in.10 
 
For these reasons, I don't think traditionalists have an easy way with option 1.11 However, 
there is another way they might motivate the claim that knowledge that p isn't sufficient for 
Eleanor. Neta (2009) presents a case where a subject knows that p, but, Neta thinks, isn't in a 
good enough epistemic position with respect to p to act on it because he doesn't believe that 
he knows that p. Neta's case involves a student who knows that p is the answer to a test 
question, but doesn't believe that he knows because he is struck by a temporary insecurity 
about the veracity of his memory. Neta claims that in this situation the student isn't in a good 
enough epistemic position with respect to p for it to justify him in answering 'p'. Now, it might 
be that the student should write 'p' as his answer anyway, given that he has nothing to lose by 
attempting an answer. But intuitively, according to Neta, it is not his knowledge of p itself that 
justifies him answering in that way. Suppose that Eleanor is in an analogous situation. She 
knows that p, but she is struck by a temporary insecurity about this being an item of 
knowledge. Arguably, in this situation, Eleanor is not in a good enough epistemic position 
with respect to p for it to justify her accepting the gamble. Does this point undermine my 
claim that knowledge is sufficient for Eleanor? Prima facie it appears to. Eleanor knows that 
p, but this knowledge isn't sufficient for p to justify her accepting the gamble. Therefore: 
                                                 
10 One might object to what I've just said by arguing that there is something importantly different about 
everyday behaviour and it's background assumptions to accepting gambles, perhaps because we don't 
consider the possibility of fatal car crashes when deciding whether to run errands, but do consider the 
possible falsity of propositions we are thinking about gambling on. But we can reformulate the point so it is 
analogous to Eleanor's situation. In the reformulated example, there are no errands involved. My friend 
offers me a gamble: If I can drive from A to B without being in a fatal car crash, he will give me £10. The 
traditionalist taking option 1 would have to have it that, even if I know that I won't be in a fatal car crash, I 
ought not accept the gamble. Again, this seems very wrong. Arguably I don't even need to know that I won't 
be in a fatal car crash to be justified in accepting the gamble. This reformulation ought to deal with that 
objection. 
11Note that once we recognise these consequences, taking option 1 leads to even more counterintuitive 
results than it first seemed. 
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knowledge isn't sufficient for Eleanor.  
 
However, troubling appearances are illusory here. The claim that if Eleanor knows that p, she 
is justified in accepting the gamble is a claim about propositional justification for Φ-ing. By 
contrast, Neta's concern is one about doxastic states and the conditions under which one 
justifiably Φs. The claim I'm making is that if Eleanor knows that p, then there is a 
proposition - p - that (propositionally) justifies Eleanor accepting the gamble. That Eleanor 
has such propositional justification is fully compatible with the possibility of her not 
justifiably Φ-ing, if she Φs. To illustrate, it is useful to analogise with the case of belief. In the 
case of belief, one can fail to justifiably believe q, because one believes q on the basis of r, 
and r isn't the kind of thing that can epistemically support a belief that q. One's belief is ill 
founded. Yet it can nevertheless remain true that there is some proposition p, which does 
(propositionally) justify a belief that q. Similarly, one can (perhaps) fail to be justified in 
believing that q, because one believes q on the basis of p, but one doubts that one knows, or is 
justified in believing, p. It can nevertheless remain true that p propositionally justifies a belief 
that q. Carrying this over, suppose that Eleanor Φs, and that her reason for Φ-ing is p, but, as 
in Neta's case, she doubts that she knows that p. Then it may be that she is criticisable for Φ-
ing, since she doubted that she knew that p. Does that mean that p doesn't (propositionally) 
justify Eleanor Φ-ing? No. It only means, at most, that she failed to meet some necessary 
doxastic condition on properly using p as a motivating reason for Φ-ing. But, just as in the 
case of belief, there is no relevant connection - of the kind a Neta style objection requires - 
between meeting certain doxastic conditions on properly using a proposition as a motivating 
reason to perform some action Φ, and that proposition (propositionally) justifying Φ-ing. It 
remains true that, if Eleanor knows that p, p justifies Eleanor accepting the gamble, even if 
she doubts that she knows that p. The Neta style objection misses the mark.12 
 
It seems to me then that traditionalists will have a hard time escaping the first horn of the 
dilemma. Denying that knowledge would be sufficient for Eleanor requires committing 
oneself to counterintuitive verdicts about knowledge, and the conditions under which it can 
justify action. 
                                                 
12 I should note that I'm not claiming that this objection is one Neta has, or would, make against the claim 
that knowledge is sufficient for Eleanor. His original target was a similar, but subtly different, principle 
espoused in Hawthorne and Stanley (2008). The reason I have included discussion of the objection it 
because it seems like an objection one might wish to make to my claim that knowledge is sufficient for 
Eleanor. 
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Option 2: Claim that p is warranted enough for Eleanor 
 
The other option available to the traditionalist is to argue that, contrary to my claim, p is 
warranted enough for Eleanor to justify her accepting the gamble. Is it? I said earlier that 
Rosanagh is a reliable testifier about whether p. That was true. But like all testifiers, 
Rosanagh sometimes gets things wrong. It turns out that the epistemic probability of p for 
Eleanor on Rosanagh's testimony, is .98 (as it is for Sarah).13 So standard Bayesian decision 
theory has it that the expected monetary return for Eleanor, given her stakes and epistemic 
probability, is -20 pence. Now, in order to answer the question of whether p is warranted 
enough for Eleanor to justify her accepting the gamble, we need to know a few things about 
her. In particular, we need to know what her preferences are, and what her level of risk-
aversion is. If it turned out that, bizarrely, Eleanor wants to lose money, then it may well be 
that p is warranted enough to justify her accepting the gamble. However, it is open to us to 
make some stipulations about Eleanor. Specifically, I'm going to stipulate the following three 
things are true of her: 
 
 (a) Eleanor is risk-neutral when it comes to accepting or declining the gamble 
 
 (b) Eleanor's preferences are Bayesian; so she prefers to accept the gamble if doing so 
 has positive expected monetary return, reject it if accepting it has negative expected 
 monetary return, and is indifferent to accepting or rejecting it if accepting/rejecting it 
 has an expected monetary return of £0.00. 
 
 (c) Each penny gained has +1 util of value for Eleanor, and each penny lost has -1 util 
 of value for her. 
 
You might worry that, now that I've shared this information about Eleanor, it is no longer 
intuitive that were she to know that p, p would be warranted enough for Eleanor to justify her 
accepting the gamble. I don't think this is a serious concern. If I had suddenly stipulated 
something unusual about Eleanor, such that she in fact preferred to lose money from the bet, 
or that she is massively risk averse, then there would, of course, be grounds for complaint. 
                                                 
13Remember that we are assuming fallibilism, so it shouldn't be problematic to think that Sarah can know 
that p with a .98 epistemic probability for p. 
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But the stipulations made here about Eleanor are not unusual. They describe the preferences 
of an average person. And as such, it is safe to suppose that they are very similar to the 
assumptions that we would have made about Eleanor when assessing whether knowledge that 
p would have rendered p sufficiently warranted to justify her in accepting the gamble. 
Moreover, as we saw earlier, it seems intuitive that knowledge that p makes p sufficiently 
warrant to justify the actions of subjects who face far less favourable stakes than Eleanor. 
 
Given these stipulations, what follows? The first thing to note is that, given her preferences, 
odds, and epistemic probability for p, accepting the gamble has a negative expected utility for 
Eleanor of -20 utils. So, assuming that everything is in order with the expected utility 
principle,14 it would be irrational for Eleanor to accept the gamble. She shouldn't do it. Now, 
given her preferences, if there is any item of information that would epistemically justify 
Eleanor accepting the gamble, were she epistemically well positioned towards it, it is the truth 
of p itself. So, if p is warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the gamble, p 
epistemically justifies her accepting the gamble. However, it follows from the stipulations that 
p epistemically justifies Eleanor accepting the gamble only if accepting it has positive 
expected monetary return. But accepting the gamble doesn't have positive expected monetary 
return for Eleanor. So p doesn't epistemically justify her accepting the gamble.15 Given that p 
is warranted enough to justify her accepting the gamble only if p epistemically justifies her 
accepting the gamble, it follows that p isn't warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the 
gamble. Here is that reasoning in numbered-premises form: 
                                                 
14 Note that I'm not saying that the expected utility principle is right for all decision cases. As long as it 
works in this case, that's enough. 
15 I'm assuming here that a proposition p can't epistemically justify a subject S Φ-ing if S's epistemic 
position with respect to p is such that, given her preferences, it is irrational for S to Φ, but were S to have a 
better epistemic position with respect to p, it would be rational for her to Φ. The reason I think this is true is 
because one of the roles propositions can play when they epistemically justify actions is as things that can 
be cited in defence, and repudiation, of criticisms of Φ-ing, as in the following example: person A: "You 
shouldn't have sold your lottery ticket because you didn't know that it would lose"; person B (in response): 
"You're wrong, I was justified in selling the ticket because I knew that the lottery was rigged against me". 
Person A criticises person B's action - her selling the lottery ticket - on the grounds that B didn't know that 
the ticket would lose. B defends her action by pointing out that she was in a good enough epistemic 
position with respect to the proposition 'my ticket will lose' for it to justify her selling it. By contrast, if S 
shouldn't Φ - and is thus open to criticism for Φ-ing - because it is irrational for her to Φ, but it is also true 
that were she to have a better epistemic position with respect to p, she would not be irrational to Φ, then she 
can't properly cite p (or her epistemic position with respect to p) in defence or repudiation of the criticism 
that she shouldn't have Φ'ed, because Φ-ing was irrational, given her evidence for p, and she shouldn't have 
done it. However, were she to have been in a good enough epistemic position with respect to p for it to 
justify her Φ-ing, then she could have cited this fact to repudiate the criticism. As she can't properly cite it 
to repudiate the criticism, she isn't in a good enough position with respect to p for it to justify her Φ-ing. No 
doubt there is a lot more to be said about the link between propositions-as-justifiers and rationality. That's 
not a discussion I can get into here. But it seems that, at least in Eleanor's case (one where consequentialism 
plausibly holds), the link I'm assuming is quite hard to deny. 
 28 
 
 (4) If p is warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the gamble, then p 
 epistemically justifies Eleanor accepting the gamble16 
 
 (5) P epistemically justifies Eleanor accepting the gamble only if accepting the gamble 
 has positive expected monetary return for Eleanor. 
 
 (6) Accepting the gamble doesn't have positive expected monetary return for Eleanor 
 
 (7) Therefore: p doesn't epistemically justify Eleanor accepting the gamble 
  
 (8) Therefore: p isn't warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the gamble. 
 
The conclusion (8) is that option 2 in untenable. In order to avoid it traditionalists will have to 
deny (4), (5), or (6). Premise (6) is, I take it, not open to dispute, since it is widely accepted 
that standard Bayesianism yields accurate verdicts on expected monetary return. That leaves 
traditionalists with (4) and (5). There are a couple of possible ways to deny (4), but neither of 
them is very compelling. Firstly, one could claim that evidence for p is simply not the kind of 
thing that can epistemically justify a subject accepting a gamble on p, in the same way that, 
say, evidence that Barack Obama is the president of the United States is not the kind of thing 
that can justify a belief that Jupiter has moons. Traditionalists could claim that there is no 
appropriate connection between p and being epistemically justified in accepting a gamble on 
p. But it is very hard to see why anyone would think that is true. If someone is challenged as 
to why they accepted a gamble on p, and responds by saying that they accepted it because 
they know that p is true, then it seems as though they have provided a perfectly legitimate 
justifier of their accepting the gamble. To claim that the fact that they knew that p was 
irrelevant to whether they were epistemically justified in accepting the gamble is extremely 
odd. One would, I think, have a hard time motivating such a claim.  
 
Another, more subtle, way of denying (4) is to concede that p is the kind of thing that can 
epistemically justify Eleanor accepting the gamble - that is, concede that there is an 
appropriate connection - but deny the entailment relation between p's being warranted enough 
                                                 
16 Note that the relevant species of justification here is propositional, rather than doxastic. 
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to justify accepting the gamble, and p's epistemically justifying Eleanor accepting the gamble. 
Jonathan Ichikawa (2012) asks us to consider the following scenario: Detective Stanley 
knows that the burglar came through the window. That the burglar came through the window 
is something that speaks in favour of arresting Smith, who is infamous for burgling houses by 
coming through the window, and it is amongst the things that will justify Stanley arresting 
Smith, if he arrests him. Clearly however, simply knowing that the burglar came through the 
window is insufficient reason for Stanley to arrest Smith. But that isn't because he needs a 
better epistemic position with respect to his belief that the burglar came through the window. 
He's epistemically fine with respect to the proposition. The problem is that he needs more 
evidence of a different kind. The point is that p can be the kind of thing that speaks in favour 
of Φ-ing, and can be warranted enough to justify Φ-ing, yet fail to justify Φ-ing, because p 
isn't a sufficient reason to Φ. Traditionalists might want to try to apply this point to premise 
(4). The thought would be that, whilst the truth of p can be amongst the things that justify 
accepting a gamble on p, even if Eleanor is warranted enough with respect to p for it to justify 
her accepting the gamble, she nevertheless isn't, all things considered, justified in accepting 
the gamble, since there is a lacuna between p being warranted enough to justify her accepting 
the gamble, and her actually being justified in accepting the gamble.  
 
I find it hard to see how that line of argument can work though in this particular case though. 
Whilst there may well be many cases where such a lacuna is present, it's hard to see why 
Eleanor's case would be one of them. What would explain the gap between p being warranted 
enough to justify her, and p justifying her? We would want some motivation for thinking that 
such a gap exists, and it is not apparent what this motivation could be. It seems to me, then, 
that it is difficult to motivate this objection to premise (4). 
 
Traditionalists might do better to try denying (5). But it's hard to see how this could be 
plausibly denied either. Given her preferences and the link we are assuming between 
rationality and propositions-as-justifiers, a minimal constraint on Eleanor being epistemically 
justified in accepting the gamble is that is reasonable for her to believe that accepting it has 
positive expected monetary return. That it isn't true that accepting the gamble has positive 
expected monetary return needn't, in itself, mean that Eleanor could not reasonably believe 
that it is true; subjects can, I take it, have reasonable false beliefs. But reasonable false beliefs 
come about when the subject has some kind of misleading evidence pointing towards the 
beliefs truth, and blamelessly follows that evidence. There is no reason to think that Eleanor is 
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blamelessly misled in the case I've described, even if she erroneously believes that accepting 
the gamble has positive expected monetary return. Moreover, we can simply stipulate that 
Eleanor's credence matches her epistemic probability, and that she has no misleading evidence 
of the kind that would render her blameless in believing such a thing, were she to believe that. 
Given these stipulations, there is little motivation for the claim that Eleanor can have a false, 
but reasonable, belief that she is justified in accepting the gamble, and little motivation for 
denying premise (5). So it looks, then, like option 2 is a hard one to take. To take it requires 
rejecting plausible links between rationality, expected utility, and the role of propositions 
justifiers of action. 
 
 
 
IV. Summing up. 
 
 
 
 
I have argued that Sarah knows that p, that if Eleanor knew that p, p would be warranted 
enough for Eleanor to justify her accepting the gamble, and that, given her stakes, p isn't 
warranted enough to justify Eleanor accepting the gamble. If these claims are correct, it 
follows that PE is true, since the only difference between Sarah and Eleanor is how much is at 
stake for them with respect to p being true, yet Sarah knows that p and Eleanor does not. 
 
The case of Sarah and Eleanor presents traditionalists who accept fallibilism with a dilemma. 
In order to block the conclusion that practical stakes affect knowledge, they must deny at least 
one of two claims. The first denial - that knowledge would be sufficient for Eleanor - commits 
them to imputing massive, and highly counterintuitive, error in our judgements about what 
kind of warrant is needed for a possibility to not stand in the way of a given action being 
justified. Insofar as we want our epistemology to cohere with common sense judgement, this 
is a serious theoretical cost. The second denial - that p isn't warranted enough to justify 
Eleanor - puts them into conflict with Bayesian decision theory. This too is a serious 
theoretical cost. It is not obvious to me which option traditionalists should take to escape the 
horns of this dilemma, and any option will burden them with theoretical costs. If no option 
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can be plausibly taken, we should accept PE. The existential argument - along with the 
attendant dilemma - is quite different in form to arguments for PE currently found in the 
literature, and the criticisms levelled against those arguments don't have force against this 
one. One may well raise objections to any putative universal norms linking knowledge and 
practical rationality, but these objections won't affect the argument given here, since it only 
relies on the claim that knowledge is sufficient for action in certain conditions. In that respect 
it relies on a weaker premise. For this reason, it seems to me that PE theorists should prefer 
the argument given here. 
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2. Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And 
The Metaphysical Roles Of Knowledge 
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I. The metaphysical roles of knowledge 
 
 
 
 
Recent epistemology has largely turned away from the project of attempting a 
decompositional conceptual analysis of knowledge and toward investigation of the normative 
and metaphysical roles that knowledge might uniquely play. To this end, on the normative 
side, it has been argued that knowledge is, variously, the 'norm' of belief (Sutton 2007, 
Williamson 2013, Littlejohn 2013), assertion (Williamson 2000, et al), and practical reasoning 
(Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, Fantl and McGrath 2002, 2007, 2009, et al). On the 
metaphysical side, Williamson (2000) argues that one's total evidence17 includes all and only 
those propositions that one knows to be true ('E=K'), and Hyman (1999, 2006) argues that the 
fact that p can be S's reason for Φ-ing iff S knows that p: 
 
 E=K: p is part of S's total evidence iff S knows that p 
 
 reasons-knowledge thesis: the fact that p can be S's reason for Φ-ing iff S   
            knows that p 
 
In this essay, I focus on these two claims about the metaphysical roles of knowledge, and, by 
raising objections to the arguments that have been put forward in their favour, argue that they 
have not been sufficiently well motivated. In both cases, I suggest, the positive arguments fail 
for the same reason: they conflict with the results delivered by environmental luck Gettier 
cases.  
 
Both E=K and the reasons-knowledge thesis have been thought by some to have far reaching 
implications, if true. For example, Williamson argues that if E=K is true, then it is natural to 
think that one is fully justified in believing that p iff one knows that p (2013). This, of course, 
                                                 
17 What is your 'total' evidence? Hyman describes the idea as follows: "The ... claim that one’s total evidence is 
simply one’s total knowledge, involves the idea that an individual has a stock or fund of evidence, which can 
guide her assessment of hypotheses. This includes every piece of evidence a person can avail herself of, without 
regard to any particular hypothesis she may be considering at any particular time" (2006: 891-892). Hereafter, 
when I refer simply to 'evidence', I mean total evidence, unless otherwise indicated. 
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flies in the face of orthodoxy about the nature of justified belief, according to which it is 
compatible with the falsity of the proposition believed. In addition, if E=K is true, then a kind 
of infallibilism about knowledge can be motivated, for if one knows that p, then p is part of 
one's evidence, and so the probability of p on one's evidence is 1 (Williamson 2000). With 
respect to the reasons-knowledge thesis, Hyman (1999, 2006) argues that it motivates the 
thought that knowledge is best understood as a kind of ability: to know that p is to have the 
ability to  for the reason that p. In addition, one might think that it could be marshalled in 
support of the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. It is natural to think 
that if the fact that p can be one's reason for action iff one knows that p, then one should treat 
p as a reason for action iff one knows that p. And this is essentially what the knowledge norm 
of practical reasoning states. The knowledge norm of practical reasoning has, in turn, been 
employed to argue that knowledge is pragmatically encroached upon.18 
 
Moreover, it might be thought that there are important interrelations between E=K and the 
reasons-knowledge thesis. In particular, that the necessity direction of the latter entails the 
necessity direction of the former. For, granted the (admittedly controversial) thesis that facts 
are simply true propositions, there are reasons to think that if the fact that p can be one's 
reason for Φ-ing only if one knows that p, then a proposition can be part of one's evidence 
only if one knows it to be true. Why? Because if p is part of S's total evidence, then it ought to 
be the case that S is able to believe things on the basis of p. The denial of this - the claim that 
there is evidence that a subject can possess, yet not employ as a basis for further beliefs - is 
very odd indeed, since evidence seems to be precisely what rational subjects form their beliefs 
on. But S's believing that q on the basis of p is simply a case of S's believing that q for the 
reason that p. It follows, if one can believe that q for the reason that p only if one knows that 
p, that one can possess p as part of one's total evidence only if one knows that p. And this is 
the necessity direction claim of E=K. The argument just given can be expressed as follows: 
 
 (1) If p is part of S's evidence, then S can believe that q on the basis of p. 
 
 (2) If S can believe that q on the basis of p, then S can believe that q for the 
                                                 
18 For canonical defences of various version of the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, see 
Fantl & McGrath (2002, 2007, 2009), Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008). 
Hawthorne and Stanley (2008), Brown (2008) and Neta (2009) gesture at the idea that the reasons-knowledge 
thesis might be marshaled in support of the knowledge norm of practical reasoning. None, however, outright 
endorses such an argument. Note that I am not endorsing any of the proposed implications of either the reasons-
knowledge thesis, or E=K here. Rather I am merely observing that they have been made. 
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 reason that p 
 
 (3) Therefore: If p is part of S's evidence, then S can believe that q for the reason that 
 p 
 
 (4) By the reasons-knowledge thesis, S can believe that q for the reason that p only if 
 S knows that p 
 
 (5) Therefore: If p is part of S's evidence, then S knows that p. (If E, then K) 
 
As mentioned, the goal here is, by raising objections to the arguments that have been put 
forward in their favour, to argue that neither E=K, nor the reasons-knowledge thesis, is 
sufficiently well motivated. In both cases, my focus is on the (more interesting, and 
controversial) necessity directions of the biconditionals. That is, the claim that p is part of S's 
total evidence only if S knows that p, and the claim that the fact that p can be S's reason for Φ-
ing only if S knows that p. I will have nothing to say about the sufficiency directions of the 
theses. We begin by looking at the reasons-knowledge thesis, and then move on to E=K. 
 
 
 
 
II. Reasons & Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
We can draw a distinction between two types of Gettier cases. 'Environmental luck' Gettier 
cases are cases in which one's belief that p is caused, at least in part, by the fact that p, but one 
fails to know that p because one is in an environment where one could easily have falsely 
believed p, or a similar proposition p*. 'Intervening luck' Gettier cases are cases where one's 
belief is causally unconnected to the fact that p, but luck intervenes to ensure that one's belief 
is nevertheless true. The former type, I will suggest, causes trouble for the reasons-knowledge 
thesis: 
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 reasons-knowledge thesis: The fact that p can be S's reason for -ing iff   
                          S knows that p 
 
The above formulation of the thesis is taken from Hyman (1999, 2006). The thesis is central 
to his claim that knowledge is best understood as a kind of ability. The thesis is also endorsed 
by Williamson (2000), Hornsby (2007), and Littlejohn (2013). Neta (2009) and Hawthorne 
and Stanley (2008) express sympathy to it, and Unger (1975) appeals to it to argue that 
nobody has a reason for doing, thinking, or feeling anything, since, he argues, nobody knows 
anything. I'll first sketch Hyman's motivation for the thesis, then I'll further expound on the 
distinction between environmental luck Gettier cases and intervening luck Gettier cases. I'll 
then argue that environmental luck Gettier cases undermine the thesis.19 To be clear, my 
ambition here is only to show that the reasons-knowledge thesis is undermotivated by 
Hyman's considerations. I do not suggest that the considerations I provide furnish us with a 
knock-down argument against the view. Nor do I propose a rival epistemology of acting-for-
reasons. Indeed, I see no prima facie reason to expect that there exists a true biconditional 
linking the ability to  for the reason that p and any unique epistemic state, if the reasons-
knowledge thesis is false. 
 
 
2.1. Motivating the reasons-knowledge thesis 
 
 
In order to motivate the necessity direction of the reasons-knowledge thesis, Hyman (1999, 
2006) asks us to consider an example of a justified true belief that falls short of knowledge. 
Henry's belief is Gettiered: 
 
 Henry is watching the television on a June afternoon. It is Wimbledon men's 
 finals day, and the television shows McEnroe beating Connors; the score is two sets 
 to love and match point to McEnroe in the third. McEnroe wins the point. Henry 
 believes justifiably that: 
                                                 
19 I'll assume along with these authors that facts can be reasons for the purposes of this essay. Though this is, of 
course, not uncontroversial. 
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  1. I have just seen McEnroe win this year's Wimbledon final 
 
 and reasonably infers that: 
 
  2. McEnroe is this year's Wimbledon champion 
 
 Actually, however, the cameras at Wimbledon have ceased to function, and the 
 television is showing a recording of last year's match. But while it does so McEnroe 
 is in the process of repeating last year's slaughter. So Henry's belief (2) is true, and 
 surely he is justified in believing (2). But we would  hardly allow that Henry knows 
 (2). (1999: 447) 
 
Hyman then asks us to suppose that Henry recalls that his brother placed a £100 bet on 
McEnroe winning, and so infers that his brother has won £100. Is the fact that McEnroe is this 
year's champion Henry's reason for believing that his brother has won £100? Clearly not, 
thinks Hyman. His reason, Hyman claims, is only that he believes that McEnroe is this year's 
champion. Similarly, the fact that McEnroe won cannot be Henry's reason for being happy, 
angry, smug, or for congratulating his brother. Hyman takes cases like this to show that p can 
be one's reason for -ing only if one knows that p. Whenever one bears an epistemic relation 
to p weaker than knowledge - justified true belief, unjustified true belief, justified false belief, 
unjustified false belief - one's reason for -ing is not p itself, but something else. Similar 
considerations motivate the other authors who subscribe to the reasons-knowledge thesis (at 
least those who try to motivate it, rather than just endorse it - I'm thinking in particular of 
Unger (1975) and Hornsby (2007)). 20  Hyman goes on to argue that, given the reasons-
knowledge thesis, knowledge is best conceived as a kind of ability: the ability to  for the 
reason that p.  
 
Although it hasn't been remarked upon before, the point extends to other cases of non-
knowledge-constituting justified true beliefs that don't have the kind of double-luck structure 
found in Gettier cases.21 Consider the following: 
                                                 
20 Unger (1975) also appeals to linguistic data about the felicity of assertions to argue for the thesis. I won't 
discuss this here; though see Littlejohn (2012) for critical commentary. 
21  The double luck is this: the subject is unlucky to be in a scenario that is not conducive to knowledge 
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 Sarah holds a ticket in a 1 million ticket lottery where only one ticket will win, and 
 every ticket has an equal chance of winning. The draw has been made, and Sarah's 
 ticket did not win, but Sarah has not seen the results yet. On the basis of the 
 probabilities involved, Sarah believes that her ticket is a loser. 
 
Many epistemologists have found it natural to say that Sarah's belief that her ticket is a loser 
is justified when based on the probabilities involved, but not knowledge. (Kyburg (1970), 
Klein (1985), Foley (1993), Lewis (1996), Hawthorne (2004), Pritchard (2007) et al). 22 
Insofar as it is, Sarah has a justified true belief that her ticket is a loser, but does not know 
this. Now suppose that upon forming her belief that her ticket is a loser, Sarah becomes 
disappointed. Is the fact that her ticket is a loser Sarah's reason for being disappointed? Surely 
it is not.  
 
2.2. Two types of Gettier case 
 
 
Hyman's McEnroe case is a Gettier case where the subject's belief that p is entirely causally 
unrelated to the fact that p. But not all Gettier cases have this feature. There are cases of 
Gettiered justified true belief where the fact that p is among the causes of the subject's belief. 
Goldman's (1976) Fake Barns case is of this kind: 
 
 Henry is driving through the countryside looking at objects off the road. He sees 
 what looks to him exactly like a barn and forms the belief 'that is a barn'. In fact it is a 
 barn, but unbeknownst to Henry, he is in 'fake barns' country - an area with only a few 
 real barns and many barn facades designed to look exactly like real barns to passing 
 motorists. Luckily for  Henry, he happens to look at one of  the only real barns in the 
 area. Henry's belief is justified and true, but not an item of knowledge. 
                                                                                                                                                        
acquisition, but then lucky to have their belief turn out to be true. Zagzebski (1994) was, to my knowledge, the 
first to notice that Gettier cases have this structure. The lottery case differs from typical Gettier cases in that 
intuitively it is not a matter of luck that Sarah's belief that her ticket is a loser turns out to be true.  
22 This is controversial though. See (Sutton (2007), Smithies (2012b), Smith (2010)) for the dissenting view that 
such lottery beliefs are not justified. I'm sympathetic to the claim that lottery beliefs are not justified, but I won't 
take a stand on this issue here. See the fifth essay in this dissertation 'From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge 
Norm Of Belief And Beyond' for more discussion. For now I'll go along with the idea that lottery beliefs are 
justified. 
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What's the difference between the two cases? In Fake Barns, the fact that there is a barn is 
(along with various facts about Henry) one of the causes of Henry's belief that the object he 
saw is a barn. It figures in a causal explanation of why Henry believes what he does. By 
contrast, in Hyman's McEnroe case, the fact that McEnroe is this year's champion is not 
amongst the causes of Henry's belief that he is. It has no place in a causal explanation of why 
Henry believes what he does. Many Gettier cases have this causal-disconnect feature. 
Consider Chisholm's (1966) sheep in the field case. You are standing outside a field looking 
in. You see what looks to you exactly like a sheep, but is in fact a dog cleverly disguised as a 
sheep. You form the belief 'there is a sheep in the field'. Actually there is a sheep in the field. 
But it is hidden from view to you behind a hill. Your belief is both justified and true, but not 
knowledge. Like the McEnroe case, but unlike Fake Barns, the fact that there is a sheep in the 
field is entirely causally unrelated to your belief that there is a sheep in the field. Gettier cases 
come in two varieties: causal and non-causal. In the former, your belief that p is caused, at 
least in part, by the fact that p, but you fail to know that p because you are in an environment 
where you could easily have falsely believed p, or a similar proposition p*. These are 
'environmental luck' Gettier cases. In the latter, your belief is causally unconnected to the fact 
that p, but luck intervenes to ensure that your belief is nevertheless true. These are 
'intervening luck' Gettier cases.23 
 
 
2.3. Counterexamples to the reasons-knowledge thesis 
 
 
I agree with Hyman that in the case he describes the fact McEnroe is this year's champion 
can't be Henry's reason for -ing. But I reject the reasons-knowledge thesis because I think it 
is counterexampled by environmental luck Gettier cases. In order to see how such cases cause 
problems for the knowledge-reasons thesis, we can adapt the McEnroe case as follows: 
 
 Henry is watching the television on a June afternoon. It is Wimbledon men's 
 finals day, and the television shows McEnroe beating Connors; the score is two sets 
 to love and match point to McEnroe in the third. McEnroe wins the point. Henry 
                                                 
23 For more on the distinction between environmental luck Gettier cases and intervening luck Gettier cases, see 
Pritchard (2008)  
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 believes justifiably that: 
 
  1. I have just seen McEnroe win this year's Wimbledon final 
 
 and reasonably infers that: 
 
  2. McEnroe is this year's Wimbledon champion 
 
 Henry really is watching this year's final. However, due to a network error, all other 
 TVs in the country, including the TVs in Henry's kitchen and bedroom, and the 
 other TV in his lounge just next to the one he is watching, are showing the final 
 from two years ago, in which Connors staged an incredible last-ditch comeback to 
 win the match. Only the TV that Henry is watching has been spared from the error. 
 Henry justifiably and  truly believes that McEnroe is this year's Wimbledon 
 champion, but he doesn't know this, because he could have very easily falsely 
 believed that Connors is.24 
 
Here Henry's belief that McEnroe is this year's champion is caused, in part, by the fact that 
McEnroe is this year's champion. As before, suppose that Henry recalls that his brother placed 
a £100 bet on McEnroe winning, and so infers that his brother has won £100. Is the fact that 
McEnroe is this year's champion Henry's reason for believing that his brother has won £100? 
Unlike in the previous case, it seems obvious to me that it is. Similarly, were Henry to be 
happy, angry, or smug, or congratulate his brother, it seems clear to me that the fact that 
McEnroe is this year's champion would be Henry's reason for being happy, angry, or smug, or 
for congratulating his brother. If this is right, then, since Henry does not know that McEnroe 
is this year's champion, we have a counterexample to the reasons-knowledge thesis.25 To be 
sure, this is a straightforward appeal to intuition. But the same is true of Hyman's argument 
for the reasons-knowledge thesis. And since intuition appears not to unequivocally support the 
                                                 
24 This is a somewhat non-standard type of Gettier case insofar as Henry could not have easily falsely believed 
the proposition 'McEnroe is this year's Wimbledon champion', but rather could have easily had a false belief 
concerning the answer to the question 'Who is this year's Wimbledon champion?'. In this respect it more closely 
resembles Gilbert Harman's (1973) 'Dead dictator' case than normal Gettier cases. I take it, however, that we will 
nevertheless want to deny knowledge to Henry here, despite the fact that he has a justified true belief. If the 
reader has concerns about appeals to this kind of case, they should note that the next case that I'm about to 
discuss does not have this non-standard structure. It is a straightforward Fake Barns-style case.  
25 To be clear, the claim here is that in this case the fact that p can not only be an explanatory reason for Henry's 
-ing, but also his motivating reason. 
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thesis, we should be reluctant to accept it. 
 
The intuitive verdict extends, I think, to many other causal Gettier cases. Consider, for 
example, the following variation on the Fake Barns case: 
 
 Henry is out hiking. He's lost, and the weather is turning nasty. The situation is 
 getting serious. He sees what he believes to be a hiker's hut in the distance, and feels 
 relieved. In fact, unbeknownst to Henry, he is in fake hiker's-hut county - an area 
 where there are only a handful of real huts, and many hut-facades designed to look 
 exactly like real huts to passing hikers. Henry justifiably and truly believes that the 
 structure in the distance is a hut, but he does not know this. 
 
Is the fact that there is a hut in the distance Henry's reason for being relieved? Intuitively, I 
submit, it is. If that's right, then the reasons-knowledge thesis is false.26 
 
 
2.4. Summing up 
 
 
Certain kinds of Gettier cases - those where the fact that p causes the subject's belief that p, 
and so the luck preventing knowledge is environmental in kind, rather than intervening - are 
in tension with the reasons-knowledge thesis, and so give us cause to be reluctant in accepting 
it. This is perhaps not surprising, since locutions of the form 'his reason for -ing was p' can 
usually be replaced salve veritate with 'he -ed because p'. Such considerations suggest that 
the subject's lack of knowledge is epiphenomena in the kinds of cases that have been appealed 
to motivate the reasons-knowledge thesis. What was really driving our intuitions was the lack 
of a causal connection between the subject's belief that p and the fact that p. Does this mean 
that we can truthfully replace the reasons-knowledge thesis with a different biconditional 
                                                 
26 I should note that some epistemologists - e.g. Hetherington (1998), Lycan (2006) - have rejected the received 
view that Fake Barns style cases are non-knowledge cases. I don't share their judgment, but I won't get into the 
issue here. I think it's fair to say that the view that Fake Barns cases are knowledge cases is a minority view. But 
if you hold it, then you should take the lesson of this essay to be, not that the reasons-knowledge thesis is false, 
but rather that it is problematic to jointly endorse both the reasons-knowledge thesis and the view that Fake 
Barns style cases are not knowledge cases. If you are particularly drawn to the reasons-knowledge thesis you 
might even think that the fact that Fake Barns cases are incompatible with the reasons-knowledge thesis gives us 
some reason to think that such cases are cases of knowledge. Similar remarks apply to the argument against E=K 
in the next section. 
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linking an epistemic state with the ability to  for the reason that p? Perhaps one with a causal 
condition? Maybe. Maybe not. There is no reason to, it seems to me, simply assume that such 
a true biconditional exists. But the matter ought to be investigated further. That project is not 
taken up here, however, for even without a rival account we have good grounds on which to 
be hesitant in accepting the claim that the fact that p can be one's reason for Φ-ing only if one 
knows that p, and so hesitant in accepting the reasons-knowledge thesis. Of course, it would 
be hasty to take one set of cases to provide a knock-down argument against the view. 
Intuitions about cases can, I take it, be trumped by theoretical conditions. Nevertheless, 
environmental luck Gettier cases do, it seems to me, suffice to show that Hyman's argument is 
not persuasive. 
 
 
 
 
III. Evidence & Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
3.1. E=K 
 
 
In the last section I argued that environmental luck Gettier cases undermine the positive case 
for the necessity direction of the reasons-knowledge thesis. In this section, I argue that the 
same is true of Williamson's arguments for the necessity direction of E=K. 
 
Williamson (2000) argues that all evidence is propositional, and that all and only those 
propositions one knows to be true are part of one's evidence. Schematically, the argument has 
the following form: 
 
 (1) All evidence is propositional 
 (2) All propositional evidence is knowledge 
 (3) All knowledge is evidence 
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 (C) Therefore, all and only knowledge is evidence. (E=K) 
 
Each premise is defended with further arguments. Central to Williamson's case for E=K is the 
claim that one's evidence is that with which hypotheses are consistent or inconsistent. 
Williamson appeals to this idea in several places in the course of his argument. We first see it 
at work in defence of premise (1). Only propositions, it is argued, are consistent and 
inconsistent with hypotheses. It follows, if evidence is that with which hypotheses are 
consistent or inconsistent, that only propositions can be evidence. We also find Williamson 
appealing to the claim to argue that only true propositions are evidence. If one's evidence 
included falsehoods it would rule out some truths by being inconsistent with them. But, 
Williamson argues, our evidence should not outright exclude any truths, even if it may make 
some truths improbable. Thus, our evidence must consist of only true propositions. 
 
My concern here is not with these arguments,27 but with Williamson's appeal to the claim in 
support of premise (2), which, in conjunction with (1), expresses the necessity direction of 
E=K. Williamson offers two arguments in support of the claim that all evidence is knowledge. 
Call these the 'consistency argument' and the 'chain reaction argument'. We will look at them 
in turn. The consistency argument proceeds from the following case: 
 
 Watching a video you see a number of balls drawn from a bag in succession. 
 Each one is replaced in the bag before the next one is drawn. You have seen 
 draws 1 to n (for some suitable value of n); in each case the ball was red. Draw n+1 
 has been made but you haven’t seen the colour of the ball. By reasoning 
 probabilistically, you form the belief that the ball drawn was red. Your belief is both 
 true and justified, but you don’t know that the ball drawn was red. (Adapted from 
 Williamson (2000: 200)) 
 
Now Williamson asks us to consider whether either of the following two false hypotheses is 
consistent with your evidence at this point: 
 
                                                 
27 E=K has attracted its fair share of critics. Here's a sample: Brueckner (2005), Silins (2005), Dodd (2007), 
Conee & Feldman (2008), Neta (2008), Goldman (2009), Comesana & Kantin (2010), Dancy (2011). Comesana 
& Kantin (2010) argue that if E=K is incompatible with the existence of a certain kind of Gettier cases. Since 
these Gettier cases exist, they conclude that E=K is false. My argument will also involve Gettier cases, but in a 
different way. 
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 h: Draws 1 to n were red; draw n+1 was black 
 h*: Draw 1 was black; draws 2 to n+1 were red. 
 
As he points out, it is natural to say that h is consistent with your evidence in the case as 
described, and h* inconsistent with it. More specifically, it seems to be perfectly consistent 
with your evidence in this case that draw n+1 was black. But if that's right, then the 
proposition <draw n+1 was red> cannot be part of your evidence, for then the proposition 
<draw n+1 was black> would be inconsistent with your evidence. By hypothesis you have a 
justified true belief that draw n+1 was red. So, Williamson infers, having a justified true belief 
that p is not sufficient for having p as part of your evidence. Williamson takes this to show 
that what is needed for evidence is knowledge that p. And this is the claim of premise (2), 
which is the necessity direction of E=K. 
 
In order to assess this argument, we need to be careful in interpreting it. Textually, it is unclear 
exactly how Williamson intends the argument to be taken. On one possible interpretation, he 
takes it to apply to all non-knowledge-constituting justified true beliefs (hereafter 'non-K 
JTBs'). That is, he thinks that whenever one has a non-K JTB that p, it will be natural to 
describe ~p as consistent with one's evidence Then, with the help of further (implicit) 
assumptions, he deductively infers that only knowledge is evidence. 
 
I think that it's uncharitable to interpret Williamson as holding that the argument applies to all 
non-K JTBs, since he doesn't outright say this. Rather, he says that an "obvious" answer to the 
question of why you don't have <draw n+1 was red> as evidence is that you don't know that 
draw n+1 was red. So a more plausible interpretation is that an abductive argument is being 
put forward. On this interpretation, Williamson is arguing that the best explanation of the 
intuitions elicited by the consistency argument is that only knowledge is evidence. When this 
is combined with the claim - in premise (3) - that all knowledge is evidence, it may well be 
that Williamson can plausibly maintain that E=K offers the best (simplest, most natural, most 
elegant etc.) account of the nature of evidence on the market.  
 
Should we be persuaded by this argument? Williamson only considers one case. So the 
suggestion that E=K best explains the data seems hasty. One might well wonder whether all 
the data about when it is natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent or inconsistent with your 
evidence agrees with E=K. Does it? In the next section I'll argue that, once we consider more 
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cases - specifically, environmental luck Gettier cases - we will see that the very considerations 
that Williamson takes to support E=K in fact provide positive reasons to think that the 
contents of some non-K JTBs are part of one's evidence. E=K actively conflicts with 
intuitions about when a hypothesis is consistent or inconsistent with one's evidence.28 
 
The chain reaction argument is gestured at in the following passage: 
 
 If evidence required only justified true belief, or some other good cognitive status 
 short of knowledge, then a critical mass of evidence could set off a kind of chain 
 reaction. Our known evidence justifies belief in various true hypotheses; they would 
 count as evidence too, so this larger evidence set would justify belief in still more true 
 hypotheses, which would in turn count as further evidence . . . The result would be 
 very different from our present conception of evidence. (2000: 201) 
This is rather vague. How exactly would the resulting conception of evidence be very 
different from our present conception? Williamson doesn't say. It seems plausible, however, to 
interpret the argument as follows. If non-K JTBs are part of one's evidence, then in, for 
example, the balls-in-the-bag case, one's inferences will get inductively stronger as one 
continues to make inferences about draws beyond draw n. When you inferred that draw n+1 
was red, your evidence included only the deliverances of draws 1 to n. However, if having a 
non-K JTB that p is sufficient for having p as part of your evidence, then you now have a 
stronger inductive base on which to infer that draw n+2 was red - namely, the fact that draws 
1 to n+1 were red. This principle iterates. So, supposing that 10,000 more draws were made 
and all were red, if non-K JTB were sufficient for evidence you could have stronger evidence 
for the claim that draw n+10,000 was red than you did for the claim that draw n+1 was red. 
But intuitively exactly the opposite is true. Intuitively, the further away you get from your 
visual evidence, and the more reliant you become on induction, the weaker your evidence 
becomes that the next draw in the sequence is red. 
 
                                                 
28 As an aside, it is worth additionally noting that if this is correct it also serves to refute the argument on its 
deductive interpretation (uncharitable though it is). For if we can show that considerations about when it is 
natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent or inconsistent with one's evidence positively support the claim that 
the contents of some non-K JTBs are evidence, then we will have shown a fortiori that there are 
counterexamples to the claim that, for the content of every belief that falls short of knowledge, it is natural to say 
that the negation of that content is consistent with one's evidence. 
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3.2. Against E=K 
 
 
As I said, I think that environmental luck Gettier cases show that both of these arguments are 
unpersuasive. In order to see this we need reflect a little on Williamson's own case. Now, the 
case as Williamson describes it is somewhat puzzling. As several commentators have 
observed, unless we are sceptics about inductive knowledge, it is quite hard to see just why 
you are unable to know that draw n+1 was red, without actually watching the draw. Provided 
that n has a suitably high value, your inference that draw n+1 was red would seem to be a 
routine case of inductive knowledge. But if you are able to know that draw n+1 was red, then 
the consistency argument refutes E=K by Williamson's own lights, since it would refute the 
claim of premise (3) that all knowledge is evidence. Thus a form of inductive scepticism 
threatens for Williamson29. Nevertheless, since my interest is in premise (2), I propose to put 
this worry aside and grant the assumption that you have a non-K JTB that draw n+1 was red. 
Once this assumption is granted, the question of just why is it that you don't know that draw 
n+1 was red arises. The most familiar kind of non-K JTBs to epistemologists are those had in 
Gettier cases. But notice that Williamson's case doesn't look like a typical Gettier case.30 To 
see this, first note that a prominent feature of Gettier cases is, as we have already seen, that 
the subject's epistemic environment is such that it is only a matter of luck that they believe 
truly.31 But intuitively it is not a matter of luck in this case that your belief that draw n+1 was 
red is true. In fact, if anything it seems as though you would have been unlucky were your 
belief to have turned out false. Secondly, note that subjects in Gettier cases are typically not in 
a position to know that they don't know that p. But nothing in Williamson's case as he 
describes it suggests that you are not in a position to know that you don't know that draw n+1 
was red. On the contrary, insofar as it is plausible that you don't know that draw n+1 was red, 
this seems to be something you could easily know. Thirdly, there is typically a kind of 
abnormality to a Gettiered subject’s epistemic environment of which they are unaware, such 
that were they aware of it, they would no longer be justified in believing p. By contrast, there 
is nothing in the case as Williamson describes it suggesting any hidden abnormality. Nothing 
in the case suggests that you are not aware of all the relevant facts about your environment. 
Insofar as you can justifiably believe that draw n+1 was red, it seems that you can do so in 
                                                 
29 This point has been made by Dodd (2007), Weatherson (manuscript), and McGlynn (2014) 
30 McGlynn (2014) also makes this observation. 
31 Pritchard (2012) describes this as one of the 'master intuitions' driving Gettier cases. 
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full awareness of all the relevant facts about the case.  
 
In short, Williamson's case lacks many of the hallmarks of Gettier cases32 33. Given this, one 
may well wonder if the consistency argument is persuasive when run against a case that does 
have these hallmark features. I don't think it is. To see this, consider the following variation on 
Williamson's case, where you do see draw n+1: 
 
 Watching a video you see a number of balls drawn from a bag in succession. 
 Each one is replaced in the bag before the next one is drawn. You have seen 
 draws 1 to n (for some suitable value of n); in each case the ball was red. You then 
 see draw n+1, in which again a red ball is drawn from the bag. Unbeknownst to you 
 however, between draws n and n+1 the bag was surreptitiously switched. The new 
 bag, from which draw n+1 was made, contained hundreds of black balls disguised 
 as red balls, and one genuinely red ball.34 By sheer luck, the genuinely red ball was 
 drawn at n+1. You justifiably and truly believe that draw in n+1 was red, but you 
 don't know this because your belief is Gettiered - you would have believed that draw 
 n+1 was a red ball even if it was really a disguised black ball. 
 
In this case you don't know that draw n+1 was red, because your belief is Gettiered. Since 
your belief was caused, in part, by the fact that draw n+1 was red, you are in an 
environmental luck Gettier case. Now consider the following false hypotheses: 
 
 h: draw n+1 was black. 
 
                                                 
32 Plausibly, the case is much better understood as analogous to a lottery case - a case where you believe solely 
on the basis of the probabilities involved that your lottery ticket is a loser. This raises interesting issues in itself, 
since a number of epistemologists (e.g. Smithies (2012), Smith (2010), Sutton(2007), amongst others) have 
argues that you not only cannot know that your ticket has lost solely on the basis of the probabilities involved, 
but you cannot even justifiably outright believe that it has. In that case, we might wonder if Williamson's 
description of the case as involving a justified belief is correct. Regrettably, I cannot go into these issues here. 
But the important thing to note is that the case bears little resemblance to a typical Gettier case 
33 The phrase 'Gettier case' is sometimes used to refer to any case of a justified true belief that is not knowledge, 
irrespective of the specific features of the believers epistemic situation. I do not use the phrase in that way. I'm 
taking 'typical Gettier case' to refer to cases that have the features outlined above. If the reader is unhappy with 
this, they should mentally replace the phrase 'not a Gettier case' with 'not a case where the subject is lucky that 
they truly belief that p, nor in a position to know that they don't know that p, nor in an abnormal epistemic 
environment such that were they aware of the abnormality, they would no longer be justified in believing that p'. 
34 Of course, it might be argued that a black ball disguised as a red ball simply is a red ball. I ask the reader to put 
this concern aside. The case could be easily amended to get around the worry. But I prefer to keep it as similar to 
Williamson's case as possible. 
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If consistency considerations favour E=K, it should be natural to say that h is consistent with 
your evidence in this new case. Is it? I feel no inclination whatsoever to say that it is, and to 
my ears it would not be natural to describe it as such. This point alone is troubling for 
Williamson's argument. But we can go further. Insofar as considerations about when it is 
natural to say that a hypothesis is consistent with one's evidence are a good guide to what 
propositions are not in one's evidence - and of course Williamson's argument trades on the 
assumption that they are - then considerations about when it is natural to say that a hypothesis 
is inconsistent with one's evidence must also be a good guide to what propositions are in one's 
evidence. And it seems to me that not only would it not be natural to describe h as consistent 
with your evidence in this case, it would be natural to describe h as positively inconsistent 
with your evidence. If that's right, then by Williamson's own endorsed method for establishing 
just which propositions are and are not part of one's evidence, we get the result that the 
contents of some non-K JTBs are evidence. That is, we get, by Williamson's own method, 
positive reasons to think that some of these contents are evidence. Thus, if we are to accept 
the method of the consistency argument at all, we must accept that it gives us positive reasons 
to think that the contents of some non-K JTBs are evidence, and thus positive reasons to think 
that E does not equal K. 
 
The verdict of the above case is not a one-off. New cases could be created in which the same 
intuition is elicited.35 Although there is no scope for a full diagnosis in this paper, it seems to 
me that all environmental luck Gettier are cases where it is natural to say that the negation of 
the subject's belief is inconsistent with their evidence. Note that this is not to say that in all 
Gettier cases it is natural to say that the negation of the subject's belief is inconsistent with 
their evidence. As we have seen, Gettier cases also come in the intervening luck variety, and it 
is less clear that such cases conflict with Williamson's claims about consistency with the 
evidence. 
 
Williamson's consistency argument fails to support his conclusion. Whilst we may accept a 
view on the nature of evidence on the basis of an abductive argument that is silent on some 
cases, we should be reluctant to accept the view on the basis of an argument that turns out to 
issue results that actively conflict with the view, even if we don't yet have a rival explanation 
                                                 
35 Littlejohn (2012) argues that Goldman's fake barns case, which is structurally similar to mine, causes problems 
for E=K. Littlejohn's argument, however, trades directly on the intuition that the driver has the same evidence 
when they are driving in real-barn country and fake-barn country, rather than engaging with Williamson's 
consistency argument. 
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of the data. 
 
What about the chain reaction argument? Is this more persuasive than the consistency 
argument? It is not, for it too fails to show that non-K JTBs of the kind found in 
environmental Gettier cases (or, for that matter, intervening luck Gettier cases) cannot be part 
of your evidence. Insofar as the argument is persuasive, all it shows is that non-K JTBs 
arrived at by induction or probabilistic reasoning cannot be part of your evidence. But of 
course, it is possible to have a non-K JTB that p that isn't arrived at by induction or 
probabilistic reasoning, but rather by observation, as is the case in the environmental luck 
version of the balls-in-the-bag case. And when your belief is arrived at in such a way, no 
problematic chain reaction of the kind described is set off. Thus, again, Williamson's 
argument falls short of supporting his desired conclusion. 
 
Of course, as with the argument against Hyman, these aren't knock-down arguments against 
Williamson's position; they don't entail that E=K isn't ultimately the right view to adopt. 
Perhaps, for example, rival views that better accommodate the data issued from consistency 
considerations will falter for different reasons. Or perhaps such views will match E=K in 
accounting for a wide range of data, but lose out on other theoretical virtues such as 
simplicity, elegance, and naturalness. Nevertheless, it’s clear that the consistency and chain 
reaction arguments don't motivate E=K. The chain reaction simply does not support the thesis, 
and if anything, consistency considerations motivate E≠K. As such, Williamson's arguments 
that only knowledge is evidence fall short of motivating the claim. 
 
 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
I have argued that environmental luck Gettier cases cause problems for arguments purporting 
to show that knowledge has two important metaphysical roles: that one's evidence consists of 
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all and only those propositions that one knows to be true, and that the fact that p can be one's 
reason for Φ-ing iff one knows that p. I have, however, been careful not to claim that such 
cases provide us with knock-down arguments against the respective views. Nevertheless, 
more work will need to be done in order to make a persuasive case that knowledge does in 
fact play these roles. 
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3. Might The Simulation Heuristic 
Influence Knowledge Attributions? 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
 
Recently epistemologists have noticed an intriguing pattern in people's knowledge 
attributions. People tend to be less willing to attribute knowledge-that-p to a subject when 
specific unrealized metaphysical possibilities of error are mentioned, and so made salient, 
than they are when such possibilities are not mentioned and not made salient, but present 
nevertheless. Call this the 'error-salience phenomenon'. Some have appealed to the 
phenomenon to motivate contextualist theses about the semantics of 'knows', and it appears to 
pose a challenge to traditional invariantist approaches to the word's semantics.  
 
What, if any, psychological processes might explain the error-salience phenomenon? The 
question has only recently generated interest. John Hawthorne (2004) and Timothy 
Williamson (2005) speculatively suggest that the phenomenon might be the result of the 
influence of the availability heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky 1972). They appeal to this idea 
to undermine the force of the apparent challenge the phenomenon poses to invariantism. 
Jennifer Nagel (2010) rejects Hawthorne and Williamson's proposal, and instead makes the 
case that the phenomenon is the result of epistemic egocentricity (Royzman et al 2003, Birch 
et al 2004). Mikkel Gerken (2013) proposes an explanation in terms of epistemic focal bias. 
Like Hawthorne and Williamson, Gerken and Nagel appeal to their proposals to attempt to 
undermine the force of the apparent challenge that the error-salience phenomenon poses to 
invariantism 
 
In this essay I make a preliminary case that the operation of the simulation heuristic 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1982) may partially explain the error-salience phenomenon. Unlike 
Hawthorne, Williamson, Nagel, and Gerken, my main motivation is not to defend 
invariantism, but first and foremost simply to understand the phenomenon in question. The 
project is an interesting one in its own right. If epistemologists want to fully understand the 
nature of knowledge, then it is imperative that they understand the psychology of knowledge 
attribution. Nevertheless, I will make some (largely negative) remarks about the prospects of 
defending semantic theses about the word 'knows' by appeal to psychological explanations of 
knowledge attribution towards the end of the essay. 
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The plan is this: §2 sets the scene, introducing the evidence - both intuitive and empirical - for 
the error-salience phenomenon, and briefly describes the impact it has had on debate about 
the semantics of 'knows'. §3.1 introduces the simulation heuristic, some of its interesting 
properties, and some of the data that has been adduced in favour of postulating it. §3.2 makes 
the case that the error-salience phenomenon can plausibly be explained by the hypothesis that 
knowledge attributions are influenced by the simulation heuristic. §4.1 presents Hawthorne 
and Williamson's availability heuristic explanation. §4.2 discusses Nagel's objections to it. 
§4.3 considers how the simulation heuristic explanation hypothesis fares against Nagel's 
objections. §4.4 presents Nagel's epistemic egocentricity account. §4.5 considers the 
relationship between Nagel's account and mine, and consider what might be said in favour of 
each. In §4.6 I show how my account integrates with Gerken's epistemic focal bias account. In 
§5, I discuss the implications of the proposed psychological explanations on the debate about 
the semantics of 'knows'. §6 concludes. 
 
Before we proceed, a disclaimer is needed. Questions about the psychology of knowledge 
attribution are complex and relatively underexplored. We should not expect to arrive at well-
supported conclusions about the influence of psychological mechanisms on knowledge 
attribution without considerable empirical investigation and theoretical reflection. I make no 
pretense that the proposal sketched here is definitive, nor that the argument offered in favour 
of it is conclusive. Nevertheless, productive inquiry is guided by the assessment of prima 
facie plausible hypotheses. The goal of this essay is to put forward just such a hypothesis. In 
§4.3 and §4.5 I discuss some outstanding empirical questions that need to be answered if we 
are to move forwards. 
 
 
 
II. The Semantics of 'Knows' 
 
 
 
Consider the following two vignettes, borrowed from Nagel (2010): 
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 (a) The plain story: John is in a furniture store. He is looking at a bright red 
 table under normal lighting conditions. He believes the table is red.  
  Q: Does John know that the table is red? 
 (b) The more detailed story: John is in a furniture store. He is looking at a bright red 
 table under normal lighting conditions. He believes the table is red. However, a white 
 table under red lighting would look exactly the same to him, and he has not checked 
 whether the lighting is normal, or whether there might be a red spotlight shining on the 
 table. 
   Q: Does John know that the table is red? 
Many epistemologists find it easier to attribute knowledge, rather than mere true belief, to 
John in case (a) than in case (b),36 despite the fact that, we may suppose, there no difference in 
John's epistemic situation between (a) and (b). Case (b) merely draws attention to a 
counterfactual aspect of John's situation that is unmentioned, but nevertheless present, in case 
(a). Although many of them regard it as a mistake, something approaching a consensus has 
emerged amongst epistemologists that we are, as a matter of fact, more reluctant to attribute 
knowledge when unrealized possibilities of error are mentioned, and so made salient, than we 
are when such possibilities go unmentioned. For ease of exposition, we will refer to cases like 
(b) as 'mentioned-error-possibility cases' (hereafter 'MEP-cases'), cases like (a) as 'non MEP-
cases', and the phenomenon of interest the 'error-salience phenomenon'. 
 
For some time the existence of the error-salience phenomenon was taken for granted by 
epistemologists. Recently it has been put to empirical test. Do non-philosophers share 
philosophers intuitions about MEP and non-MEP cases? Initial studies suggested a negative 
answer (Buckwalter 2010, Feltz and Zarpentine 2010). More recent studies, however, have 
found some evidence for the phenomenon. For example, Schaffer and Knobe (2012) 
presented participants in an experiment with variations on Keith DeRose's (2009) bank cases, 
in which Hannah asserts to her partner that the bank is open on Saturday. Some participants 
were given vignettes in which the possibility of error was made salient. Others were given 
vignettes where this possibility was not made salient. Participants were then asked to rate 
their degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement: 'Hannah knows that the bank 
                                                 
36 A sample: Hawthorne (2004), Lewis (1996), Stanley (2005), DeRose (2009), Unger (1971), Cohen (2002). 
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will be open on Saturday'. Schaffer and Knobe found that participants presented with the non 
MEP-case were more inclined to agree with the statement than those presented with the MEP-
case, to a statistically significant degree. Alexander, Gonnerman, and Waterman 
(forthcoming) found the same with Nagel's (a) and (b) cases. Further confirmatory work is 
needed, but from here on in we will assume along with the rest of the participants in the 
debate of interest that error-salience is a real and robust phenomenon.  
 
The error-salience phenomenon has played an important role in recent debate about the 
semantics of the word 'knows'. Contextualists hold that the truth conditions of sentences of the 
form 'S knows that p' are context-sensitive. One popular way of cashing out this idea is that 
the context partially determines the epistemic standard S needs to meet in order for the 
sentence 'S knows that p' to be true in that context. Contextualists have claimed to find 
vindication for their view from the error-salience phenomenon.37 If contextualism is true, it is 
perfectly consistent to claim that 'John knows that the table is red' in non MEP-cases like (a) 
and 'John doesn't know that the table is red' in MEP-cases like (b). The standards required for 
it to be true to say that 'John knows that the table is red' are higher, the thought goes, in (b) 
than they are in (a), because an error possibility has been made contextually relevant in (b) 
but not (a). DeRose (2005) is quite explicit about the error-salience phenomenon being a 
central motivation for contextualism: 
 
 "The best grounds for accepting contextualism concerning knowledge attributions 
 come from how knowledge-attributing (and knowledge-denying) sentences are used in 
 ordinary, non-philosophical talk: What ordinary speakers will count as ‘‘knowledge’’ 
 in some non-philosophical contexts they will deny is such in others" (2005: 172) 
By contrast, the error-salience phenomenon seems, prima facie, to pose a challenge to 
invariantists who hold that 'knows' does not have a contextualist semantics. If the truth-
conditions for sentences of the form 'S knows that p' aren't shifty in the way that 
contextualists suggest, then why are people's knowledge attributions shifty? Invariantism 
appears to be at odds with actual usage. And this, one might think, is a mark against it. 
(DeRose 2009, et al.) 
Against this background, some invariantists have sort to motivate a certain kind of error-
                                                 
37 DeRose (2005, 2009), Lewis (1996), Cohen (2002) 
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theory about the error-salience phenomenon. Their strategy is to develop hypotheses about the 
psychological mechanisms that produce the phenomenon whereby it is the result of well-
known heuristics and biases, and then argue that these psychological explanations of the 
phenomenon show that it does not undermine invariantism. So we see Hawthorne (2004) and 
Williamson (2005) suggesting that the phenomenon is the result of the influence of the 
availability heuristic, Nagel (2010) arguing that it is the result of epistemic egocentricity, and 
Gerken (2013) arguing that it is the result of an epistemic focal bias.  
My interest here is not primarily in the debate between invariantists and contextualists 
(though see §5 for some remarks on the prospects of appealing to psychological explanations 
to defend classical invariantism). Rather I am first and foremost interested in understanding 
what psychological mechanisms give rise to the error-salience phenomenon. The proposal put 
forward here is that the influence of the simulation heuristic might at least partially explain it. 
In the next section I introduce the heuristic and make the case for its ability to explain the 
phenomenon. 
 
 
III. The Simulation Heuristic Hypothesis 
 
 
 
3.1 Introducing the simulation heuristic 
 
Counterfactual thinking - thinking about what was not, but could have been, the case - is 
pervasive in human cognition. It is, amongst other things, central to the imagining of novel 
combinations that is a building block of creativity (Byrne 2002, Costello & Keane 2000, Fink 
et al. 1992). As philosophers well know, it also helps people to reveal counterexamples to 
deductions (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 2002, Byrne et al. 1999), and judgements of 
accountability, fault, responsibility, and blame, are often the consequence of counterfactual 
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thought (Markman & Tetlock 2000, Hegarty & Pratto 2000). 
 
Psychologists have converged on agreement about the way that counterfactual judgement is 
produced. As Kahneman and Tversky (1982) put it, the assessment of counterfactuals is 
produced by an operation that resembles the running of a simulation model. When 
considering whether a proposition like 'If LeBron had made his last 3-point attempt, the 
Miami Heat would have won the game' is true, people will mentally simulate alternative 
sequences of events and their outcomes by mutating events that obtained in the actual world. 
For example, a very obvious mutation for assessing whether the proposition 'If LeBron had 
made his last 3-point attempt, the Miami Heat would have won the game' would be to imagine 
a world in which Lebron actually makes the last 3-pointer, and then running a simulation to 
form a judgement about what might have happened thereafter. 
 
This kind of psychological process is heuristically governed. As Byrne (2002) puts it, people 
systematically 'zoom in' on the same things from potentially infinite sets of possibilities. That 
is, they will, with a high degree of regularity, mutate certain possibilities rather than others in 
forming counterfactual judgements. For example, studies show that people tend to mutate 
exceptional events rather than normal ones (Kahneman and Tversky 1982), tend mutate 
events that are in their control more than those that are out of their control, tend to mutate 
recent events more than temporarily distal events within causal chains (Miller & 
Gunasegaram 1990, Segura et al. 2002, Byrne et al. 2000), and tend not to mutate natural 
laws (Seelu et al. 1995). It is these tendencies that go under the name 'the simulation 
heuristic'. 
 
 
3.2. Making the case for an explanation of the error-salience phenomenon 
from the influence of the simulation heuristic  
 
 
My proposal is that the operation of the simulation heuristic might at least partially explain 
the error-salience phenomenon. How might this happen? Our starting point is the observation 
that there is wide agreement amongst epistemologists that knowing-that-p is a modal state, 
requiring that one's belief that p is true in a certain set of metaphysically possible, but non-
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actual, worlds where it is held. There are a number of different ways to flesh out this idea. For 
example, the sceptically inclined might take knowing to require that one's belief is true in all 
or almost all possible worlds where it is held, thereby placing a very high bar on knowing. 
More popular are views that place restrictions on membership of the set. According to those 
who advocate a safety condition on knowledge, one's belief need not be true in all possible 
worlds in which it is held, but only all those possible worlds that are nearby to the actual 
world, where nearness is determined by a similarity relation. According to those who 
advocate a sensitivity condition, knowing requires that one not believe that p in the nearest 
worlds in which p is false.38  
 
However one chooses to understand the modal requirements on knowledge, the following 
hypothesis is very plausible if knowing-that-p is a modal state and assuming that people are 
generally accurate in their knowledge attributions: their actual assessments of whether a 
subject, S, knows that p, will involve counterfactual thinking. This certainly seems to be the 
case when people are presented with Gettier cases, for example. A plausible diagnosis of why 
people tend to deny knowledge in Gettier cases is that they recognise that there are very 
nearby possible worlds in which the subject falsely believes that p, and therefore judge that 
the belief is not sufficiently modally robust to count as an item of knowledge. The subject, 
they recognize, could easily have falsely believed that p. 
 
If people's assessments of whether a subject knows do proceed in this way, then it would, one 
might think, be no surprise were the simulation heuristic to influence knowledge attributions. 
Much counterfactual thinking is influenced by the simulation heuristic, and knowledge 
attribution involves counterfactual thinking, so it is prima facie plausible that the simulation 
heuristic will influence knowledge attribution. But this observation alone does not provide us 
with any clues as to just how the simulation heuristic might exert its influence, and thus does 
not provide us with any kind of explanation of the error-salience phenomenon. To find such 
an explanation, we need to look more closely at the workings of the simulation heuristic. 
 
One key observation comes from Kahneman and Miller (1984). Kahneman and Miller 
observed that in performing counterfactual reasoning about what could have been the case, 
                                                 
38 For defences of the claim the safety is necessary for knowledge, see Williamson (2000), Pritchard (2005) and 
Sosa (1999). For defences of the claim that sensitivity is necessary for knowledge, see Nozick (1981) and 
DeRose (2009). 
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people will tend to treat some aspects the situation as relatively fixed and immutable, and 
others as mutable. Which aspects of the situation are treated as mutable, and which are treated 
as immutable, is affected by the simulation heuristic. Kahneman and Miller hypothesise that 
the mutability of any aspect of a situation increases when attention is drawn to it, and it is 
made psychologically salient. Evidence for this hypothesis, they note, was found by Read 
(1985). In one of Read's experiments, subjects were taught the rules of a simple two-person 
card game. Subjects were then shown the hands of two players, A and B, and asked to 
complete stems such as, "A would have won if..." or A would have lost if...." Read found that 
a large majority of completions involved changes to the hand held by A, despite the fact that 
the same outcome could, of course, been just as easily produced by altering B's hand. The fact 
that subjects tended to mutate the actions of the actor to whom attention is drawn, and tended 
not to mutate the actions of the actor to whom attention was not drawn, supports Kahneman 
and Miller's hypothesis. Read also tested the hypothesis with vignettes such as the following: 
 
 Helen was driving to work along a three-lane road, where the middle lane is 
 used for passing by traffic from both directions. She changed lanes to pass a 
 slow-moving truck, and quickly realizes that she was headed directly for  another car 
 coming in the opposite direction. For a moment it looked as if a collision was 
 inevitable. However, this did not occur. (Read 1985) 
 
Read asked subjects to indicate, in one sentence, how they think the accident was avoided. A 
substantial majority of subjects completed the story by ascribing the critical action to Helen. 
Again, this supports Kahneman and Miller's hypothesis that drawing attention to an aspect of 
the situation increases its mutability. 
 
Questions remain about just how strongly Read's findings support Kahneman and Miller's 
hypothesis that the mutability of any aspect of a situation increases when attention is drawn to 
it, since Read's experiments involve the mutability of the actions of focal and background 
actors, and it doesn't follow from the fact that subjects tend to mutate the actions of actors to 
whom attention is drawn that they will tend to mutate any aspect of the situation to which 
attention is drawn. Nevertheless, Read's studies lend some credence to Kahneman and Miller's 
hypothesis. The matter needs to be investigated further, but let us suppose that Kahneman and 
Miller are correct in their hypothesis. What implications might this have for our 
understanding of the psychological processes producing the error-salience phenomenon? 
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A natural thought is this: if Kahneman and Miller are right, and the mutability of any aspect of 
a situation increases when attention is directed to it, then we should expect readers to be more 
reluctant to attribute knowledge in MEP' cases than in non-MEP cases. To see why this is, 
consider Nagel's John cases from §2. In case (a) no attention is drawn to the fact that John 
would have falsely believed that the table was red if he was looking at a white table under a 
red light. Case (a) is a non-MEP case. Case (b) is a MEP case; attention is drawn to the fact 
that John would have falsely believed that the table was red if he was looking at a white table 
under a red light. If Kahneman and Miller's hypothesis is correct, then in case (b) this fact of 
the situation will be highly mutable (or at least, more mutable than it is in case (a)). Readers 
of (b) will thus be more prone to imagine it actually obtaining. In doing so, they will come to 
recognise that there is a possible world in which John falsely believes that the table is red. By 
contrast, they will display less of a tendency to arrive at this conclusion in case (a). Since 
attention is not drawn to the fact that John would have believed that the table is red if it was 
white but he was looking at it under a red light, this aspect of the situation will tend not to be 
entertained and will tend not be mutated. Readers will thus tend not to recognise that this is a 
possible world in which John falsely believes that the table is red.  
 
How the explanation proceeds from here depends on how strong the demands are that readers 
place on subjects in order to count them as knowing. If people demand that a subject's belief 
is true in all possible worlds in which it is held in order to count that subject as knowing, then 
we are availed of an explanation of how the influence of the simulation heuristic might 
produce the error-salience phenomenon. In MEP cases like (b), but not in non-MEP cases like 
(a), readers will be more likely to come to recognise that there is a possible world in which 
John falsely believes that the table in from of him is red, and will thus be more likely to deny 
that he knows that it is red. 
 
However, suppose that people don't demand truth in all possible worlds in which the belief is 
held, but only in a certain epistemically relevant set of worlds. Then the denial of knowledge 
will depend on whether readers process the world in which John falsely believes that he is 
looking at a red table because he is looking at a white table under a red light as an 
epistemically relevant world. Why should we think that they would do that? One reason to 
expect such an outcome is that people tend to treat the salience of something as evidence for 
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its relevance to the task at hand (see, e.g., Gigerenzer and Todd 1999).39 If so, then a plausible 
explanation emerges for why readers will tend to deny that subjects know in MEP cases like 
(b) even if they don't demand that the subject's belief is true in all possible worlds in which it 
is held. The world in which John falsely believes that he is looking at a red table because he is 
looking at a white table under a red light is contextually salient in (b). So readers will tend to 
process it as epistemically relevant - that is, they will tend to process it as one of the worlds in 
which John has to have a true belief in order for his belief in the actual world to count as 
knowledge. From the operation of the simulation heuristic, they will come to recognise that he 
would falsely believe that the table is red in this world. Since John falsely believes that the 
table is red in this world, and subjects will tend to treat this world as epistemically relevant, 
they will therefore tend to deny that he knows that the table is red in the actual world. This 
will not happen in the (a) case. Thus we would expect to see higher levels of knowledge 
attributions in (a) than in (b). 
The focus here has been on Nagel's John cases. But they are merely an example. The point 
should generalise to all of the error-salience cases that epistemologists have been interested 
in, since they all share the common feature of drawing attention to certain unrealized error 
possibilities. In that case, we have a (preliminary) case for thinking that the error-salience 
phenomenon is at least partially the result of the influence of the simulation heuristic.  
 
 
 
IV. Comparison With Rival Accounts 
 
 
 
§4.1. The availability heuristic explanation 
                                                 
39 Gerken (2013) also makes this point. Gerken's account will be discussed in more detail in §4.6 
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In the last section, I made the case that the simulation heuristic might at least partially explain 
the error-salience phenomenon. Another explanation for the phenomenon can be found in 
Hawthorne (2004) and Williamson (2005). Hawthorne and Williamson suggest that the 
phenomenon might (at least in part) be the result of the influence of the availability heuristic. 
In this section and the next I discuss the availability heuristic explanation and objections to it 
from Nagel (2010). The purpose of doing so is to assess how the simulation heuristic 
explanation fares against Nagel's objections. It is important to do so, since the simulation and 
availability heuristics are thought to be closely related. Thus one might worry that the 
problems Nagel identifies with the availability heuristic explanation will be inherited by the 
simulation heuristic explanation. This will be a starting point for critical evaluation of the 
simulation heuristic explanation. 
 
The availability heuristic was first postulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1973). Roughly 
characterised, it describes a psychological phenomenon whereby people rely on the ease with 
which examples of events of a certain type can be imagined or remembered in order to form 
judgements about the probability that an event of that type will occur. Like all heuristics, the 
availability heuristic provides a cognitively cheap way of arriving at a conclusion with a fairly 
good degree of accuracy. However, the cost of employing this mental shortcut is systematic 
fallibility. Relying on the availability heuristic leads people to overestimate the likelihood of 
certain events that are uncommon, but easily imagined and remembered. For example, people 
tend to overestimate the number of deaths caused by dramatic events, since such events are 
disproportionately discussed. 40  Could something similar be going on in epistemology? 
Williamson thinks it's a possibility: 
 
 "One effect of fictional violence on television is to make viewers  overestimate their 
 chances of being the victims of violent crime: they  suffer an illusion of danger. Might 
 not an illusion of epistemic danger result from exposure to lurid stories about brains in 
 vats, evil demons, painted mules, or gamblers who bet the farm?" (2005: 226) 
The suggestion - put forward by both Williamson and Hawthorne - is that the effect of making 
unrealized error possibilities salient in MEP-cases is to lead people, by relying on the 
availability heuristic, to overestimate the likelihood of their obtaining, and thereby come to 
                                                 
40 Lichtenstein et al. (1978) 
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deny that subjects in MEP cases know. Hawthorne cites Slovic et al. on this point. Says 
Slovic: "[a] particularly important implication of the availability heuristic is that discussion of 
a low-probability hazard may increase its memorability and imaginability and hence its 
perceived riskiness" (Slovic et al. 1982: 465).41 
 
§4.2. Nagel's objections to the availability heuristic explanation 
 
It is important to note at this juncture that the simulation heuristic explanation and the 
availability heuristic explanation needn't be seen as rivals. Hawthorne makes it clear that he 
does not necessarily take the availability heuristic explanation to exhaustively account for the 
error-salience phenomenon. Other psychological mechanisms may also contribute. One of 
these, it might be thought, could be the simulation heuristic. Similarly, I am not suggesting 
that the simulation heuristic explanation exhaustively explains the phenomenon. It is perfectly 
compatible with my account that the availability heuristic also contributes. That said, there are 
good reasons to think the availability heuristic is not contributing to the phenomenon, for 
Williamson and Hawthorne's proposal has been subjected to criticism from Nagel (2010). In 
this section I present, and comment on, Nagel's objections. Given the similarities between the 
availability heuristic and the simulation heuristic, Nagel's objections will be presented in 
some detail, since the task of the next section is to discuss how the simulation heuristic 
explanation fares against them.  
§4.2.1 The imaginability objection 
Nagel's first objection departs from the work of Steven Sherman (1985). Sherman found 
evidence that when a given event is difficult to imagine, subjects who have been encouraged 
to imagine or discuss it will tend to assess its occurrence as less probable than subjects who 
have not been encouraged. Sherman presented subjects with booklets about a fictitious 
disease, which described symptoms of a disease without giving any statistics on its prevalence 
(though it was described as becoming 'increasingly prevalent' on the subject's student 
campus). One group was given a booklet in which the described symptoms were easy to 
                                                 
41 It is important to note that Hawthorne and Williamson don't fully endorse the availability heuristic explanation. 
They merely put it forward as a interesting tentative possibility. 
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imagine. The other group was given a booklet in which the described symptoms were hard to 
imagine. Within each group, half of the participants were given the booklet and asked to 
assess the likelihood of their contracting the disease, and half were asked to imagine 
themselves coming down with the disease over a three-week period and then write out a 
narrative detailing how they imagined they would be affected. They were then asked to assess 
the likelihood of their contracting the disease. Sherman's results were as follows: subjects who 
read the hard-to-imagine booklet, but did not imagine themselves coming down with the 
disease, rated their probability of contracting the disease as slightly lower than their 
counterparts who read the easy-to-imagine booklet. Subjects who read the hard-to-imagine 
booklet and imagined themselves coming down with the disease, rated themselves less likely 
to contract the disease than their counterparts who did not engage in the imagining task. 
Subjects who read the easy-to-imagine booklet and engaged in the imagining task rated 
themselves as more likely to contract the disease than their counterparts who did not engage 
in the imagining task. 
What Sherman's study shows, Nagel notes, is that being encouraged to imagine a scenario 
only increases its apparent probability when the scenario is easy to imagine. When the 
scenario is hard to imagine, the opposite effect can occur. This is where Nagel's objection 
kicks in. Nagel argues that it is far from clear that the kinds of MEP-cases to which 
epistemologists trade involve unrealized error possibility scenarios that are easy to imagine: 
"It is not immediately obvious that scenarios involving brains-in-vats and tricky lighting 
should count as 'easy to imagine' in the relevant sense (to say nothing of more esoteric 
examples involving brain lesions and strange coincidences). Casual introspection is unlikely 
to settle the question of whether a given scenario has a level of imaginability that would 
prompt a positive rather than a negative availability effect" (2010: 293). Nagel's point here is 
not to make the case that the availability heuristic isn't doing the work here. But rather that it 
is far from obvious that it is. Call this first objection the imaginability objection. 
§4.2.2 The comparative imaginability objection 
Nagel's second objection leads on from the imaginability objection. Nagel observes that even 
if the sceptical possibilities that epistemologists trade in are easy to imagine (and so the 
imaginability objection doesn't hold), we should expect to see higher levels of knowledge-
denial in MEP-cases where the unrealized error possibility is commonplace and unexotic than 
MEP-cases where it is arcane, recherché, and hard to imagine. But it is not obvious, she 
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argues, that this is the case. If it isn't, then it is unlikely that the availability heuristic 
explanation can account for the error-salience phenomenon. Call this the comparative 
imaginability objection. 
§4.2.3 The spontaneous discounting objection 
Nagel's third objection departs from the observation that what the availability heuristic 
explanation needs to account for the error-salience phenomenon is that sheer mention of 
unrealized error possibilities causes people to overestimate the likelihood of the possibility via 
the availability heuristic. Why is sheer mention necessary? Because the phenomenon that 
needs to be explained is that people tend to shift in their knowledge attributions from making 
positive attributions in non MEP-cases like (a) to negative attributions in MEP-cases like (b) 
when only MEP-cases mention the possibility of error. Drawing on the work of Daniel 
Oppenheimer (2004) et al., and Norbert Schwarz et al. (1983), Nagel observes that sheer 
mention tends to have the opposite effect to what those who endorse the availability heuristic 
explanation need here. In a series of experiments Oppenheimer found that when subjects 
recognised that there was an explanation for increased availability that was unrelated to 
objective frequencies, they would automatically discount the significance of availability in 
forming judgements - a tendency known as spontaneous discounting. For example, in one 
experiment Oppenheimer asked subjects to rank the relative frequencies of various surnames 
in the USA. The subjects were generally quite good at this. But Oppenheimer discovered that 
they had a tendency to underestimate the objective frequency of famous names like 'Bush', 
'Clinton', 'Furtado', and 'Kravitz'. Oppenheimer's suggestion was that this result is the result of 
spontaneous discounting: the subjects will have recognised that the increased availability of 
such names was because the people they associated with them were famous, recognised that 
the fame of a name does not correlate with its objective frequency, and so discounted 
availability in forming their judgements about the objective frequency of the name in the 
USA. Spontaneous discounting also occurs across a range of other types of judgements. For 
example, Schwarz et al. (1983) found that, whilst subjects tend to report greater happiness on 
sunny days than on rainy days, this phenomenon can be cancelled by explicitly drawing 
subject's attention to the weather by commenting on it immediately before asking them about 
their mood. 
Supposing that the availability heuristic is affected by spontaneous discounting, how does this 
cause problems for the availability heuristic explanation of the error-salience phenomenon? 
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Nagel observes that the general lesson of spontaneous discounting is that when subjects are 
overtly primed with a construct, they tend to correct (or overcorrect) for its influence on their 
immediate subsequent judgements.  She then observes that the mention of the possibility of 
error in the typical kinds of MEP-cases that epistemologists deal in cannot reasonably be 
described as subliminal. Indeed, it appears to be overt. But in that case we should not 
necessarily expect that mentioning error possibilities will lead to an increase in people’s 
subjective probability judgements about their obtaining in the way that the availability 
heuristic explanation suggests, and indeed we may well expect the opposite effect. Call this 
the spontaneous discounting objection 
§4.2.4 The cancelling objection 
Nagel's forth objection is this: the error-salience phenomenon seems to be active in 
environments where we are reasoning carefully about epistemological issues (in the 
epistemology classroom, for example). So those who endorse the availability heuristic 
explanation will need to make the case that the heuristic is in operation in such environments. 
However, she notes, this suggestion is at odds with general facts about the workings of 
heuristics. Most heuristic tend to be diminished in effect in situation where we have 
"incentives for accuracy, or penalties for error, have been made self-conscious about our 
judgements, or expect to have to justify our judgements to others." (2010: 299) These 
conditions seem to be precisely though found in the epistemology classroom. In such contexts 
people tend to rely more on systematic processing and less on heuristics. So unless the 
heuristic that explains the error-salience phenomenon is especially robust or difficult to 
cancel, we should not expect it to have a substantial on our knowledge attributions and 
denials. And we may add (though Nagel does not) that the evidence suggests that the 
availability heuristic is not unusually robust. Call this the cancelling objection.  
§4.2.5 The probability objection 
Nagel's last objection has a more conceptual flavour. She objects is that it is unclear that a 
perceived non-zero probability of error makes the relevant kind of difference to knowledge 
attributions. People can, it seems, judge that the probability of the unrealized error possibility 
is very low, yet be inspired to deny that the subject knows. The persuasiveness of sceptical 
strategies, Nagel observes, seem to depend on the sceptic being able to persuade us that things 
would look the same to the subject in the world in which they falsely believe that p. 
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Persuasiveness doesn't seem to track probabilities. But in that case, it is unclear why the 
availability heuristic's leading people to overestimate the probability of the false belief 
possibility obtaining would result in them judging that the subject does not know. 
Furthermore, it is, Nagel argues, unclear why a slight increase in the apparent probability of 
the false belief possibility obtaining would be enough to sway people from judging that the 
subject knows to judging that he does not know. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that 
people will often judge that a subject lacks knowledge that p when the probability of p being 
false is explicitly stated as being very small - for example, in lottery cases - but continue to 
attribute knowledge of propositions that were formed using methods with a higher degree of 
fallibility. Given this, one might wonder why an increase in the perceived probability of 
epistemic danger would lead people to deny that a subject knows. Call this objection the 
probability objection.42 
 
§4.3 How does the simulation heuristic explanation fare against Nagel's 
objections? 
 
We have five objections to the availability heuristic explanation of the error-salience 
phenomenon from Nagel: the imaginability objection; the comparative imaginability 
objection; the spontaneous discounting objection; the cancelling objection; and the 
probability objection. This section addresses the question: how does the simulation heuristic 
explanation fare against these objections? 
First though, I will make some remarks on the persuasiveness of the objections. I am 
persuaded by the imaginability objection, the spontaneous discounting objection, and the 
probability objection. Together they appear to me to torpedo the availability heuristic 
explanation, and I have nothing further to add to them. However, matters are more complex 
when it comes to the comparative imaginability objection, and the cancelling objection. With 
respect to the comparative imaginability objection, as Gerken (2013) points out, there seems 
                                                 
42 Nagel offers a second conceptual objection that focuses specifically on the prospects of appealing to the 
availability heuristic explanation to defend invariantism, rather than simply to explain the error-salience 
phenomenon. Since the purpose of this essay isn't to defend invariantism, we will skip it. 
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to be something of a consensus amongst epistemologists that, contra Nagel, it is harder to get 
people to go negative with their knowledge attributions by mentioning far-fetched, recherché, 
and hard to imagine alternatives, than it is with commonplace, easier-to-imagine, alternatives 
(MacFarlane 2005, et al). Anyone who has taught an undergraduate epistemology class will 
know that it is a better idea to try to generate scepticism in one's students about whether S 
knows that her car is parked outside by pointing out that she can't rule the possibility that it 
has been stolen than by pointing out that she can't rule out the possibility that it has 
spontaneously reorganized into the form of a giant lizard. (The example is MacFarlane's). No 
empirical work has yet been done on the relationship between knowledge attribution and the 
comparative ease or difficulty of imagining mentioned alternatives. The matter should be 
studied. But we can, with at least a reasonable degree of confidence, proceed on the 
assumption that, contra Nagel, harder-to-imagine alternatives are less effective at generating 
negative knowledge attribution judgements than easier-to-imagine alternatives. For this 
reason, I do not find the comparative imaginability objection persuasive. And from here 
onwards I will not take it to be a desideratum on the simulation heuristic explanation that it is 
able to avoid Nagel's objection.  
I will also not take it to be a desideratum on the simulation heuristic explanation that it is able 
to avoid the cancelling objection. The reason for this is that, whilst we should expect to see 
diminished reliance on non-robust heuristics in the circumstances that Nagel describes when 
there are more methodical means by which to arrive at a judgement on the question at hand, it 
is a striking fact about knowledge attribution that we do not have any methodical means by 
which to form judgements about whether a given subject knows that p. All we have to go on 
is our intuitive judgement. Accordingly, it is hard to see how whatever heuristics (if any) that 
have an influence on knowledge attribution would be diminished in effect, even if the 
assessment of whether a subject knows is being performed in circumstances under which 
reliance on non-robust heuristics is usually diminished. Thus, the cancelling objection misses 
the mark.   
So how does the simulation heuristic explanation fare against the probability objection, the 
imaginability objection, and the spontaneous discounting objection? I see no difficulties for 
the simulation heuristic explanation analogous to those facing the availability heuristic 
explanation with respect to the probability objection. The simulation heuristic explanation 
makes no reference to probabilities, and makes no claim that people's judgements about the 
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probability of error possibilities explains the error-salience phenomenon. So there is no 
apparent reason why the fact that people can, at least ostensibly, continue to judge that the 
probability of the unrealized error possibility is very low and at the same time be moved to 
deny that the subject knows would create trouble for the simulation heuristic explanation. 
Nor, for the same reason, is there any apparent reason why trouble would be created by the 
fact that people will often judge that a subject lacks knowledge of the truth of a proposition 
when the probability of it being false is explicitly stated as being vanishingly small, but 
continue to attribute knowledge of propositions that were formed using methods with a higher 
degree of fallibility. 
According to the imaginability objection, when events of a certain type are hard to imagine, 
the influence of the availability heuristic is to make people judge them to be less, rather than 
more, likely to obtain. And since it is far from clear that the kinds of MEP cases that 
philosophers and the folk have interacted with describe easy, rather than hard, to imagine, 
possibilities, it is correspondingly far from clear that the error-salience phenomenon can be 
explained by appeal to the workings of the availability heuristic. The objection clearly doesn't 
carry directly over to the simulation heuristic explanation. That explanation makes no 
reference to the likelihood of outcomes in its account, so the fact that people will judge hard-
to-imagine events as less likely has no bearing on the plausibility of the explanation. 
However, one might wonder: does a roughly analogous objection arise for the simulation 
heuristic explanation? Not obviously. Whilst there is good evidence that counterfactual 
possibilities that are easier to imagine tend to be mutated more than those that are hard to 
imagine (Byrne 2002, 2005), this fact doesn't obviously threaten the simulation heuristic 
explanation. The only inference we could reasonably make from the fact that hard to imagine 
possibilities are mutated less than easy to imagine possibilities is that there will be a greater 
tendency for people to deny knowledge in MEP cases where the error possibility is easy to 
imagine than there is in MEP cases where the error possibility is hard to imagine. But, as just 
discussed, it seems quite likely that this is what actually happens. Suppose that most of the 
MEP cases that epistemologists discuss do in fact describe error possibilities that are hard 
imagine. The only way that this would cause problems for the simulation heuristic 
explanation would be if, when people attended to hard to imagine possibilities, they became 
even more confident that things couldn't have been otherwise to how they were than their non-
MEP counterparts who haven't had their attention drawn to any other possibilities. But there is 
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no evidence for or against this being the case. The matter will need to be studied further. But 
unless such a patterning is found, there will be no analogous imaginability objection against 
the simulation heuristic explanation. 
What about the spontaneous discounting objection? Does the phenomenon of spontaneous 
discounting undermine the prospects of the simulation heuristic explanation? Nagel's concern 
was that when there is an obvious explanation for availability, people will tend to discount it 
in forming their judgements. And since MEP cases seem to be cases when the explanation for 
increased availability is obvious, it is unlikely that the error-salience phenomenon can be 
explained by the influence of the availability heuristic. One parallel concern for the simulation 
heuristic explanation would be if, when there is an obvious explanation for the increased 
salience of a counterfactual aspect of the situation, subjects will, as a result, tend not to mutate 
it to the same extent that they do when there is no obvious explanation for increased salience, 
and to a lesser extent than those who have not had their attention drawn to it The question of 
whether or not this is the case has not been studied. So more work will be needed here before 
we can draw any conclusions. (There is, it seems, no a priori reason to expect it to happen 
however). Another concern might be that when there is obvious explanation for the increased 
salience of an alternative, people will tend to discount the relevance of the salience. If so, then 
even if they come to recognise that the subject would falsely believe that p in this possible 
world, they will not be lead to deny that the subject knows that p because they will not treat 
this world as an epistemically relevant one. This possibility has not yet been studied. So more 
empirical work will need to be done here too.  
 
§4.4. Nagel's hypothesis: Epistemic Egocentrism 
 
It is not clear that any of Nagel's objections to the availability heuristic explanation cause 
trouble for the simulation heuristic explanation (though more empirical work will be required 
before we know where exactly it stands). However, having criticised the availability heuristic 
explanation, Nagel goes on to present her own hypothesis about the psychological 
mechanisms producing the error-salience phenomenon. This section presents Nagel's 
hypothesis. The next section discusses the relative strengths and weaknesses of my hypothesis 
and Nagel's, and presents outstanding empirical questions that will need to be studied in order 
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for us further our understanding of psychology behind the error-salience phenomenon. 
Nagel's account appeals to a psychological bias known as epistemic egocentrism. Work by, 
amongst others, Royzman et al. (2003) and Birch et al. (2004), has shown that people are 
poor at representing the perspectives of those with less information than themselves. The 
result of this is that they often draw on privileged information when evaluating other's 
judgements. For example, Baron and Hershey (1988) tested subjects by having them evaluate 
fictional medical and financial decisions. Baron and Hershey provided the subjects with the 
information on which decisions were supposedly made, and also on the supposed outcomes of 
the decisions. Baron and Hershey found that although most subjects believed that the 
information about the supposed outcomes had no effect on their evaluation of the decision, in 
reality their evaluations were strongly biased by the outcome given. Despite recognising that 
the people whose decisions they were evaluating did not share their knowledge of the 
outcomes when they made their decisions, when they were asked about the quality of the 
decisions, the subjects represented the decision-makers egocentrically, as though they did 
have this knowledge. 
Nagel's proposal is that the bias of epistemic egocentricity might explain the error-salience 
phenomenon as follows:  
 "If we naturally evaluate the statements and judgements of more naive subjects as 
 though they shared our privileged beliefs and concerns, without being aware that we 
 are doing so, we may unfairly penalize them for failing to respond to those concerns as 
 we would, just as Baron and Hershey's subjects penalized the fictitious doctors whose 
 patients died from a generally very beneficial procedure with a small risk of death" 
 (2010: 303) 
How would this apply to the (a) and (b) cases? Nagel suggests that, since in (b) but not (a), 
concerns about the possibility of tricky lighting have been raised, readers will mistakenly 
evaluate John as if he shared those concerns in (b). Once they have done so, they will 
interpret the fact that he did not check the colour of the lighting, despite having a concern as 
to its colour, as a sign of compromised or motivated belief formation. The typical hallmarks 
of compromised or motivated belief formation - haste, distraction, wishful thinking etc. - are 
conditions which typically lower the accuracy of judgement. When the accuracy of one's 
judgement is compromised, one seems to be a mere believer, rather than a knower. Thus 
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readers of (b) will display a greater tendency than readers of (a) to deny that John knows, 
exactly in line with the error-salience phenomenon. The same will go for all MEP-cases. 
 
§4.5 Comparing the simulation heuristic explanation and the epistemic 
egocentrism explanation 
 
This section examines the respective merits of the epistemic egocentricity explanation and the 
simulation heuristic explanation. An important first observation is that, just as before with the 
availability heuristic explanation, the simulation heuristic explanation and the epistemic 
egocentricity explanation need not be seen as rivals, for it is entirely possible that they both 
contribute to the error-salience phenomenon (Nagel makes no claim that her explanation is 
exhaustive). 
What can be said in favour of the epistemic egocentricity explanation? First off, it appears to 
avoid most of the objections facing the availability heuristic explanation. If the error-salience 
phenomenon is produced not by increased availability, but rather by the mistaken projection 
of concerns on to subjects, then the fact that when events of a certain type are hard to imagine, 
people tend judge them to be less, rather than more, likely to obtain, would appear to be 
irrelevant to whether they will display more of a tendency to deny knowledge in MEP-cases 
than in non MEP-cases. Additionally, as Nagel points out, unlike the availability heuristic, the 
epistemic egocentricity bias is known not to be subject to spontaneous discounting (Pohl & 
Hell 1996, Krueger & Clement 1994). So the epistemic egocentricity explanation is not 
vulnerable to the spontaneous discounting objection. Nor is there any reason to think that it 
will be vulnerable to the probability objection - concerns aren't a function of probabilities. 
Moreover, the epistemic egocentricity explanation has been subjected to empirical testing by 
Alexander, Gonnerman, & Waterman (forthcoming) (hereafter 'AGW'). AGW observed that 
the epistemic egocentricity explanation predicts that there should be relatively little difference 
between narrator cases - cases where the relevant information about the possibility of error is 
shared only with the reader, and not the subject - and subject cases - cases where the 
possibility of error is shared with the subject of the case (for example, by including another 
party in the story who tells the subject that, say, the table would have looked red to him if he 
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had been looking at a white table under a red light). AGW tested this prediction by comparing 
the strength of agreement in readers with the statement 'John knows that the table is red'. 
across narrator cases and subject cases. In line with the prediction of the epistemic 
egocentricity explanation, they found no statistically significant difference in readers mean 
strength of agreement with the statement. This result is compatible with the epistemic 
egocentricity explanation. 
AGW also hypothesised that if epistemic egocentricity is producing the error-salience 
phenomenon, then we should find a negative correlation between the projection of our 
concerns onto others and our willingness to attribute knowledge to them. They tested this 
hypothesis by presenting participants with Nagel's (b) MEP-case, and asking them to indicate 
their strength of agreement with (1) the claim that John knows that the table is red, and (2) the 
claim that John is considering the possibility that he is looking at a white table under a red 
spotlight. They found a modest negative correlation. It is, they note, unclear what this tells us 
about the epistemic egocentricity explanation. One possibility, they suggest, is that it is 
exactly what we should expect on that explanation, since the standard line on epistemic 
egocentrism is that people are unaware of the fact that it has occurred (Baron & Hershey 
1988, Camerer et al. 1989). If people are unaware that they are projecting concerns, then we 
shouldn't expect to find a strong negative correlation simply by asking subjects whether they 
thinking that John shares the concern, since they will presumably have limited access to their 
projections. If this is right, AGW note, then if we are to find good evidence for the epistemic 
egocentricity explanation, we need to find better ways of measuring the largely unconscious 
projection. However, they also consider some other possibilities. Perhaps for example, people 
are aware of their projections, but raise the standards for knowledge attribution in 
conversational contexts that mentioned unrealized error possibilities in non-uniform ways. 
More work is needed here.  
The epistemic egocentricity explanation certainly has things to be said in favour of it. 
However, two concerns remain outstanding. Firstly, as discussed in §7, there is some reason to 
think that, contra Nagel, it is harder to elicit knowledge denials in MEP-cases where the 
mentioned unrealized error possibility is hard to imagine, than it is in MEP-cases where the 
mentioned unrealized error possibility is easier to imagine. Epistemologists do a better job of 
making sceptics of their students by pointing out that you can't rule out that your car was 
stolen than by pointing out that it could have spontaneously reformed in the form of a giant 
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lizard. If this is right, can the epistemic egocentricity explanation account for it? The matter is 
unclear. There is no obvious reason to expect that the fact that the counterfactual possibility 
one is concerned about is hard to imagine would lead one to be less inclined to deny that a 
subject who shares the concern, but does nothing to rule it out, knows. But in that case, there 
is no obvious reason to expect that the epistemic egocentricity explanation does predict the 
(apparent) fact that harder-to-imagine cases elicit less of a tendency towards knowledge 
denial. And that might be seen as a mark against it. However, caution is needed here. Firstly, 
as noted earlier, no empirical work has yet been done to show that harder-to-imagine MEP-
cases result in less knowledge-denial than easier-to-imagine MEP-cases. Secondly, ease of 
imagination effects can have subtle and surprising interactions with other effects. 43  So it 
would be hasty to draw a priori conclusions. The matter should be studied further. 
The second worry is this: the epistemic egocentricity explanation relies on the assumption that 
in MEP cases like case (b) merely mentioning the possibility of error is sufficient to raise it as 
a concern in the reader's mind. But it is not obvious that this is the case. Mentioning 
something isn't the same thing as expressing a concern about it, so if the epistemic 
egocentricity explanation is to be persuasive we will have to be given good reason to think 
that in MEP cases mentioning tends to trigger concern. Again, more work is needed here. 
The simulation heuristic explanation doesn't face these two worries. Since it makes no 
reference to concerns, it does not have to make good on the claim that mentioning triggers 
concern. And it seems quite clear that we should expect to find the phenomenon of harder-to-
imagine cases eliciting less of a tendency towards knowledge denial if the simulation heuristic 
explanation is correct. It is widely recognised that people tend to mutate alternatives that are 
easy to imagine to a greater degree than those that are hard to imagine (Byrne 2002, 2005). So 
if the error-salience phenomenon is the result of people mutating the mentioned error 
possibility in MEP-cases and thereby coming to deny that the subject knows, then we should 
expect to see this tendency weakened when the mentioned error possibility is harder-to-
imagine as compared to when it is easier-to-imagine. This is a point in favour of the 
simulation heuristic explanation. 
What about AGW's studies? Do they tell against the simulation heuristic explanation? They 
do not. AGW found no difference in people’s tendency to attribute knowledge between 
narrator cases and subject cases. This result is in line with the epistemic egocentricity 
                                                 
43 Thanks to Jennifer Nagel here. 
 75 
explanation, but it equally well comports with the simulation heuristic explanation. In both 
the narrator and the subject cases, the reader's attention was drawn to the unrealized 
possibility that John would have believed that he was looking at a red table if he was looking 
at a white table under a red light. The cases are the same in this respect. And according to the 
simulation heuristic explanation, it is this fact about attention that causes people to deny that 
he knows. So on the simulation heuristic explanation, we wouldn't expect to see any 
difference in knowledge attribution between the narrator and subject cases. Thus AGW's first 
study equally well supports the simulation heuristic explanation as the epistemic egocentricity 
explanation.  
What about AGW's second study? The simulation heuristic explanation does not predict that 
there will be a negative correlation between experimental participants projection of concerns 
onto others and their willingness to attribute knowledge. So prima facie the fact that AGW 
found a negative correlation would seem to be a blow to the simulation heuristic explanation. 
However, matters are not so straightforward. As AGW note, the negative correlation they 
found was very modest. AGW suggest that this might be what we should expect on the 
epistemic egocentricity explanation, because the standard line on epistemic egocentrism is 
that people are unaware of the fact that it has occurred. But if the influence of epistemic 
egocentrism really is opaque to those it affects, then it is unclear that we should expect to find 
any negative correlation of the sort that AGW found on the epistemic egocentricity 
explanation. If people don't realise that they are illegitimately projecting concerns on to the 
subject, then asking them whether they think the subject has the relevant concerns ought not 
to be an effective experimental method. So it is quite unclear what AGW's second study tells 
us, and what is producing the modest negative correlation. Insofar as these matters are 
unclear, we should be hesitant to take the results to undermine the simulation heuristic 
explanation. 
In the next section I show how the simulation heuristic explanation integrates with Gerken's 
epistemic focal bias theory. However, before we proceed, it will be useful to sum up some of 
the outstanding empirical questions.  
Before we can be confident that the error-salience phenomenon is the result of the influence 
of the simulation heuristic, we will need to know more about the nature of the simulation 
heuristic. Two point of interest have been identified: firstly, it should be investigated whether 
the simulation heuristic is subject to spontaneous discounting in such a way that this would 
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undermine the simulation heuristic explanation. Secondly, the matter of just what effect 
drawing people’s attention to hard-to-imagine counterfactual aspects of a situation has on 
their counterfactual reasoning should be investigated.  
One empirical question of interest to both the simulation heuristic explanation and the 
epistemic egocentricity explanation is the contrasting effects of presenting people with easy-
to-imagine MEP-cases and hard-to-imagine MEP-cases. Are people more willing to attribute 
knowledge when the mentioned unrealized alternative is hard to imagine than when it is easy 
to imagine? Epistemologists have tended to assume that they are. But the matter can, and 
should, be tested empirically. If the assumption turns out to be correct, then it will be 
important for the epistemic egocentricity explanation to investigate the effects of difficulty of 
imaginability on epistemic egocentricity. If the assumption turns out to be incorrect, this will 
be a strike against the simulation heuristic explanation. 
 
§4.6 Gerken on epistemic focal bias 
 
Mikkel Gerken (2013) has also offered a proposal about the psychological processes 
generating the error-salience phenomenon. In this section I briefly present Gerken's proposal, 
and show how it does not compete with, but rather complements, the simulation heuristic 
explanation. Gerken's account, which he calls 'epistemic focal bias', derives from the 
following two principles: 
 Principle of contextual salience: Normally, for an agent, A, q is a contextually 
 salient alternative to S's knowledge that p iff A processes q as an epistemically 
 relevant alternative to S's knowledge that p 
 Principle of epistemic satisficing: Normally, an agent A, forms epistemic  judgements 
 on the basis of a prima facie reason that is arrived at by processing  only a limited part 
 of the evidence that is available to A. 
We discussed the principle of contextual salience in §3. As Gerken says:  
 "Often the psychological salience of some feature of a scenario affects our  cognitive 
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 processing whether or not that feature is relevant to the task at hand. This 
 psychological feature is reasonable since, for many tasks, the contextual salience of 
 something can amount to defeasible evidence for its relevance to the task (Bach 1985, 
 2010: §5; Gigerenzer and Todd 1999; Stanovich 2009). If so, processing salient 
 features of a scenario as epistemically relevant is normally a cognitive practice that 
 exemplifies bounded rationality since this mode of processing makes good use of the 
 subject’s limited cognitive resources (Stein 1996)." Gerken (2013: 50) 
 Gerken's reason for postulating the principle of epistemic satisficing is that it is a very 
general fact about human cognition that people will often reach a judgement via a process that 
comes to a halt once a prima facie reason has been found (Simon 1955, 1983).  
Gerken observes that if the principle of contextual salience and the principle of epistemic 
satisficing both hold, then we should expect the error-salience phenomenon. When an 
alternative, q, has been made salient, as happens in MEP-cases (but not in non MEP-cases), 
according to the principle of contextual salience people will normally regard this as 
incompatible with S's knowing that p, unless they regard S as being able to rule out q. So in 
MEP-cases people will normally acquire a prima facie reason to regard S as a non-knower. 
They will not acquire any such reason in non MEP-cases. According to the principle of 
epistemic satisficing, the processing normally comes to a halt once a prima facie reason for 
making a judgement has been arrived at. That is, people will normally not engage in further 
processing by critically assessing the salient alternative in the light of her background beliefs 
or further evidence. Rather, they will normally judge that S does not know in MEP cases. In 
this way, the error-salience phenomenon will be produced. 
The epistemic focal bias account is perfectly compatible with the simulation heuristic 
explanation. Indeed the two complement one another.44 The simulation heuristic explanation 
primarily offers an account of why people will display more of a tendency to recognise that 
there is a possible world in which the subject falsely believes that p in MEP-cases than in non 
MEP-cases. The epistemic focal bias account, on the other hand, offers an explanation for 
why this disparity in recognition will lead people to deny knowledge in MEP-cases but not in 
non MEP-cases. Since the two accounts focus on different parts of the set of psychological 
processes that produce the error-salience phenomenon, they do not compete with one another. 
                                                 
44 Gerken notes that the epistemic focal bias account and the epistemic egocentricity explanation may also 
complement one another (2013: 59 f26) 
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And in fact they complement one another, since combined they offer us a more thorough 
explanation of the phenomenon than either does alone. For example, supposing that it is 
harder to get people to go negative in their knowledge judgements by mentioning harder-to-
imagine error possibilities than it is with easier-to-imagine error possibilities, the epistemic 
focal bias account alone lacks the resources to explain why this is. The simulation heuristic 
explanation, by contrast, predicts it. 
 
 
 
V. The Semantics Of 'Knows' Again 
 
 
 
As discussed in §2, Williamson, Hawthorne, Nagel, and Gerken, all take their proposals to 
lend some support for invariantism about the semantics of 'knows'. In each case, the argument 
takes the same form: the existence of the error-salience phenomenon appears to pose a 
challenge to invariantism, since if invariantism were correct, it would show that people 
commit systematic errors in their knowledge attribution. However, if it can be shown that we 
should expect there to be such errors even if 'knows' has an invariantist semantics, because 
they are the result of well known psychological heuristics or biases, then the case against 
invariantism is at least partially undermined. And of course this is what the invariantists try to 
show - Williamson and Hawthorne with the availability heuristic explanation, Nagel with the 
epistemic egocentricity explanation, and Gerken with the epistemic focal bias account.  
One might also think that the simulation heuristic explanation similarly blocks the argument 
against invariantism from the error-salience phenomenon. The thought would be that people 
rely on mental simulation to form judgements about whether the subject's belief is sufficiently 
modally robust to count as an item of knowledge, but because mental simulation is influenced 
by a heuristic which leads people to mutate salient aspects of a scenario more than non-salient 
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aspects, people are systematically led astray in their knowledge attributions when presented 
with salient, but epistemically irrelevant, error possibilities. 
I have reservations about appealing to the psychological processes producing the error-
salience phenomenon to defend invariantism. Though I certainly don't have a knock-down 
argument against the prospects of doing so, I will in closing, briefly sketch a line of thought 
according to which we should expect the error-salience phenomenon producing psychological 
processes to be constitutive of the concept of knowledge. We begin with the observation that 
according to traditional Bayesian decision theory, rational decision makers maximize 
expected utility, where expected utility is a function of the value of various possible 
outcomes, and the probability of their occurring. However, as Ross and Schroeder (2014) 
point out, for almost every proposition one should, and typically will, have a non-zero 
credence that it is true, since there is nothing that we can be completely certain is false. If we 
were to factor all of these non-zero probabilities into our decision making, then coming to a 
decision about how to act would very often be an unmanageably complex task for creatures, 
like ourselves, who have limited cognitive capacities and often need to engage in decision 
making in time-pressured circumstances. For this reason it has long been recognised by 
decision theorists - Savage (1972) and Joyce (1999) - and more recently by epistemologists - 
Weatherson (2005) and Ross and Schroeder (2014) - that when we are engaged in practical 
reasoning we must take some uncertain propositions to be certain for the purposes of decision 
making in order for decision making tasks to be manageable. One recent proposal is that our 
system of practical reasoning is governed by a norm stating that one should treat p as certain 
for the purposes of practical reasoning only if one knows that p. This is, of course, 
controversial.45 Suppose, however, that it is correct. In that case, it seems that one central role 
for the concept of knowledge is to simplify decision making tasks by allowing us to take as 
certain in our practical reasoning uncertain propositions that are known to be true.46 This is 
where the concern arises for invariantism. Given that we face a huge number of decision 
making tasks every day, we need a way of making good decisions in a cognitively cheap 
manner. If the function of the concept of knowledge is to help us to do this, by enabling us to 
simplify decision making tasks, then we will need a concept of knowledge that allows us to 
make accurate knowledge attributions in a cognitively cheap manner, if we are to be rational 
                                                 
45 Brown (2008), Neta (2009), Reed (2010), Schiffer (2007), and Gerken (2011), amongst others, dispute the 
claim. This issue is discussed in greater detail in the essays 'Excuses and Epistemic Norms', and 'From Moore's 
Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond' in this dissertation. 
46 See the essay 'From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond' in this dissertation. 
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decision makers. And there is some tension between this need, and the invariantist suggestion 
that reliance on heuristics leads to systematic error in our knowledge attribution. If heuristic 
psychological processes have a tendency to lead us astray in our knowledge attributions in the 
way that the discussed proposals suggest when coupled with invariantism, then accurately 
judging whether a subject - either oneself of another - knows or not, will be a fairly hard 
cognitive task, requiring correction from system 2 psychological processes, rather than sole 
reliance on system 1 processes. Thus, making accurate knowledge attributions will be a 
relatively laborious and cognitively expensive task if invariantism is correct as compared to if 
contextualism is correct, for on contextualism, relying on such heuristics will tend not to lead 
one astray in one's knowledge attributions. For this reason I think it is unclear that an 
invariantist concept of knowledge would be fit to play one of the central normative roles that 
it is designed to play. The tension is between the fact that we employ the concept of 
knowledge to ease the cognitive burden of decision making and the fact that on invariantism 
accurate knowledge attribution will be a cognitively burdensome task. The tension appears to 
be lessened if our concept of knowledge is contextualist, and this, one might think, is a prima 
facie reason to prefer contextualism if, as the proposals discussed here suggest, knowledge 
attribution is influenced by heuristic processes. 
As I said, this is hardly a conclusive argument. It is possible that even if invariantism is 
correct, sufficiently accurate knowledge attribution is cognitively cheap enough for the 
concept of knowledge to play the required role. Nevertheless, there does appear to be some 
cause for concern. This issue should be explored more, but this task is beyond the scope of 
this essay. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 
Questions about what psychological processes produce the error-salience phenomenon are 
complex and relatively under-explored. Much more work will need to be done before we can 
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confidently draw any conclusions. Nevertheless, there is, I have argued, some reason to think 
that the phenomenon might be at least in part explained as the result of the influence of the 
simulation heuristic on knowledge attribution. The goal of this essay has been to sketch how 
such an explanation would go. This lays a foundation for further investigation. 
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4. Excuses And Epistemic Norms 
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§I. Norms, Justifications, and Excuses 
 
 
 
 
§1.1 The Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning 
 
 
Recently it has been popular to argue that there are epistemic constraints on appropriate 
practical reasoning. That is, in order for a chain of practical reasoning to be permissible, from 
an epistemic point of view, the reasoner must bear a certain epistemic relation to the 
propositions employed in the reasoning. Just what this epistemic relation might be is a matter 
of controversy. John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (2008) defend the following principle: 
 
 RPK: Where one's choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the proposition p as 
 a reason for acting iff you know that p 
 
RPK states that, when p is relevant to practical decision making, knowing that p is necessary 
and sufficient for appropriately treating p as a reason for acting, where appropriateness should 
be understood in terms permissibility: it is epistemically permissible to treat p as a reason for 
acting iff you know that p.47 The necessity direction claim of RPK, which will be the focus of 
this essay (call it the 'K-Norm'), has come in for criticism.48 A number of authors have offered 
apparent counterexamples to the K-Norm and argued that, as a result, we should prefer 
weaker principles requiring subjects to merely stand in some kind of justification or justified 
belief relation to p in order to appropriately employ it in practical reasoning (call these 'J-
Norms'). The purpose of this essay is threefold. Some have objected to appeals to the 
justification/excuse distinction made by K-Norm proponents in response to the would-be 
counterexamples. In the first section of the essay I reply to these objections, arguing that they 
                                                 
47Elsewhere Hawthorne and Stanley offer up variations of this idea: 'One should act on p only if one knows that 
p' (Stanley, 2005: 9); 'If p is practically relevant, it is acceptable to use the premise that p in one's practical 
reasoning only if one knows that p, and (at least in many cases) unacceptable to use the premise that p in one's 
practical reasoning if one doesn't know it' (Hawthorne, 2004: 30). Fantl and McGrath (2009) also defend several 
knowledge-action principles. The most recent and important of these is 'KJ': 'If you know that p, then p is 
warranted enough to justify you in Φ'ing, for any Φ'. In this essay I will focus only on the formulation found in 
Hawthorne and Stanley (2008). 
48 As has the sufficiency direction. See Brown (2008) 
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are, variously, unpersuasive and inconclusive. In the second section of the essay I explore the 
question of whether rivals to the K-Norm proposed by these critics are subject to would-be 
counterexamples analogous to those facing the K-Norm, and answer in the affirmative. I 
argue that, as a consequence of this, the rival proposals will likewise require an appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction. Finally, in the third section, I argue that, whilst this fact 
undermines the force of the J-Normers objections to the K-Norm, we have nevertheless as yet 
been given no reason at present to prefer the K-Norm to the rival norms, and vice versa, since 
we have been given no reason to prefer to draw the line between justification and excuse 
where K-Normers would have us draw it rather than where J-Normers would, and vice versa. 
 
 
§1.2. The K-Norm and Alleged Counterexamples 
 
 
Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) offer two kinds of considerations in defence of the K-Norm. 
Firstly, they observe that there is a close connection between the concept of knowledge and 
out everyday assessments of the behaviour of others. For example if Hannah and Sarah are 
trying to find the restaurant at which they have reservations, if instead of asking for 
directions, Hannah goes on her hunch that the restaurant is down a street on the left, and turns 
out to be mistaken, a natural way for Sarah to criticise Hannah's behaviour is by saying 'You 
shouldn't have gone down this street; you didn't know that the restaurant was here'. The K-
Norm, they observe, explains the appropriateness of Sarah's criticism. If it is permissible to 
act only on what you know, then the reasoning that led Hannah to act as she did was 
impermissible and she is, ceteris paribus, thereby criticisable on these grounds. Similarly, if 
John decides not to buy health insurance anymore, reasoning that he won't need it because he 
won't get ill, his mother may appropriately berate him for his decision on the grounds that he 
doesn't know that he won't fall ill. Again, the K-Norm explains the appropriateness of the 
criticism, in the same way that it does for Hannah. Moreover, Hawthorne and Stanley point 
out, knowledge also interacts with conditional orders in a way that supports the K-Norm. 
"Suppose a prison guard is ordered to shoot a prisoner if and only if they are trying to escape. 
If the guard knows someone is trying to escape and yet does not shoot he will be held 
accountable. Suppose meanwhile he does not know that someone is trying to escape but 
shoots then anyway, acting on a belief grounded in a baseless hunch that they were trying to 
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escape. Here again the person will be faulted." (2008: 572) Our common practice, Hawthorne 
and Stanley suggest, is to require knowledge of the antecedent of a conditional order in order 
to discharge it. Again, they observe, the suggestion that the K-Norm governs practical 
reasoning explains this fact. Lastly, they argue, blame and judgements of negligence interact 
with knowledge in a way that provides support for the K-Norm. For example, if a doctor uses 
a needle that he does not know to be clean, then he is prima facie negligent.  
 
The second consideration that Hawthorne and Stanley offer in defence of the K-Norm stems 
from the following scenario. Suppose that you are offered 1 cent for a lottery ticket that cost 
$1, in a 10,000 ticket lottery with a $5,000 first prize, and you reason as follows: 
 
 (1) I will lose the lottery 
 (2) So, if I keep the ticket I will get nothing 
 (3) If I sell the ticket I will get 1 cent 
 (4) So, I ought to sell the ticket 
 
This piece of practical reasoning is, Hawthorne and Stanley note, obviously defective. If one 
has only probabilistic evidence for the claim that one's ticket will lose, then it is clearly 
inappropriate to treat the proposition that the ticket will lose as a premise in one's practical 
reasoning, even if the proposition is in fact true, and enjoys strong probabilistic support. The 
most natural explanation of this, they suggest, is because, as the K-Norm claims, it is 
impermissible to treat p as a reason for acting unless one knows that p, and one cannot know 
merely on the basis of the probabilities involved that one's lottery ticket has lost. 
 
There is a great deal that can (and has) been said about these arguments for the K-Norm. For 
the purposes of this essay though, we can restrict our attention to one kind of objection to the 
view; namely that the K-Norm is subject to counterexamples from cases where subjects fail to 
know the relevant proposition, but it nevertheless seems inappropriate to criticise them for 
treating it as a premise in practical reasoning. Such cases come in two forms: Gettier cases, 
and justified false belief cases. Jessica Brown (2008) offers a good example of the first: 
 
 TIMETABLE: Suppose...that S leaves the office at 12.00pm in order to meet her 
 partner for lunch at 1pm. S believes truly that there is an express train at 12.20pm 
 which would allow her to arrive in time to make lunch. Further, this belief is justified: 
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 S checked the train timetable on the internet just before leaving the office. In fact, 
 unbeknownst to S, she is in a  Gettier situation:a hacker has got into the train website 
 and for a joke has replaced all of the  current timetables with last season’s timetables. 
 Luckily for S, according to both the old and new timetables, there is an express at 
 12.20pm. So, S’s belief is a case of true justified belief but not knowledge. (2008: 172) 
 
Suppose that S acts according to her belief that there is a 12.20 express train. Brown asks us 
to consider whether it is appropriate for her to do so. By Brown's judgement, it is. Intuitively, 
it doesn't seem appropriate for S's partner to criticise her actions, or her relying on her belief 
that there was a 12.20 express train. After all, S wasn't to know that the website had been 
hacked. It would be unreasonable for S's partner to criticise her by saying, for example, 'You 
shouldn't have left so late, as you didn't know there was an express at 12.20'. Brown takes the 
fact that such criticism would be unreasonable to show that, contra Hawthorne and Stanley, 
knowledge is not the norm of practical reasoning. As a general point, Brown argues, cases like 
TIMETABLE show that when a subject fails to know that p because her true belief is 
Gettiered, but would know that p were she in a non-Gettier case, the fact that her belief is 
Gettiered does not change the appropriateness of her relying on p in her practical reasoning. If 
Brown is right about this, then the K-Norm is false. Ram Neta (2009) makes the same point, 
as does Mikkel Gerken (2011).  
 
Gettier cases are not the only way that the K-Norm has been called into question. As Lackey 
(2007), Neta (2009), and Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) recognize, there are cases where a 
subject has a great deal of justification for p, and hence every reason to think that they know 
that p, but the subject doesn't know that p because p is false, yet it seems as though it would 
be wrong to criticise the subject for their behaviour when they act on p. An adaptation of the 
above case will serve to illustrate the point. Suppose the case is exactly the same, except that 
there is no express train at 12.20 - the old timetable is not the same as the new timetable when 
it comes to 12.20 trains - and S misses her lunch. Were S's partner to complain about her 
behaviour, she would, it seems, be well within her rights to respond that she had every reason 
to think that there was a 12.20 express - after all, the website said there would be, and how 
was she to know it had been hacked? - and that this legitimised her behaviour. Arguably, in 
this case, despite S not knowing that p and p being false, it was nevertheless permissible for S 
to rely on p in her practical reasoning. If it was, then the K-Norm is false, since there are non-
knowledge conditions under which it is epistemically permissible to employ p in one's 
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practical reasoning. 
 
 
§1.3. Responding To the Counterexamples: The Justification/Excuse 
Distinction 
 
 
We have, then, two types of apparent counterexamples to the K-Norm. Proponents of the K-
Norm are well aware of these. In an attempt to vitiate their force, Hawthorne and Stanley 
follow Williamson (2000) in appealing to the distinction between justifiably Φ-ing and 
excusably Φ-ing. They argue that Gettier cases and justified false belief cases are cases where 
the subject does not appropriately employ p in their practical reasoning - in line with the 
verdict of the K-Norm - but is to be excused for failing to meet the norm's conditions, because 
they have every reason to believe that they do meet the norm's conditions. Since their 
behaviour is excusable, they are not to be blamed or criticised. But, Hawthorne and Stanley 
argue, merely excusable behaviour should not be confused with justified behaviour, and the 
intuition that Gettiered subjects and justified false belief subjects are not open to criticism for 
acting as they do should, contra the critics, not be taken to show that they are fully justified in 
acting as they do. Moreover, Hawthorne and Stanley think, not only does the appeal to the 
distinction vitiate the force of the Gettier and justified false belief would-be counterexamples 
to the K-Norm, but also that the distinction is unavoidable. On this point they remark: 
  
 "...as Tim Williamson has emphasized, [the need to distinguish between justified Φ-ing 
 and excusable Φ-ing] will arise whatever one's normative theory, given that no 
 conditions are  luminous...In general, luminosity failure makes for confusion or at least 
 hesitancy in our normative theorizing...After all...excusable lapses from a norm are no 
 counterexample to that norm" (2008: 578) 
 
The idea here is that, since no conditions are luminous - where a condition C is luminous iff 
for every case A, if in A condition C obtains, then in A one is in a position to know that C 
obtains - it will always be possible for a subject to justifiably, but falsely, believe that they 
satisfy the conditions specified in a norm. Since the subject has 'done their best', they are 
excused from transgressing the norm. But they nevertheless fail to satisfy it. In that case, one 
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might think, there are no benefits to be had from moving to weaker justification norms, and 
the would-be counterexamples to the K-Norm fail to imperil the theory. We will turn to 
assessment of these claims about the universality of a need to appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction shortly. Before we do, it should be noted that a number of 
critics of the K-Norm have found the justification/excuse response unpersuasive, and used 
their objections, along with the would-be counterexamples, as a springboard to motivate rival 
proposals. 
 
 
 
 
§1.4 Objections to Appealing to the Justification/Excuse Distinction & Replies 
 
 
 
 
Jon Kvanvig's (2010) objection to Hawthorne and Stanley's reply can be found in the 
following passage: 
 
 "...the world is full of rules and requirements, 'musts' and 'oughts', but what we have a 
 need for are the epistemic underpinnings relevant to the fundamental questions of what 
 to do and what to believe. If we wish, we can put the answers to such questions in 
 terms of normative terminology: things we should do or should believe, things that are 
 the right thing to do or the right thing to believe. If we do so, we should understand the 
 relevant normativity in terms of the basic questions regarding what to do and what to 
 believe...[one problematic possibility] is to offer multiplicity where we seek simplicity. 
 Instead of offering one theory that tells us what to do and what to think, this approach 
 generates multiple answers, so that doing A or thinking B can be prescribed in terms of 
 one normative notion, but proscribed in terms of another. In the face of such 
 complexity, a Socratic response is appropriate: we want to know one thing - what to do 
 and what to think - and we get multiplicity. No, we want just one thing. It is really 
 important that we get it, and we will not pay much attention to theories that do not 
 answer this fundamental concern. Moreover, multiple answer theories are simply 
 unhelpful in this context, leaving only perplexity in their trail."  (2010: 237-238) 
 
Kvanvig takes the K-Norm, shored up with an appeal to the justification/excuse distinction, to 
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be a 'multiple answer theory', and hence undesirable. It is undesirable because appealing to the 
distinction conflicts with the fundamental goal of normative theorizing: to answer the central 
questions of the egocentric predicament - in this case the question being: 'when should I 
employ a proposition as a premise in practical reasoning?'. Should this objection make us 
hesitant to accept the K-Norm, given that it must appeal to the justification/excuse distinction 
in order to explain our judgements about Gettier and justified false belief cases? I'm sceptical. 
Taken on its face the objection belies a misunderstanding of the nature of the distinction 
proponents of the K-Norm wish to appeal to. Recall, the thought is that when one acts in 
accordance with the norm one's behaviour is justified, and when one blamelessly fails to act in 
accordance with it, one's behaviour is excusable. Arguably it is a mistake on Kvanvig's part to 
interpret this as a multiple answer theory. His complaint appears to be that a theorist touting 
such a theory fails to properly tell you what to do, since his answer, of the form 'You can do A, 
and you'll be justified, or you can do ~A, and you'll be excused', licenses conflicting options, 
and hence fails to give guidance on how to proceed. Interpreted in this way, Kvanvig's 
objection misses the mark. Such a theorist has told you what to do: A. Saying that one will be 
excused if one performs some act Φ is not, in any sense, to recommend, instruct, or advise 
that one Φ. Rather, to say that one will be excused if one Φ's is to inform that, under certain 
circumstances, one will not bear the adverse normative consequences that normally 
accompany Φ-ing. This is simply not the same thing as instructing, advising, or 
recommending Φ-ing. Excusable actions are wrong actions. They should not be done. 
Accordingly, one might think, it's hard to make sense of Kvanvig's complaint here, since there 
is no sense in which the proponent of the K-Norm is offering multiple answers to the question 
of what to do. 
 
However, there may be a more serious concern in the vicinity. Arguably a subject, like S in 
TIMETABLE, who has every reason to think that they know that p, and is in a situation where 
p is relevant to their decision making, would be irrational not to treat p as a reason for acting. 
Suppose that S decides, on nothing more than a baseless hunch that it might be wrong, not to 
rely on the timetable in front of her but instead to phone the train company before deciding 
what to do. It is quite natural to think that in behaving as she does, S behaves irrationally in 
virtue of being overly cautious. In that case, given the plausible assumption that rationality 
has normative force we do indeed have a multiple answer theory, for on the one hand we have 
the K-Norm telling S that she shouldn't employ p as a premise in her reasoning, and on the 
other, rationality telling her that she should. What then is she supposed to do? Which 
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suggestion should win out? This issue is one that K-Normers will have to face up to. However 
we shouldn't simply assume, as Kvanvig appears to, that a satisfactory non multiple-answer 
theory is available. No doubt, were it possible to develop one, it would be theoretically 
desirable to do so. But as Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) have emphasised, and as we will 
see in further detail later, given the extent and degree of luminosity failure, it may be that we 
are simply forced into accepting a multiple answer theory, whether we like it or not. If so, then 
Kvanvig's objection will be impotent. As it stands, it is inconclusive. 
 
Mikkel Gerken (2011) objects in a different way to Hawthorne and Stanley's appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction in defence of the K-Norm. His complaint is that there is no 
workable fleshing out of its details. Quite reasonably, he demands that proponents of the K-
Norm tell us just what the conditions are for one to excusably violate the norm. Running 
through several possibilities, he finds each wanting, and goes on to argue that the only 
plausible proposal ultimately collapses into his own Warrant Account, which states that: 
 
 WA: In the deliberative context, DC, S meets the epistemic conditions on  rational use 
 of (her belief that) p as a premise in practical reasoning or of (her belief that) p as a 
 reason for acting only if S is warranted in believing that p to a degree that is adequate 
 relative to DC 49 
 
WA takes a deliberative context as, not the de facto circumstances S is in, but rather the 
circumstances S rationally presupposes herself to be in, where the notion of rationality in play 
is externally constrained. Gerken means 'warranted in believing' to be roughly synonymous 
with 'justified in believing'. So WA states that a minimal epistemic constraint on appropriate 
employment of p in practical reasoning is that the subject employing p is justified in believing 
that p to a degree adequate to the circumstances the subject rationally presupposes herself to 
be in. Whilst he acknowledges that in some deliberative contexts knowledge will be required, 
Gerken also thinks that in others mere justified belief will be sufficient. 
 
Why does Gerken think that the only plausible account of the justification/excuse distinction 
in this context collapses into the WA? First he considers the following notion of excusability: 
one is excused for failing to satisfy the K-Norm when one has every reason to think that one 
                                                 
49Gerken actually expresses WA as a biconditional. Again, since our interest in this essay is only in necessity 
direction principles, I have amended the principle accordingly. 
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knows that p. He finds fault with this proposal, pointing out that very young humans most 
likely cannot entertain higher-order thoughts such as 'I know that p', and hence can't satisfy 
the excusability condition. Since, Gerken thinks, such subjects are capable of excusably 
failing to satisfy the epistemic norm of practical reasoning, this notion of excusability is 
flawed. The second possibility that Gerken considers is that a subject is excused when they 
possess knowledge level propositional justification for p.50  He takes this to be even less 
appealing than the first proposal, since it is not clear how the presence of such justification 
could be sufficient to excuse given that a subject can possess propositional justification for p 
even when this justification has no effect on the reasoning that leads to their acting, and hence 
has no place in an explanation of why the subject acted as they did. Finally, Gerken considers 
a proposal he finds more promising: a subject is excused when they justifiably believe that p. 
Here he adds a basing requirement to the propositional justification requirement - the subject 
must possess doxastic justification for p. However, Gerken maintains that this approach 
simply collapses into his own WA, because: 
 
 "It is compatible with a warrant approach to hold that the degree of warrant normally 
 required for knowledge is what is normally required for action/practical reasoning. But 
 a central reason for distinguishing between “warrant normally required for 
 knowledge” and “knowledge itself” is this: In certain epistemically abnormal cases, 
 the degree of warrant that would have met the warrant condition on knowledge in 
 normal circumstances is insufficient  for knowledge. In some such cases, the warrant 
 may nevertheless be sufficient for rational action/practical reasoning. As mentioned, 
 cases of warranted false belief and Gettier-style cases are paradigms of such 
 epistemically abnormal cases. So, to say that knowledge is normally required for 
 action/practical reasoning but that warranted belief will do in abnormal cases amounts 
 to accepting a version of a warrant account compatible with WA" (2011: 542) 
 
This line of thought is mistaken. Gerken assumes that proponents of the K-Norm will accept 
that the 'abnormal' cases are ones where the subject is justified in employing p in their 
practical reasoning - in his words, warranted belief "will do" in abnormal cases. If K-Norm 
proponents did accept such a thing, then Gerken would be right that the K-Norm collapses 
into his own WA, since they will deliver the same verdicts in the same cases. However, as we 
have already seen, proponents of the K-Norm will not accept this. They claim - unlike 
                                                 
50 For more on the notion of knowledge-level justification, see §2.2 
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Gerken's WA - that subjects in abnormal cases are excused, not justified. It may be that such 
subjects ought not bear the normative consequences typically associated with transgression of 
the norm, but they nevertheless engage in an act of wrongdoing. Pace Gerken, mere warranted 
belief, according to proponents of the K-Norm, will not do in abnormal cases. In this respect 
the K-Norm differs fundamentally from the WA. The upshot of this is that, firstly, a workable 
notion of excusability for the K-Norm does not cause it collapse into Gerken's WA, and 
secondly, that proponents of the K-Norm are free to characterise excusability in term of 
justified belief, or some other kind of knowledge-level-justification-plus-basing condition. 
 
So Gerken's objection raises no problem for the possibility of developing a workable 
justification/excuse distinction to shore up the K-Norm. A final objection comes from Lackey 
(2007). Unlike Kvanvig and Gerken, Lackey doesn't attempt to put pressure on the 
workability of the distinction. Rather she argues that it is wrongly applied by proponents of 
the K-Norm. Lackey asks us to consider our epistemic twins in demon worlds.51 They share 
all the same non-factive mental states as those of us in normal worlds who know that p - from 
the subjective perspective the demon world is indistinguishable from the normal world - but 
whereas we know that p, their beliefs that p are false, and hence not knowledge. Lackey's 
argument is simple: she claims that there is a strong intuitive pull to say that such subjects 
should not be subject to criticism when they employ p in their practical reasoning, and 
concludes from this that they are fully justified in doing so. 
 
It is hard to know what to make of this objection. Clearly proponents of the K-Norm can, and 
will, agree with Lackey that it is wrong to criticise subjects in demon worlds for behaving as 
they do. However, they will deny the assumption Lackey seems to make that non-
criticisability is sufficient for justification. Again, they think such behaviour is excusable. 
Lackey is best read, then, as denying that subjects in demon worlds are in any need of 
excuses, since they are fully justified, and motivating this claim by an appeal to intuition. 
Essentially she is arguing that proponents of the K-Norm are applying the justification/excuse 
distinction in the wrong place. What we seem to have then is a clash of intuitions, since, 
evidently, proponents of the K-Norm do not find it intuitive that demon world subjects are 
fully justified in employing they false beliefs that p in their practical reasoning. I take it that 
their reason for this is that in such cases there is one particular dimension on which demon-
world subjects beliefs are clearly inferior to their counterparts beliefs: namely, they are false. 
                                                 
51That is, consider the 'New Evil Demon' scenario described in Cohen (1984). 
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Given the apparent intuition-clash, it seems fair to say that Lackey's objection is, at best, 
inconclusive. Ideally we would like something firmer than intuitions to resolve this debate. 
 
 
 
 
§II. Justification Norms 
 
 
 
 
§2.1 Rival Proposals 
 
 
The criticisms surveyed of the K-Norm's proponent's appeals to the justification/excuse 
distinction are, variously, unpersuasive and inconclusive. However, the critics have 
nevertheless taken them, along with the would-be counterexamples, to show that it is 
theoretically desirable to have an account that obviates the need to appeal to the distinction. 
With this thought in mind, the critics have proposed rivals epistemic norms of practical 
reasoning that are, it is claimed, in a better position to capture our judgements about cases. 
 
We have already seen Gerken's (2011) proposal: replace the knowledge condition with a 
justification condition. A number of other authors offer up variations on this idea. Neta (2009) 
defends the following principle: 
 
 JBK: Where S's choice is p-dependent, it is rationally permissible for S to treat the 
 proposition that p as a reason for acting iff S justifiably believes that she knows that p 
 (2009: 686) 
 
Here we are interested in the necessity direction claim of JBK. It states that, rather than 
knowledge, a minimal epistemic constraint on the rational permissibility of a subject treating 
p as a reason for acting is that the subject justifiably believes that she knows that p. This is, in 
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one sense, a weaker condition than knowledge because a subject may justifiably, but 
mistakenly believe that they know that p. It is compatible with p being false.52 Neta argues 
that JBK delivers the right verdict about Gettier and justified false belief subjects: since such 
subjects plausibly justifiably believe that they know that p, they are justified in acting as they 
do in treating p as a reason for acting. He also argues that it explains all the cases Hawthorne 
and Stanley use to motivate the K-Norm. 
  
In the context of investigating epistemic norms of assertion, rather than practical reasoning, 
Lackey (2007) defends a somewhat different J-Norm. It is natural to think that her proposal 
could be carried over to the case of practical reasoning. The resulting J-Norm would look like 
this:53 
 
 RTBNA*: It is appropriate for S to employ p in practical reasoning only if (1) It is 
 reasonable for S to believe that p, and (2) If S employed p in practical reasoning, S 
 would do so at least in part because it is reasonable for S to believe that p 
 
The RTBNA* is to be understood as follows: clause (1) states that S must have a certain 
degree of propositional justification for the truth of p - enough to make a belief formed by S 
on the basis of this justification reasonable, where a reasonable belief is one that has 
justification of sufficient strength to underwrite the subject knowing that p. Clause (2) states 
that it is necessary that, if S does employ p in practical reasoning, S does so in part because p 
is well justified for S. That is, S's employing p in practical reasoning must be grounded in or 
based on the justification S has for p. This clause is included to prevent cases where the 
subject employing p in practical reasoning has excellent evidence for p, but does not pay any 
heed to this evidence in coming to act as she does, from counting as epistemically appropriate. 
Clauses like (2) will be important later. Since Gettier and justified false belief cases are ones 
where, Lackey argues, the subject reasonably believes that p, such cases are perfectly 
compatible with the RTBNA*. 
 
                                                 
52 Though in another sense it may be a stronger condition - if knowledge isn't luminous, then arguably there can 
be cases where S knows that p but doesn't justifiably believe that she knows that p. 
53Although it seems likely to me that Lackey would defend the principle I attribute to her here, strictly speaking 
she is not on the record as arguing for it, since her original arguments only concern epistemic norms of assertion, 
rather than practical reasoning. The same is true of the principle I will shortly attribute to Kvanvig. In each case I 
will, for ease of expression, speak as though these authors do indeed defend the epistemic norms of practical 
reasoning I discuss in this essay. If the reader objects to this, he or she should simply treat the relevant principles 
as possible positions that could be taken in the debate. 
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Like Lackey (2007), Kvanvig (2010), in the context of assertion rather than practical 
reasoning, also defends a justification norm. Again it is natural to think that his proposal could 
be carried over to the practical reasoning case, resulting in the following 'Justification 
Account': 
 
 JA:  It is appropriate for S to employ p in practical reasoning only if S has  epistemic 
 justification for p. 
 
'Epistemic justification' is a term of art for Kvanvig. He takes it, firstly to identify 
propositional, rather than doxastic, justification, and secondly - like Lackey - to be 
justification sufficient to underwrite knowledge. Understood as such, subjects in Gettier and 
justified false belief cases have epistemic justification for p. No shortcoming in their 
justification for p prevents them from knowing that p. Accordingly, JA judges such subjects to 
be justified in acting as they do in employing p as a premise in their practical reasoning. 
 
 
§2.2. Common Features of The J-Norms 
 
 
So we have four J-Norms of practical reasoning: JBK, RTBNA*, WA, and JA.54 It will be 
useful for the proceeding argumentation to draw out some important common features 
amongst them. The first of these is that all the proposed J-Norms should plausibly be 
understood as requiring, not just some justification, but a certain level of justification for 
appropriate employment of a proposition in practical reasoning: namely knowledge-level 
justification. It can be defined as follows:  
 
 K-level Justification: S is knowledge-level justified in believing p iff no weakness in 
                                                 
54J-Norms of practical reasoning have also been proposed by Littlejohn (2009) and Fantl and McGrath (2009). 
Littlejohn defends a principle according to which where one's choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat the 
proposition that p as a reason for acting iff you are justified in believing that p, and p is true. Fantl and McGrath 
defend the following principle: p is warranted enough to justify you Ф'ing, for any Ф iff you are justified in 
believing that p. I omit discussion of these proposals partly for reasons of space, and partly because they are not 
motivated by the claimed undesirability of appeals to the justification/excuse distinction in defense of the K-
Norm - the primary concern of this essay. I do think, however, that everything I will go on to say about the 
proposals that are discussed also applies to these two proposed principles. 
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 p's justification stands in the way of S knowing that p.55 
 
Most accounts of knowledge have it that in order for you to know that p, you have, to some 
degree, to be justified in believing that p. K-level justification is justification strong enough 
such that no shortcomings in your strength of justification stand in the way of you knowing 
that p. Put intuitively: you are k-level justified in believing that p iff you are justified enough 
to know it. If other factors - truth, belief, absence of Gettier-style luck - conspire in a k-level 
justified subjects favour, than that subject will know that p, since their justification is strong 
enough for knowledge.56 Defined like this, subjects in Gettier cases are k-level justified in 
believing that p, since it is not their lack of justification that prevents them from knowing that 
p, rather it is the presence of some kind of epistemic luck infecting the relation between their 
belief and its truth. Were the Gettier-style luck subtracted from their situation, they would in 
fact know that p, and this is true even when there is no change to their level of justification for 
p. K-level justified belief is also possible for subjects with false beliefs. A subject S has a k-
level justified false belief that p just when, were S's belief that p true and not Gettiered, and 
there were no change to S's level of justification for p, S would know that p. 
 
Kvanvig and Lackey are explicit that the JA and RTBNA* respectively require the subject to 
have k-level justification. Gerken and Neta don't mention the issue, but the most plausible 
interpretation of their principles will include such a requirement, since each of the 
counterexamples to the K-Norm they discuss are one's where the subject plausibly has k-level 
justification for p, and there are no obvious cases where less-than-k-level justification is 
sufficient for appropriate employment of a proposition as a premise in practical reasoning; the 
obvious defectiveness of the lottery reasoning demonstrates this point. It is possible to adapt 
lottery cases so that's one's evidence is arbitrarily strong, yet not knowledge-level, whilst 
retaining the judgement that it is inappropriate to rely on the lottery proposition in one's 
reasoning.57 
 
                                                 
55See Fantl and McGrath (2009). Weatherson (personal communication) has expressed to me a concern that k-
level justification might be an incoherent notion if it relies on the supposition (which he is sceptical of) that 
knowledge is 'factorisable'. I won't get into this issue here. 
56 Here is a way of testing whether a subject who doesn't know that p is k-level justified in believing that p: hold 
fixed their justification, and alter other factors - belief that p, the truth of p, and the absence of Gettier-style luck 
- affecting knowledge. If you can make it such that they would know that p under certain configurations of 
external factors, whilst their justification remains fixed, then they are k-level justified in believing p. See Fantl 
and McGrath (2009) and Conee and Feldman (2004) for more details. 
57 See also Fantl and McGrath (2009) 
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A second common feature of three of the four proposed J-norms is that they require the 
subjects employment of p in practical reasoning to be in some way based on, or grounded in, 
the justification the subject has for p. It is not enough that the subject has justification for p, 
the subject must also employ p in their practical reasoning in part because they have this 
justification. Such a requirement is well motivated, since cases where a subject possess 
propositional justification for p, but this justification plays no role in their coming to employ p 
in their practical reasoning, are intuitively cases where the subject is open to (epistemic) 
criticism for acting as they do. Consider the following case: 
 
 TV: Smith is thinking about whether to buy a new plasma screen television. He prefers 
 to do so iff there is at least £1000 in his bank account. In fact there is, and Smith has 
 good evidence for this - he checked his bank account yesterday. However, Smith has 
 temporarily forgotten this fact. Nevertheless, Smith believes he has more than £1000 
 in his account. This belief is not based on the evidence Smith has, but rather purely on 
 wishful thinking. On the basis of his wishful-thinking-formed belief, Smith proceeds to 
 buy the television. 
 
If you are like me you will judge that Smith is criticisable for employing 'I have £1000 in my 
bank account' in his practical reasoning in this case. One should not act on the basis of wishful 
thinking. This is evidence that Smith has violated a norm. An  obvious candidate for that norm 
is something like: one's employment of a proposition in one's practical reasoning should be 
(in some way) sensitive on the evidence one has for the truth of that proposition. Just what the 
basing relation will amount to exactly is a difficult question, but it is not one that needs to be 
addressed here; the notion is, I take it, sufficiently intuitive for our purposes. Roughly 
speaking, the idea is that it can't be a matter of mere coincidence that the subject employs p in 
their practical reasoning when they have k-level justification for p; The subject's willingness 
to employ p in practical reasoning must be somehow sensitive to the facts about their 
epistemic situation. 
 
I am unable to imagine any circumstances where a subject has good justification for p, but 
this justification plays no role in the subject coming to employ p in their practical reasoning, 
where the subject would not be criticisable in the way that Smith is. That could just be a 
failure of imagination on my part, of course. Nevertheless, in the absence of obvious 
counterexamples I take it that such a condition will be a crucial feature of any plausible J-
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Norm of practical reasoning. In this respect, Kvanvig's JA proposal is flawed, since it does not 
include any such basing condition. That doesn't mean JA is false, however. Indeed, it is 
entailed by both the K-Norm, and the other J-Norms surveyed. However, in order to refute a 
claim of the form 'X is a necessary condition for Y', one must show that there is at least one 
states-of-affairs - Z - that is sufficient for Y's obtaining, but where X does not obtain in Z. If 
it's true that a basing relation is essential for any plausible epistemic norm of practical 
reasoning, then there will be no cases in which satisfaction of Kvanvig's JA will be sufficient 
for epistemically appropriate practical reasoning (even if necessary), and so he will not have 
shown that there is no additional, stronger, necessity direction norm of practical reasoning on 
top of JA.58 
 
To recap briefly, in this section we have seen that there are two features that any J-Norm must 
have in order for it to be a plausible rival to the K-Norm. These are (1) the subject must have 
k-level justification for p, and (2) the subject's employment of p in their practical reasoning 
must be in some way based on the justification they have for p. In the next two sections I'll 
explore the question of whether the J-Norms surveyed face similar apparent counterexamples 
to those facing the K-Norm. I'll argue that J-Norm proponents will likewise have to appeal to 
the justification/excuse distinction in order to shore up their theories against these 
counterexamples. I'll then go on to argue that the force of the J-Normers would-be 
counterexamples to the K-Norm is undermined by this fact. 
 
 
 
§2.3 One Potential Way of Counterexampling J-Norms 
 
 
Each of the three proposed J-Norms can be seen as expressing a variation on the following 
idea: that one is permitted to employ p as a premise in practical reasoning only if one 
justifiably believes that p. This idea can be expressed as follows: 
 
 JB: It is permissible to employ p as a premise in practical reasoning only if you 
 justifiably believe that p 
                                                 
58
 For this reason I will henceforth no longer directly argue against the JA norm in the essay. 
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For the purposes of assessing whether the proposed J-Norms are subject to would-be 
counterexamples of the kind facing the K-Norm, and so require an appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction, it will be useful for us to initially focus on the question of 
whether JB requires an appeal to the distinction, and then, if it does, go on to see whether the 
considerations that show that it does can be extended to make the same point about the J-
Norms proposed by Gerken, Neta, and Lackey.  
 
One apparently promising way of arguing that JB is subject to the same kinds of would-be 
counterexamples to the K-Norm departs from the seemingly platitudinous idea that in general 
evidence can be misleading and that, as a result it is possible to have false justified beliefs 
about the answer to just about any question, including the question of whether one is justified 
in believing that p. As Daniel Greco (2014) puts it: "Justified false beliefs are possible. This 
claim commands almost universal agreement among contemporary epistemologists. Most 
would go further and claim that the possibility of justified false belief isn't restricted to special 
subject matters. Rather, in no domain is justification an infallible guide to truth. At least, if 
there are domains in which justification entails truth, this requires some special explanation." 
(2014: 203).  
 
The suggestion, then, would be that since it is in general possible to have misleading 
evidence, and so justified false beliefs, we should be able to construct cases where one has 
higher-order evidence (that is, evidence about one's first-order epistemic position) that is 
sufficiently strong as to justify one in believing that one is justified in believing that p, yet this 
evidence nevertheless be misleading, and so one is not justified in believing that p. From such 
cases we could then construct would-be counterexamples to JB that are analogous to those 
that the K-Norm faces, where the subject transgresses the norm but is not properly criticisable 
for doing so because they had every reason to think that they conformed to it. We would 
thereby be in possession of cases where proponents of JB would have to appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction. 
 
Much has been written recently on the impact of higher-order evidence on first-order 
epistemic states (see for example Christensen 2010, Elga 2013, Horowitz 2013, Lasonen-
Aarnio 2014), but most of the literature has focused on cases where the subject does well, 
epistemically speaking, on the 1st-order, but has higher-order evidence that she has done 
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badly. So, for example, one focus has been on the question of whether a justified belief that 
one does not justifiably believe that p can defeat an otherwise justified belief that p. Or 
interest however is in a different question. What we want to know is whether there can be 
cases where one does badly, epistemically speaking, on the 1st-order, and so one does not 
justifiably believe that p, but one has higher-order evidence that one has done well on the 1st-
order, and so one is justified in believing that one does justifiably believe that p. As we may 
put it, the question is not whether higher-order evidence defeats 1st-order justificatory 
success, but rather whether higher-order evidence conquers 1st-order justificatory failure.  
 
If it is in general possible to have misleading evidence, and so justified false beliefs, then the 
answer to this latter question would seem to be 'no'. And it is not difficult to construct cases 
that appear to reflect this. Consider the following: 
 
 LOGICIAN: Dmitri is a professional logician, and is engaged in some elementary 
 logical reasoning. He arrives at a false conclusion - p - because he affirms the 
 consequent in the course of his reasoning. This mistake comes about because, 
 unbeknownst to himself, Dmitri has recently developed a brain lesion impairing his 
 ability to competently recognise errors in logical reasoning. However, prior to this 
 cognitive impairment, Dmitri was highly competent  at logical reasoning, as one 
 would expect from a professional logician. On the basis of his fallacious reasoning, 
 Dmitri comes to believe that p. On the basis of his reasonable belief that he is a 
 highly competent logical reasoner, and the elementary nature of the reasoning he 
 engaged in, Dmitri comes to believe that he justifiably believes that p. 
 
 SCIENTIST: Ivan is working on a PhD in biochemistry. He runs a series of 
 experiments to establish whether there is a correlation between the presence of a 
 certain DNA strand and propensity to obesity in mice. Having completed the tests, he 
 comes to believe that there is a correlation and shows his findings to Professor Jones, 
 an expert in the field. Professor Jones studies Ivan's work and, without giving his 
 opinion on the question of whether there is in fact a correlation, tells Ivan that it 
 justifies him in believing that there is a correlation. In fact, Ivan's experiments were 
 riddled with design flaws and fallacious reasoning. Professor Jones didn't pick up on 
 this however, since he was very tired when he studied Ivan's work. Nevertheless, Ivan 
 has no reason to doubt Professor Jones's competence on this occasion, and so comes 
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 to believe, on the basis of Professor Jones's say so, that he justifiably believes that 
 there is a correlation. 
 
It is very natural to describe the LOGICIAN case as follows: Dmitri does not justifiably 
believe that p. After all, he arrived at p via an egregious logical fallacy (moreover, we can 
suppose that he knows that affirming the consequent is a logical fallacy). However, despite 
lacking a justified belief that p, his belief that he justifiably believes that p is itself justified, 
since the reasoning he engaged in was elementary, he has every reason to believe that he is a 
highly competent logical reasoner, and he has no reason to suspect that he has made an error 
in this instance. If this description of the case is correct, then LOGICIAN presents a scenario 
in which the subject does not justifiably believe that p, but justifiably believes that he does 
justifiably believe that p. The same seems to go for Ivan in SCIENTIST. Ivan arrived at his 
belief that there is a correlation on the basis of an experimental process that was riddled with 
design flaws and fallacious reasoning. Plausibly such epistemic vices preclude the possibility 
of Ivan's belief being justified. Nevertheless, since he has been told by an expert whose 
judgement he has no reason to distrust that his belief is in fact justified, plausibly Ivan 
justifiably believes that he justifiably believes that there is a correlation. If this description of 
the case is correct, then again we have a scenario in which the subject does not justifiably 
believe that p, but justifiably believes that he does justifiably believe that p.  
 
If these descriptions of Dmitri and Ivan are correct, then we can construct would-be 
counterexamples to JB analogous to those facing the K-Norm that require those who would 
endorse JB to appeal to the justification/excuse distinction. Take the case of Dmitri. Suppose 
that Dmitri goes on to employ p in a piece of practical reasoning as follows: 
 
 (1) p is the correct conclusion 
 (2) If p is the correct conclusion, I shouldn't work on the problem anymore 
 (3) Therefore: I shouldn't work on the problem anymore. 
 
 And suppose that he does so on the grounds of his belief that he justifiably believe that p, and 
so is permitted, from the epistemic perspective, rely on premise (1). In doing so, he 
transgresses JB, since he does not meet the necessary condition of justifiably believing that 
which he employs as a premise in practical reasoning. However, quite plausibly it would be 
unreasonable to criticise Dmitri for doing so, since he had every reason to think that what he 
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was doing was permissible. Accordingly, we will either have to conclude that JB is false - if 
we don't want to allow for the possibility that there can be blameless violations of it - or 
accept that, although Dmitri did something impermissible, he is to be excused for his 
behaviour. Accordingly, just as K-Normers have to appeal to the justification/excuse 
distinction to handle apparent counterexamples stemming from situations where subjects 
violate the norm but cannot properly be blamed for doing so, so to will those who endorse JB, 
for precisely the same reason. The same argument can be constructed using Ivan as an 
example. Suppose that Ivan goes on to employ the proposition that there is a correlation 
between the presence of the DNA strand and a propensity to obesity in mice as follows: 
 
 (1) There is a correlation between the presence of the DNA strand and a propensity to 
 obesity in mice  
 (2) If there is a correlation between the presence of the DNA strand and a  propensity 
 to obesity in mice, then I should write an article stating that there is a correlation 
 between the presence of the DNA strand and a propensity to obesity in mice 
 (3) Therefore, I should write an article stating that there is a correlation between the 
 presence of the DNA strand and a propensity to obesity in mice 
 
And suppose that he employs premise (1) on the grounds of his belief that he justifiably 
believes that there is a correlation, and so is permitted, from the epistemic perspective, to do 
so. In doing so, like Dmitri, he transgresses JB, since he does not meet the necessary condition 
of justifiably believe that which he employs as a premise in practical reasoning. However, as 
with Dmitri it would be unreasonable to criticise Ivan for doing so, since he had every reason 
to think that what he was doing was permissible. The same conclusions follow as they do with 
the case of Dmitri. 
 
Importantly, the cases can be adapted to argue that JBK, WA, and RTBNA* will also have to 
appeal to the justification/excuse distinction. Consider first WA. A reminder, it states that: 
 
 WA: In the deliberative context, DC, S meets the epistemic conditions on  rational use 
 of (her belief that) p as a premise in practical reasoning or of (her belief that) p as a 
 reason for acting only if S is warranted in believing that p to a degree that is adequate 
 relative to DC 
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Recall, WA is best interpreted as requiring that S has, at minimum, k-level justification in 
believing that p in order to permissibly employ p as a premise in practical reasoning. 
LOGICIAN and SCIENTIST both describe cases where the subject does not k-level justifiably 
believe that p. As a result, they fail to satisfy WA when they go on to employ to employ p in 
their practical reasoning. Yet Dmitri and Ivan are blameless for their violations when they go 
on to employ the respective propositions as premises in their practical reasoning. Accordingly, 
we will either have to conclude that WA is false - if we don't want to allow for the possibility 
that there can be blameless violations of it - or accept that, although Dmitri and Ivan did 
something impermissible, they are to be excused for their behaviour. Accordingly, just as K-
Normers have to appeal to the justification/excuse distinction to handle apparent 
counterexamples stemming from situations where subjects violate the norm but cannot 
properly be blamed for doing so, so to will those, like Gerken, who endorse WA, for precisely 
the same reason. 
 
Similarly with RTBNA*. A reminder: 
 
 RTBNA*: It is appropriate for S to employ p in practical reasoning only if (1) It is 
 reasonable for S to believe that p, and (2) If S employed p in practical reasoning, S 
 would do so at least in part because it is reasonable for S to believe that p 
 
It is not reasonable (in the sense of k-level justification) for either Dmitri or Ivan to believe 
what they do. By reasoning parallel to that of the last paragraph, we will either have to 
conclude that RTBNA* is false, or shore it up with an appeal to the justification/excuse 
distinction. 
 
Now consider JBK. A reminder, it states that: 
 
 JBK: Where S's choice is p-dependent, it is rationally permissible for S to treat the 
 proposition that p as a reason for acting iff S justifiably believes that she knows that p 
 (2009: 686) 
 
Consider the following adaptation of LOGICIAN: 
 
 LOGICIAN-JBK: Dmitri is a professional logician, and is engaged in some 
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 elementary logical reasoning. He arrives at a false conclusion - p - because he affirms 
 the consequent in the course of his reasoning. This mistake comes about because, 
 unbeknownst to himself, Dmitri has recently developed a brain lesion impairing his 
 ability to competently recognise errors in logical reasoning. However, prior to this 
 cognitive impairment, Dmitri was highly competent at logical reasoning, as one would 
 expect from a professional logician. On the basis of his fallacious reasoning, Dmitri 
 comes to believe that p. On the basis of his reasonable belief that he is a highly 
 competent logical reasoner, and the elementary nature of the reasoning he engaged in, 
 Dmitri comes to believe that knows that p. 
 
Dmitri believes himself to know that p. But this belief is not justified. Why not? Because 
knowledge is factive. If Dmitri did justifiably believe that he knows that p, then he would also 
justifiably believe that p. Since he doesn't justifiably believe this (just as in LOGICIAN), he 
doesn't justifiably believe that he knows that p. However, suppose that Dmitri also considers 
whether he justifiably believes that he knows p. Reasonably taking himself to be a highly 
competent logical reasoner, Dmitri concludes, on the basis of this belief, that his belief that he 
knows is justified. Plausibly, despite being false, this belief of Dmitri's is justified. After all, 
he has every reason to think that he is a highly competent logical reasoner, and no reason to 
doubt it, and so every reason to think that he's justified in believing that he knows that p. Now 
suppose that, as before, Dmitri goes on to employ p in his practical reasoning on the grounds 
of his belief that he justifiably believe that he knows that p, and so is permitted, from the 
epistemic perspective, to do so. In doing so, he transgresses JBK, since he does not meet the 
necessary condition of justifiably believing that he knows that which he employs as a premise 
in practical reasoning. However, it would be unreasonable to criticise Dmitri for doing so, 
since he had every reason to think that what he was doing was permissible. Accordingly, as 
with WA and RTBNA* we will either have to conclude that JBK is false - if we don't want to 
allow for the possibility that there can be blameless violations of it - or shore it up with an 
appeal to the justification/excuse distinction. 
 
 
§2.4. Concerns about the arguments just given 
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It is a platitude that evidence can be misleading, and thus that one can have a justified false 
belief in just about any domain. From this we were able to construct cases, such as 
LOGICIAN and SCIENTIST, where it seems right to think that the subjects justifiably but 
falsely believe that they justifiably believe that p, and so would-be counterexamples to the 
proposed J-Norms that are analogous to those that the K-Norm faces. These cases appear to 
show that J-Normers need to appeal to the justification/excuse distinction in order to shore up 
their theories. However, in this section I will suggest that their persuasive force is 
questionable, for it may be that J-Normers can acknowledge that, given the platitudes, if there 
are domains in which justification entails truth, then this is something that requires special 
explanation, but argue that the domain of justified beliefs about 1st-order justification is a 
domain with just such a special explanation. 
 
The prospects of arguing that, higher-order evidence aside, Dmitri and Ivan in fact justifiably 
hold their 1st-order beliefs are bleak. Even internalists will presumably want to maintain that, 
ceteris paribus, beliefs formed on the basis of logical fallacies and flawed experiments aren't 
justified. However, there may be reasons to think that in cases like LOGICIAN and 
SCIENTIST, 2nd-order justification has downwards generative force. That is, that the presence 
of a justified 2nd-order belief that one justifiably believes that p creates justification for the 
otherwise unjustified 1st-order belief. In this section I will briefly sketch a couple of reasons 
why one might think that. The conclusion I draw is that if we are to be persuaded that there 
are would-be counterexamples of the kind that require J-Normers to appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction, more argumentative machinery will be needed. In §2.5 I 
provide what I take to be a more compelling argument for the claim. 
 
One reason to think that 2nd-order justification might have downwards generative force is that 
denying this, and accepting the description of cases like LOGICIAN and SCIENTIST that was 
put forward in the last section, commits one to implausible looking claims about what 
constitutes a rational epistemic agent.59 Presumably subjects who are justified in believing 
that p can rationally believe that p, and subjects who are not justified in believing that p can 
rationally suspend judgement on p or disbelieve that p. If that's right, then insofar as we want 
to claim that Dmitri and Ivan have 2nd-order justification but not 1st-order justification, we 
are committed to the claim that Dmitri and Ivan can rationally believe that they are justified in 
                                                 
59 The point I'm about to make is closely related to a point that Horowitz (2013) makes with respect to cases of 
higher-order defeat. 
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believing that p and at the same time rationally suspend judgement on p. But it is far from 
clear that this combination of attitudes is rationally co-tenable. To see this, imagine having a 
conversation with Dmitri about his opinions. 
 
 You: So, what's the answer then, Dmitri? 
 Dmitri: I couldn't say 
 You: Difficult problem is it then? 
 Dmitri: No, it's easy, and given my calculations, the thing that I ought to believe is 
 that the answer is p 
 You: Oh, so you think that the answer is p then? 
 Dmitri: No, I'm not saying that. I ought to believe that the answer is p, but I'm 
 withholding judgement 
 You: I'm confused, if you think that the right thing for you to believe is that the answer 
 is p, then why don't you believe that? 
 Dmitri: ... 
 
Dmitri is hard to make sense of in this conversation - he seems to have an irrational 
combination of attitudes. Surely if he believes that he ought to believe that p, then if he is 
rational he will believe that p? His attitudes as they stand are akratic, for he doesn't do what he 
takes himself to have sufficient reason to do. Another way of revealing the oddness of the 
combination of Dmitri's attitudes is to consider how - according to the description of his case 
in the last section - it would be rational for him to behave in response to being offered a bet on 
whether p.60 If Dmitri is justified in believing that he is justified in believing that p, but not 
justified in believing that p, and rational subjects doxastic attitudes conform to their 
justificatory status, then if Dmitri is offered a bet on p which his preferences make it rational 
for him to take iff he is justified in believing that p, then Dmitri, if rational, will decline the 
bet whilst at the same time maintaining that he is making a mistake in doing so. Really, he 
will say, he should be taking the bet. Again, this does not look like the behaviour of a rational 
person. The general problem is that the claim that one can justifiably but falsely believe that 
one justifiably believes that p leads to the conclusion that one can rationally believe that one 
ought to believe that p yet still rationally suspend judgement on whether p or disbelieve p, and 
these appear to be irrational combinations of attitudes. J-Normers who wish to deny the 
                                                 
60 Again, this point is an adaptation of a point made by Horowitz (2013) 
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description of the LOGICIAN and SCIENTIST cases that lead to the conclusion that they must 
appeal to the justification/excuse distinction may want to take the apparent irrationality of 
such combinations of attitudes as a reason to think that despite the general non-factivity of 
justified belief, in the special case of 2nd-order justified beliefs about first-order justified 
beliefs, 2nd-order justified beliefs are factive, since they have downwards generative force. If 
so, then J-Normers may have the resources to deny the argument of the last section purporting 
to force an appeal to the justification/excuse distinction upon them. At the very least, it seems 
as though they are in a position to maintain that the LOGICIAN and SCIENTIST cases don't 
clearly support that conclusion. More argument will be needed. 
 
A second concern about the argument of the last section stems from the description of the 
LOGICIAN-JBK case that purports to show that Neta's JBK theory will require an appeal to 
the justification/excuse distinction. It was claimed that Dmitri doesn't justifiably believe that 
he knows that p, but does justifiably believe that he justifiably believes that he knows that p. 
The claim that Dmitri doesn't justifiably believe that he knows that p was argued for from the 
observation that, had he justifiably believed that he knew, then, since knowledge is factive, he 
would a fortiori justifiably believe that p, and his fallacious reasoning precludes the 
possibility of his belief that p being justified. Given this point about the factivity of 
knowledge, it is essential for the argument of the last section that Dmitri doesn't justifiably 
believe that he knows that p, even though he justifiably believes that he justifiably believes 
that p. Otherwise we wouldn't have would-be counterexamples to JBK. But J-Normers might 
protest that this claim is implausible, since the evidence that justifies Dmitri in believing that 
he is justified in believing p - namely his evidence that he is an excellent logician, and that the 
reasoning he engaged in was elementary - also justifies him in believing that he knows that p. 
Such an objection would put pressure on the description of the case offered in the last section, 
and thus on that section's argument. Moreover, it might also be argued that this state of affairs 
- one where the subject is justified in believing that they justifiably believe that p, but not 
justified in believing that they know that p  - describes an impossibility. According to certain 
conceptions of justification - conceptions which J-Normers may wish to endorse - justification 
is best conceived of as the 'appearance of knowledge' (see e.g. Ichikawa 2014, Bird, 2007, and 
Reynolds, 2013), in the sense that a subject's belief that p is justified only if it is internally 
indiscriminable to the subject from an item of knowledge. If such a theory of justification can 
be made to work, then it may be that J-Normers can argue that a subject is justified in 
believing that they justifiably believe that p only if the subject is justified in believing that 
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they know that p. And in that case, higher-order justification would have downward 
generative force, as the following argument would show: 
 
 (1) If S justifiably believes that S knows that p, then, a fortiori, S justifiably 
 believes that p 
 
 (2) If S justifiably believes that S justifiably believes that p, then S justifiably 
 believes that S knows that p 
  
 (3) Therefore, if S justifiably believes that S justifiably believes that p, then S 
 justifiably believes that p 
 
So again, it seems that J-Normers may be able to offer a principled reason to resist the 
description of the LOGICIAN and SCIENTIST cases put forward in the last section and argue 
that higher-order justification has downward generative force of a kind that blocks the need 
for them to appeal to the justification/excuse distinction. So as before, more argument will be 
needed if we are to accept the claims of the last section purporting to show that J-Normers 
will need to appeal to the distinction. 
 
 
§2.5. Anti-Luminosity 
 
  
More would need to be done to flesh out the details of these lines of argument in order for 
them to motivate us to reject the argument of §2.3. Nevertheless, it should be clear that there 
is room for maneuverer here for J-Normers. Thus, if we are to be persuaded that the proposed 
J-Norms are subject to would-be counterexamples analogous to those facing the K-Norm that 
force appeals to the justification/excuse distinction, more argument will be needed. In this 
section I present what I take to be a more compelling argument. 
 
As we saw earlier, Hawthorne and Stanley think that anti-luminosity considerations provide 
an argument for our desired conclusion. Amia Srinivasan agrees. She remarks that "...If there 
are no conditions such that we are always in a position to know whether we are in them, then 
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it is possible to unknowingly, and thus blamelessly, violate any norm" (manuscript) 
 
I think that these authors are right. I am persuaded by the anti-luminosity argument of 
Williamson (2000) and also that anti-luminosity considerations provided the needed additional 
argumentative machinery that was lacking. However, Srinivasan and Hawthorne and Stanley 
don't tell us just how the argument would go, and it is far from clear at first pass how anti-
luminosity entails our desired conclusion. To see this, compare the claim of anti-luminosity as 
applied to transgressions of JB to the nature of the would-be counterexamples that the J-
Norms would face were they analogous to those that the K-Norm faces. Anti-luminosity 
claims that: 
 
 Anti-luminosity: For any non-trivial condition C, it is possible for C to obtain but S 
 does not know that C obtains 
 
Applied to the condition of failing to satisfy JB, the claim then, is: 
 
 JB-Anti-Luminosity: It is possible for S to fail to satisfy JB, but S does not 
 know that S fails to satisfy JB 
 
And analogous to the would-be counterexamples to the K-Norm, would-be counterexamples 
to the proposed J-Norms would have a structure whereby the conditions laid down in the 
proposed norms are not satisfied, but the subject has every reason to think that they are, and 
so is justified in believing that they satisfy the norm. So, in the case of JB, analogous would-
be counterexamples would have a structure whereby the subject fails to satisfy JB, but has 
every reason to think that they do satisfy it, and so is justified in believing that they satisfy it. 
Does JB-Anti-Luminosity entail that there will be cases with this structure? Not obviously. JB-
Anti-Luminosity only obviously entails that there will be cases where subjects fail to satisfy 
the conditions laid down in JB, but are not in a position to know this. But it is one thing not to 
know that one is transgressing a norm, and quite another to justifiably believe that one is not 
transgressing it, and, prima facie at least, it is the fact that the subjects in would-be 
counterexamples to the K-Norm justifiably believe that they are acting in a permissible 
manner that renders them blameless - and thus requires an appeal to the justification/excuse 
distinction - rather than the fact that they don't know that they are transgressing the norm. 
Merely not knowing that you are transgressing a norm will not necessarily render you 
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blameless for your transgression, for it may be that, although you don't know that you are 
transgressing, you have good evidence that you are. And in such a case, it is implausible to 
think that merely appealing to the fact that you didn't know will get you off the hook. 
Accordingly, there is no immediately obvious route from luminosity failure to the conclusion 
those who endorse JB must also appeal to the distinction.  
 
Nevertheless, I want to argue, there is a route. It can be found by combining two observations. 
Firstly, that the denial of luminosity for justification can be pushed beyond the conclusion that 
a subject can fail to justifiably believe that p without the subject being in a position to know 
this, to the conclusion that a subject can fail to justifiably believe that p even though it is 
arbitrarily improbable short of 0 for the subject that this is the case - that is to say, even 
though it is arbitrarily probable short of 1 for the subject that they do not fail to justifiably 
believe that p. Secondly, even supposing that anti-luminosity considerations don't show that, 
for an epistemic state like justified belief, one can be in a situation where that epistemic state 
does not obtain but one is in a position to justifiably believe that it doesn't obtain - and I will 
suggest that it is unclear whether anti-luminosity considerations can show this - the 
observation that JB can fail to obtain when it is arbitrarily improbable short of 0 for the 
subject that it fails to obtains is sufficient to force those who would endorse JB into appealing 
to the justification/excuse distinction. 
 
We can show that it is possible to fail to satisfy JB even though it is arbitrarily probable short 
of 1 for you that you satisfy it by adapting a recent argument from Williamson (2014) to the 
effect that it is possible to know that p even though it is arbitrarily improbable short of 0 that 
you know that p. First I'll present Williamson's argument, then I'll show how it can be adapted 
for our purposes. Williamson asks as to imagine that you are standing some distance from an 
unmarked clock face with a single hand:61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 My presentation of the Williamson's argument departs in some respects from his, but nothing important turns 
on the alterations - they are made merely make the argument clearer. 
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Suppose that there are 1000 unmarked equally spaced points around the edge of the clock 
face. Suppose that the hand is in fact pointing at 272. Williamson observes that there is a 
strongest thing that you can know by visual inspection about where the hand is pointing. You 
can know some things about the hand's position - for example, that it isn't pointing at 1 or 
999, or 100 or 900, but given the limits on your discriminatory capacities, you can't know 
exactly where it is pointing. The strongest thing that you can know is that it is within an 
interval {-n, 272, +n}, where n = the distance from 272 that, for all you know, the hand could 
be pointing at. Let us suppose that your discriminatory capacities are such that n = 10. In that 
case, the strongest thing that you can know about the hand's position is that it is within the 
interval {262,282}. However, you can only know this if the hand is in fact pointing at 272. If 
it had been pointing at, say, 269, then, given your discriminatory capacities, the strongest 
thing you could have known about its position is that it was within the interval {259,279}. Let 
us suppose that you believe, on the basis of your perceptual experience, that the hand is 
pointing within the interval {262,282}. Ex hypothesi you know that the hand's position is 
within the interval {262,282}. But, as Williamson points out, it is very unlikely on your 
evidence that you know this. Why? Because you only know this if the hand is pointing at 272, 
but of course for all you know it could be pointing at any of 262,263,...,282 other than 272. 
And if it was, then you wouldn't know that it is pointing between {262,282}. Since, for all 
you know it could be pointing at any position between 262 and 282 other than 272, it is highly 
unlikely on your evidence that it is pointing at 272. If we suppose (as Williamson suggests) 
that you should give equal credence to the propositions that, for each of 262,...,282 the hand is 
pointing at 262,...,282, then your credence that it is pointing at 272 should be .05. 
Accordingly, here we have a case where you know that p (where 'p' = 'The hand is pointing 
between {262,282}'), but it is highly unlikely on your evidence that you know that p. And we 
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could decrease the likelihood on your evidence that you know that p arbitrarily low short of 0 
by increasing the number of points around the edge of the clock face. 
 
In order to see how this kind of case can be adapted to deliver the conclusion that you can fail 
to satisfy JB even though it is highly likely on your evidence that you satisfy it, the first thing 
to note is that, as Williamson points out, the conclusion of the clock case can easily be 
extended from showing that it is possible to have improbable knowledge to showing that it is 
possible to have improbable justified belief. Just as there is a strongest thing that you know 
about the hand's position, so there is a strongest thing that you are justified in believing about 
the hand's position. Suppose that your discriminatory capacities are such that the strongest 
thing you can justifiably believe about the hand's position is, as before, that it is somewhere 
between plus +10 and -10 of it's actual position. In that case the strongest thing that you can 
justifiably believe about the hand's position is that it is within the interval {262,282}. But 
again, you can only justifiably believe this if the hand is in fact pointing at 272. And for all 
you know it could be pointing at any of 262,263,...,282. If it was, then you wouldn't justifiably 
believe that it is pointing between {262,282}. Accordingly, supposing that you believe that it 
is pointing between {262,282) then here we have a case where you justifiably believe that p 
(where 'p' = 'The hand is pointing between {262,282}'), but it is highly unlikely on your 
evidence that you justifiably believe p. And of course, as before, we could decrease the 
likelihood on your evidence that you justifiably believe that p arbitrarily short low of 0 by 
increasing the number of points around the edge of the clock face. 
 
The second step towards our desired conclusion that it is possible to fail to satisfy JB even 
though it is highly likely for you that you do satisfy it is to observe that the case can be 
amended from showing that it is possible to justifiably believe something even though it is 
highly unlikely for you that you are justified in believing it, to showing that it possible to fail 
to be justified in believing something even though it is highly likely for you that you are 
justified in believing it. To see this, observe that since you are at most justified in believing 
that the hand is pointing somewhere in the interval {262,282}, you are not justified in 
believing that <the hand is pointing somewhere within an interval with a higher low-end than 
262 or a lower high-end than 282> - your discriminatory capacities are not good enough for 
such a belief to be justified. Call this proposition 'q'. Notice that you are only not justified in 
believing q if the hand is in fact pointing at 272. However, it is of course highly likely on your 
evidence that the hand is not pointing at 272. It follows that it is highly likely on your 
 113 
evidence that you are justified in believing q. Let us suppose that you believe q. In that case, 
we have a situation in which there is a proposition - q - which you unjustifiably believe where 
it is nevertheless highly likely on your evidence that you do justifiably believe it. More 
perspicaciously put, the argument is as follows: 
 
 (1) If the strongest thing you are justified in believing about the hand's position is that 
 it is within the interval (262,282}, then you are not justified in believing q 
 
 (2) The strongest thing you are justified in believing about the hand's position is that it 
 is within the interval (262,282} 
 
 (3) Therefore, you are not justified in believing q 
 
 (4) You are only not justified in believing q if the hand is pointing at 272 
 
 (5) It is highly unlikely on your evidence that the hand is pointing at 272 
 
 (6) Therefore, it is highly unlikely on your evidence that you are not justified in 
 believing q 
  
 (7) Therefore, it is highly likely on your evidence that you are justified in believing q 
 
 (8) Therefore, you are not justified in believing q and it is highly likely on  your 
 evidence that you are justified in believing q 
 
So here we have a case in which you do not satisfy the condition - justified belief - laid down 
by JB as necessary for permissibly taking p as a premise in your practical reasoning, but it is 
highly likely for you that you do. The last step is to imagine that you take q premise in your 
practical reasoning. Let us suppose that you are offered a bet on whether or not q is true which 
offers £100 if q is true and loses you £10 if q is false. You reason as follows: 
 
 (1) q 
 (2) If q, and I accept the bet, then I win £100 
 (3) Therefore, if I accept the bet, I will win £100 
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 (4) I desire to win £100 
 (5) Therefore, I should accept the bet. 
 
In doing so, you violate JB by employing q - which you are not justified in believing - in your 
practical reasoning. Are you criticisable for doing so? I want to suggest that you are not. 
Remember, although you are not justified in believing q, not only are you not in a position to 
know this, but it is highly likely on your evidence that you are justified in believing it. We can 
suppose that it was your awareness of this latter fact that led you to reason as you did. 
Imagine a third-party holding you to blame for your reasoning. Their complaint is that in 
relying on q in your reasoning, you transgressed JB. In blaming you for your transgression, I 
suggest that the third-party is being unreasonable. It seems perfectly legitimate for you to 
respond to the criticism by arguing that you should be excused on the grounds that, not only 
did you not know that you were transgressing JB, but it was highly likely, given your 
evidence, that you were in fact not transgressing it. If so, then we have a case where you 
blamelessly violated the norm, and thus a case which will force us either to reject JB - if we 
don't want to allow for the possibility of blameless violations of it - or shore it up with an 
appeal to the justification/excuse distinction. 
 
And just as before, we can adapt this case of applying anti-luminosity considerations to JB to 
applying them to WA, RTBNA*, and JBK, for the same argument could be run to show that it 
is possible to fail to k-level justifiably believe that p even though it is highly likely on your 
evidence that you do simply by replacing 'the strongest thing you justifiably believe in the 
clock case with 'the strongest thing you k-level justifiably believe', and to show that it is 
possible to fail to reasonably believe that you know that p, even though it is highly likely on 
your evidence that you do reasonably believe that you know by replacing it with 'the strongest 
thing you justifiably believe that you know'. It should be clear to the reader by now how we 
can thereby show that those who endorse these theories will have to appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction to shore them up. 
 
 
§2.6. Paradox? 
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I take the argument of the last section to show that J-Normers will have to appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction in the same way that K-Normers do in order to shore-up their 
views against would-be counterexamples from cases of blameless transgressions. Unlike the 
argument of §2.4 which relied on an intuitive but, as we saw, controversial, interpretation of 
the LOGICIAN and SCIENTIST cases, this argument only relies on a few fairly innocuous 
assumptions. Namely that the strongest thing you can justifiably believe about the hand's 
position is that it is within an interval {-n,272,+n}, that you can only justifiably this if it is in 
fact pointing at 272, and that, given that for all you know the hand could be pointing 
anywhere within this interval, it is unlikely on your evidence that the hand is pointing at 272. 
Since I find it hard to see how J-Normers could plausibly deny any of these assumptions, I 
find it correspondingly hard to see how they can avoid having to appeal to the 
justification/excuse distinction. I will discuss the implications of this result for the broader 
debate shortly, but before I do I want to discuss what might appear to be an impending 
collision course between the arguments of the last two sections. In the last section I argued 
that reflection on anti-luminosity considerations shows that for the various proposed J-Norms, 
it is possible to blamelessly transgress them because it is possible to transgress them even 
though it is highly probable on one's evidence that one satisfies them. In §2.4 I suggested that 
there are a number of problems with the idea that one can justifiably but falsely believe that 
one satisfies the conditions laid down in the various J-Norms. You might worry that this gives 
rise to a paradox. On the one hand, you might think that the clock case shows that it is 
possible to justifiably but falsely believe that you justifiably believe that p. On the other hand, 
it looks as though the claim that such a state of affairs is possible forces us to make 
implausible claims about rationality (because it delivers the verdict that akrasia is rational) 
and may in fact simply be outright false (because justified belief is internally indiscriminable 
from knowledge). In that case we would have a paradox, and it is unclear how we might go 
about resolving it. I am untroubled by this suggestion however, since I think that there are 
plausible theories of justification that deliver the result that the appearance of paradox here is 
illusory. The paradox would only arise if we took the clock case to show that it is possible to 
justifiably but falsely believe that one justifiably believes that p. But closer inspection reveals 
that this is highly disputable. All that it shows is that it is possible to fail to justifiably believe 
that p when it is very likely on your evidence that you in fact justifiably believe that p. And, as 
many have taken lottery cases to show, a proposition's being arbitrarily probable on your 
evidence isn't sufficient to outright justify you in believing it. Notice that in the clock case 
you, like the lottery ticket holder, but unlike Gettier victim, are in a position to know that you 
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don't know that the hand isn't pointing at 272. Accordingly, you are in a position to know that 
you don't know that you are justified in believing q. If, as may well be the case, justification is 
internally indiscriminable from knowledge, then it follows that the clock case does not show 
that it is possible to justifiably but falsely believe that one justifiably believes that p, and in 
that case the potential paradox can be avoided.  
 
 
 
 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
A number of commentators have attempted to undermine the claim that knowledge is the 
norm of practical reasoning by arguing that in certain cases - namely Gettier cases and 
justified false belief cases - subjects who take propositions that they do not know to be true as 
premises in their practical reasoning are not to be criticised or blamed for their actions. The 
critics take this to show that knowledge is not the norm of practical reasoning. The response 
of K-Normers has been to accept that blame and criticism is inappropriate in these cases, but 
argue that this is because the subjects are merely to be excused for transgressing the norm, 
and excusable transgressions of a norm are not counterexamples to that norm. Moreover, they 
have claimed, any rival norms will be subject to analogous would-be counterexamples. The 
response of the critics has been to reject the excuse maneuverer and develop rival accounts 
that deliver the verdict that subjects in Gettier cases and justified false belief cases act 
permissibly in relying on their beliefs in practical reasoning. The goal of this essay has been 
to assess the viability of the excuse maneuverer and the K-Normers claim that rival 
justification norms will be subject to analogous would-be counterexamples. It has been argued 
that the various objections to the excuse maneuverer are either unpersuasive or inconclusive, 
and that the rival J-Norms will indeed be subject to analogous would-be counterexamples 
where subjects blamelessly, and hence excusably, transgress the relevant norms. Where does 
this leave the debate? An obvious result is that the critics objection to the K-Norm: that the 
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fact that it can be unwittingly, and hence blamelessly, violated requires that K-Normers make 
an appeal to the distinction between justifications and excuses that is theoretically 
problematic, is impotent. There are no good reasons to think that appealing to the distinction 
in the context of defending theories of the epistemic norms of practical reasoning is 
problematic, and given that weaker justification norms will also have to appeal to the 
distinction to handle analogous would-be counterexamples, there is no obvious benefit to be 
had from developing rival accounts which deliver the verdict that those who act on the 
misleading appearance of knowledge do so permissibly. However, it would be a mistake to 
think that this provides a full vindication of the K-Norm. It is one thing to show that no 
theoretical gain is provided by attempting to develop theories of the epistemic norms of 
practical reasoning that do not allow for there to be blameless transgressions, and thus avoid 
the need to appeal to a distinction between justification action and excusable action. It is quite 
another to show that the correct place to draw the line of the justification/excuse distinction in 
the case of epistemic norms of practical reasoning is at the level of knowledge, rather than 
justified belief. Recall, one way of interpreting Lackey's objection to the K-Norm was as 
claiming that, disagreements about the necessity of justification/excuse distinctions aside, it is 
simply counterintuitive to suggest that subjects who justifiably believe that p, but don't know 
that p, do anything that requires excusing when they rely on p in their practical reasoning. 
Although some - myself included - do not find this counterintuitive, it seems likely that just as 
many will share Lackey's judgement. Accordingly we are faced with a clash of intuitions. In 
the light of this, if either K-Normers or J-Normers want to persuade us that theirs is the right 
theory, both sides will need to offer more motivation for their respective views. 
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5. From Moore's Paradox To The 
Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond 
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§I. Knowledge Is The Norm Of Belief 
 
 
 
§1.1. Introduction 
 
It is widely accepted that one cannot felicitously assert Moorean conjunctions of the form 'p, 
& I don't know that p'. It is often argued that this datum motivates the claim that knowledge is 
the norm of assertion in the sense that the speech act of asserting is governed by a rule stating 
that one must assert only what one knows.62  
 
It is also often claimed that one cannot rationally outright believe63 conjunctions of the form 
'p, & I don't know that p'.64 Can we argue in parallel that knowledge is the norm of belief, in 
the sense that belief is governed by a rule stating that one must believe only what one knows? 
 
Most epistemologists would reject such an inference. 65  Surely, it will be argued, one is 
epistemically permitted to believe those propositions it is rational for one to believe? And 
surely there can be rational beliefs that don't amount to knowledge? The Gettiered, the 
envatted, and the epistemically unlucky with strong misleading evidence, seem to have 
rational beliefs. But their beliefs are not items of knowledge. That it is epistemically 
permissible to believe propositions that one does not know to be true is as widely accepted as 
                                                 
62  Moore (1962), Hintikka (1962), Unger (1975), Slote (1979) Jones (1991), DeRose (1991, 2002, 2009), 
Williamson (1996, 2000), Hawthorne (2004), Turri (2011), amongst others 
63 By 'outright belief' I mean a state that involves fully committing oneself to the truth of p, rather than merely 
taking p to be highly probable. There is, of course, nothing odd about saying 'I believe that p, but I don't know 
that p'. Plausibly this is because doing so involves hedging to avoid committing oneself to p. There is, I take it, 
nothing irrational about taking p to be highly probable (short of 1) whilst believing that one does not know that 
p. Thus, I commit myself to rejecting a metaphysics of outright belief where it can be reduced to subjective 
probability above a threshold <1. For more on these matters, see Huber ed. (2009), as well §2 of this essay. 
Hereafter when I talk simply of 'belief' I mean outright belief, unless otherwise stated. I intend 'rational' to be 
read as roughly synonymous with 'reasonable' 
64 Those who argue that it is irrational to believe Moore-paradoxical conjunctions include: Sorensen (1988), Heal 
(1994), Shoemaker (1994), Williamson (2000), de Almedia (2001), Adler (2002), Sutton (2005, 2007) Huemer 
(2007), Hill and Schechter (2007), Littlejohn (2010, 2012), Smithies (2012a, 2012b), and Gibbons (2013). (Note 
that some of these authors only discuss conjunctions of the form 'p, but I don't believe that p'). Not everyone 
thinks this. For the dissenting view see McGlynn (2014) I won't defend the irrationality of believing Moorean 
conjunctions here. Rather, I take it as my starting point. 
65 A small but growing number of epistemologists accept the knowledge norm of belief. They include Sutton 
(2005, 2007), Williamson (2013), and Littlejohn (2013) 
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the claim that one cannot felicitously assert 'p & I don't know that p'.66  
 
In this essay I will argue that, in conjunction with certain plausible assumptions, the 
impermissibility of believing that p without knowing that p is entailed by the irrationality of 
believing 'p, & I don't know that p'. Given that it is permissible to believe that p if one knows 
that p, it follows that it is permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p. Knowledge is the 
norm of belief.67  
 
The plan is this: §1.2 presents the master argument. §1.3 motivates its controversial premises 
and shows how they entail the conclusion. §2 explores the question of why it is permissible to 
believe only what one knows. In §3 a number of objections are considered. §4 concludes. 
                                                 
66 The list of epistemologists who think it is permissible to believe propositions that one does not know to be true 
is too long to include here. Suffice it to say that it includes the majority of those who work in the field. 
67 It is important to note that in arguing that it is permissible to believe that p iff you know that p, I do not intend 
to suggest that it is rational to believe that p only if you know that p. On the contrary, there are reasons to think 
that the fact that it is permissible to believe that p iff you know that p explains why it is rational for the Gettiered, 
the envatted and the unlucky to believe that p. As Lasonen-Aarnio (2010) and Williamson (manuscript) have 
emphasised, despite their transgressing the primary norm of belief, the Gettiered, the envatted, and the unlucky 
nevertheless do well as believers in an important respect, namely that in believing that p in situations in which it 
appears as though they know that p, they display a disposition to conform with the knowledge norm. It's just that 
due to abnormal circumstances the manifestation of this disposition is blocked on the particular occasion of their 
believing that p. Given that circumstances are normally not abnormal, plausibly it is entirely rational for the 
Gettiered, the envatted, and the unlucky to believe that p despite not knowing that p - in normal worlds, which 
they may rationally presuppose themselves to be in, their beliefs would be items of knowledge. Moreover, 
arguably it is rational for them to believe that p precisely because it is permissible to believe that p iff one knows 
that p. Had the conditions under which it is permissible to believe that p not been knowledge, but rather 
something else, then the conditions under which it is rational to believe that p would have been correspondingly 
different. Accordingly, the fact that it is permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p may explain why it is 
rational to believe that p in certain non-knowledge circumstances such as those that the Gettiered, the envatted, 
and the unlucky, find themselves in. Of course, there is much more to be said here. I don't for a moment suppose 
that this brief account constitutes a full exposition and defense of a theory of rational belief derived from the 
knowledge norm. That task is not undertaken here, however, for the main aim of this essay is to argue for the 
knowledge norm of belief and explore the question of why knowledge, rather than something else, is the norm. It 
is worth noting, however, that if the norms of rational belief can be explained by the knowledge norm for 
permissible belief in the way just suggested, a recent objection to the knowledge norm from Cohen and 
Comesana (2013a, 2013b, Cohen (manuscript)) is vitiated. Cohen and Comesana argue that those who endorse 
the claim that a belief is justified iff it is an item of knowledge ('J=K') are using 'justified' in a technical sense. 
They of course recognise that who endorse J=K are free to use 'justified' in a technical sense and equate it with 
knowledge, but they demand that if they do, then given that this is a technical sense of justification, they must 
explain why believers and theorists should care about beliefs being justified in this sense. My own view is that 
'justified' admits of several senses, including both a sense that is roughly synonymous with 'rational' or 
'reasonable', and a sense that is roughly synonymous with permissible and contrasts with excusability. It should 
be clear why we (both believers and theorists) should care about the latter sense of justified belief. One of the 
central goals of epistemology is to try to understand the nature of our epistemic systems - and in particular the 
conditions under which they permit belief in a proposition. The answer, I will be arguing, is: when, and only 
when, that belief would be an item of knowledge. Clearly, if to use 'justified belief' to refer to a belief that is 
epistemically permissible is to use the term in a technical sense, it is nevertheless a sense that epistemologists 
should take great interest in. Moreover, if Lasonen-Aarnio and Williamson are on the right track, even the project 
closer to Cohen and Comesana's heart - namely understanding the nature of epistemic rationality - needs to look 
to this sense of 'justified', for it is then in virtue of the fact that it is permissible to believe that p iff you know that 
p that rational belief has the character and normative force that it does.  
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§1.2 The master argument 
 
 
The master argument is simple: 
 
 (1) It is irrational to believe 'p & I don't know that p' 
 
  ~RB(p & ~Kp) 
 
 (2) If one knows that p, one rationally believes that p  
 
  Kp → RBp 
 
 (3) Therefore, it is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing that one does not know 
 that p 
 
  K~Kp → ~RBp 
 
 (4) If it is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing that one does not know that p, 
 then it is not permissible to believe p when one does not know that p 
 
  (K~Kp →  ~RBp) →  (~Kp → ~PBp) 
 
 (5) Therefore: it is permissible to believe only what one knows. 
 
  PBp →  Kp 
 
Premise (1) simply states our starting point: that it is irrational to believe Moorean 
conjunctions. Premise (2) is almost universally accepted by epistemologists. (3) follows from 
(1) and (2) as follows: 
 
 (a) It is irrational to believe 'p, & I don't know that p' 
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  ~RB(p & ~Kp) 
  - premise (1) 
 
 (b) If one knows that p, one rationally believes that p 
 
  Kp → RBp 
  - premise (2) 
 
 (c) One knows that one does not know that p, and one rationally believes that p 
 
  K~Kp & RBp 
  - assume for reductio 
 
 (d) Therefore: one rationally believes that one does not know that p 
 
  RB~Kp 
  - b,c 
 
 (e) One rationally believes that p 
 
  RBp 
  - c, &E 
 
 (f) Therefore: one rationally believes 'p, & I don't know that p' 
 
  RB(p & ~Kp) 
  - d,e, &closure 
 
 (g) (f) contradicts (a). 
 
So we must either reject (1) or (2) or accept (3): that it is irrational to believe that p whilst 
knowing that you don't know that p. Since we should accept (1) and (2), we should accept 
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(3).68 
 
(5) is our conclusion, that knowledge is the norm of belief. But why accept premise (4)? It is 
far from obvious that the irrationality of believing p whilst knowing that one does not know 
that p entails that that it is impermissible to believe that p when one does not know that p. 
This needs to be argued for. It is to this task that we now turn. 
 
 
§1.3. Permission, culpability, and excusability 
 
 
§1.3.1 The gap that excuses fill 
 
The aim of this section is to argue that the impermissibility of believing that p without 
knowing that p is entailed by the irrationality of believing that p whilst knowing that one does 
not know that p. That's what premise (4) states. I motivate this claim by arguing that it follows 
from the nature of the relationship between permissibility, culpability, and excusability. 
 
Roughly put, the argument will be this: it follows from the fact that it is irrational to believe 
that p whilst knowing that you don't know that p, that it can only be rational to believe that p 
whilst not knowing that p when you are unaware that this is what you are doing (that is, when 
you don't know that you don't know that p). This fact, I argue, implies that believing that p 
without knowing that p is impermissible, because it is only when you have an excuse for 
believing that p without knowing that p - the excuse being that you did not know that you 
were doing this - that it can be rational for you to do so. And if it were permissible to believe 
that p without knowing that p, you wouldn't need an excuse in order to rationally do so. This 
section is dedicated to explicating and motivating this claim. 
 
We begin by considering the relationship between permissibility, culpability, and excusability. 
A very natural account of the relationship goes as follows. If Φ-ing is impermissible, then if S 
Φ's, S does something wrong. Often when you do something wrong, you are culpable for your 
                                                 
68 The derivation of (f) from (d) and (e) assumes that rational belief is closed under conjunction. You might think 
that rational belief isn't closed under conjunction, in which case you might have qualms about this argument. I 
address these concerns in §3. 
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behaviour. But not always; sometimes you have an excuse. Excuses diminish or remove your 
culpability for wrongful behaviour without also turning it into rightful behaviour. Excuses 
have two important properties. Firstly, a fact F can only excuse you for Φ-ing if you were not 
permitted to Φ. If you were permitted to Φ, then not only do you not need an excuse, you 
cannot have an excuse, since having an excuse for Φ-ing entails that Φ-ing was 
impermissible. Hence the strangeness of 'S did nothing wrong, but we excuse him for it'. If S 
did nothing wrong, one is lead to wonder, what is he being excused for? Only wrongdoing 
calls for an excuse. Secondly, excuses exhaustively fill the gap between wrongdoing and 
culpability. If you Φ, and Φ-ing is impermissible, then if you don't have an excuse for Φ-ing, 
you are culpable for Φ-ing. Hence the strangeness of 'S shouldn't have Φ'ed, but he did 
anyway, and he doesn't have any sort of excuse. Nevertheless, he's not to blame'. If S did 
something wrong, and he doesn't have an excuse, surely he must be blameworthy? If you 
wrong, you need an excuse to get off the hook.69 
 
If this view of excuses is right, then it entails the following principle: 
 
 1st Permissibility principle: Φ-ing is permissible for S iff it is possible for  S to non-
 culpably Φ without an excuse.70 
 
Not only does this principle follow from a very natural account of the relationship between 
permissibility, culpability, and excusability, it also makes good intuitive sense. If you are 
permitted to Φ, then you shouldn't need an excuse to Φ without being held culpable. You only 
need an excuse - and moreover, as we just saw, can only have an excuse - when you do 
something wrong, and you, ex hypothesi, didn't do anything wrong. On the other hand, if the 
only way you can avoid being culpable for your behaviour is by having an excuse, then it 
must be that you were not permitted to do what you did. 
 
It will be useful to look at a case to get a feel for this principle. So consider the following 
                                                 
69 That's not to say that excuses are the only thing that diminishes culpability. Sometimes people are so far gone 
that it is not appropriate to hold them to the standards others are held to. In that case, they have an exemption. 
But if they are not appropriately held to the relevant standard, then they cease to have an obligation to conform 
to it. So exemptions don't threaten the claim that excuses exhaustively fill the gap between wrongdoing and 
culpability. (cf. Gardner (1997)) 
70 Assuming that Φ-ing is impermissible iff not Φ-ing is obligatory, an equivalent principle is: 
 
 1st Obligation principle: not Φ-ing is obligatory for S iff it is not possible for S to non-culpably Φ without an 
excuse. 
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scenario, borrowed from Elizabeth Harman (2011): 
 
 Cyanide Coffee 
 
 Anne spoons some cyanide into the coffee she is making for Bill. Bill drinks the 
 coffee and dies. Given suitable background assumptions (for example, Anne was not 
 acting in self defense), Anne did something morally  impermissible. However, she is 
 not culpable for her behaviour, since she reasonably believed that the cyanide was in 
 fact sugar. It turns out that Bill's nemesis surreptitiously switched the contents of the 
 sugar bowl when no one was around. 
 
Anne did something impermissible in poisoning Bill, but she is not culpable because she has 
an excellent excuse - she was blamelessly unaware of what she was doing. Given that what 
she did was impermissible, the principle states that it is not possible for Anne to be non-
culpable without an excuse. That seems right. Had Anne known what she was doing, and not 
had any other kind of excuse, she would surely have been culpable for poisoning Bill. On the 
other hand, had there not been any malevolent interference, and so Anne had simply spooned 
some sugar into Bill's coffee, rather than cyanide, then she would have had no need for an 
excuse for her behaviour, since she would have done nothing that required excusing, and it is 
very odd to think that she would need something that would normally serve to excuse to be in 
place in order not to be culpable for what she did.71 
 
The 1st permissibility principle provides us with a test. We can establish whether Φ-ing is 
permissible or not for S by establishing whether it is possible for S to non-culpably Φ without 
an excuse. If it is possible, then S is permitted to Φ. If it isn't, then S is not permitted to Φ. 
   
In order to run such a test, we need, of course, to know under what conditions it is possible to 
be excused for wrongdoing - that is, what kinds of considerations excuse. Providing an 
exhaustive list is far beyond the scope of this essay, and unnecessary in any case. But it is 
often thought that at least the following can serve to excuse (see, e.g. Gardner (1997)): 
Duress, Provocation, Intoxication, and Misapprehension. Intuitive cases are easy to come by: 
                                                 
71 I don't mean to suggest that every case will be this clear-cut. There are tricky cases where Φ-ing is permissible, 
but ill advised. In such cases, if you Φ it may be that you are properly criticisable. There are also cases where Φ-
ing is permitted but all your evidence suggests that it isn't. Again, here you may be properly criticisable, because 
reckless, if you Φ. These matters will be discussed further in §3. 
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 Duress: If Dan is coerced into smuggling weapons by a gang who have made threats 
 to his wellbeing, then whilst, we may suppose, the threats didn't made his action 
 permissible, the duress may well diminish his culpability. He did something 
 impermissible, but he has an excuse - he was under duress.  
 
 Provocation: If Joan lashes out physically at her friend after months of taunting, then 
 whilst, we may suppose, she was wrong to do so, the fact that she was provoked may 
 well diminish her culpability. She wasn't permitted to lash out, but she has an excuse - 
 she was provoked.  
 
 Intoxication: If someone slips a pill into Sarah's drink, which causes her to 
 drive dangerously, then although she did something wrong in driving in that 
 manner, it may well be that her culpability is diminished because she was  drugged. 
 She wasn't permitted to drive in that manner, but she has an excuse - she was drugged. 
 
  Misapprehension: We have already seen a case of misapprehension excusing - Anne-
 the-poisoner. Here's a similar case: If Tom, a policeman, unwittingly strays on to a 
 movie set and shoots and kills what he reasonably but mistakenly believes to be a 
 fleeing armed robber, who is in fact an actor, then whilst he wronged - he killed an 
 innocent man, after all - the fact that it was reasonable for him to believe that his 
 behaviour was justified may well diminish his culpability. He wasn't permitted to 
 shoot the innocent man, but he has an excuse - it appeared as though he was in a 
 situation where shooting was permitted. 
 
To be clear, the claim here is not that duress, provocation, intoxication and misapprehension 
always excuse, or that they always fully remove culpability. If the duress or provocation was 
very mild, and the wrongdoing very great, then the fact that there was duress or provocation 
may only partially remove culpability, or may not remove it at all. Likewise, if Sarah is 
responsible for her own intoxication - she voluntarily drank far too much liquor - the fact that 
she was intoxicated may do little to nothing to excuse her wrongdoing. Similar considerations 
apply to other excusing conditions. 
 
§1.3.2. When misapprehension excuses 
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Given the goal of this section - to argue that if it is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing 
that one does not know that p, then it is not permissible to believe p when one does not know 
that p - it should be clear that our interest is in misapprehension cases. That is, cases where 
appearances diverge from reality in such a way that a subject's wrongful behaviour is 
excusable. There are a number of questions we can ask about the conditions under which 
misapprehension excuses. For example, we will want to know what character 
misapprehension must have in order to excuse. Clearly, as with duress, provocation, and 
intoxication, it doesn't always. If, rather than straying on to a movie set, Tom was instead 
walking down the street and shot a young black man, racistly believing that the man was an 
armed robber, without a shred of evidence, then the fact that Tom believed that the man was a 
armed robber will likely do very little to diminish his culpability. Mere mistaken belief isn't 
sufficient for misapprehension to excuse. What else is required then? The question is a 
difficult one. However, for the purposes of motivating premise (4), we do not need to attempt 
to answer this question. It will suffice to note that at least sometimes, not knowing that you are 
Φ-ing excuses wrongful Φ-ing, even if it doesn't always. The cases of Anne-the-poisoner and 
Tom-the-killer-cop show just this. 
 
I want to argue that, in conjunction with the fact that not knowing what you are doing can 
serve to excuse, the 1st permissibility principle motivates premise (4).  
 
Now, it might seem as though there is a particularly straightforward way of arguing for this. 
The argument doesn't work, but as we will see, its failure is instructive. It departs from the 
thought that, if not knowing what you are doing excuses (at least sometimes), and Φ-ing is 
permissible for S iff it is possible for S to non-culpably not-Φ without an excuse, then we 
should be able to cash out the 1st permissibility principle as follows: 
 
 2nd Permissibility principle: Φ-ing is permissible for S iff were S to know that she 
 was Φ-ing, then it would be possible for S to non-culpably Φ without an excuse 
 
The thought is this: the 1st permissibility principle states that Φ-ing is permissible for S iff it 
is metaphysically possible for S to non-culpably Φ without an excuse. As we have seen, not 
knowing you are Φ-ing (sometimes) excuses. So it would seem to follow that Φ-ing is 
permissible iff it is possible for S to non-culpably Φ whilst not having the excuse of not 
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knowing that she is Φ-ing, and not having any other excuse. And that entails knowing that she 
is Φ-ing and not having any other excuse. 
 
From the 2nd permissibility principle, it is straightforward to derive premise (4). 
 
 (1*) By the 2nd permissibility principle if believing that p without knowing that p is 
 permissible, then it is possible to non-culpably believe that p whilst knowing that you 
 don't know that p, without an excuse 
 
 (2*) It is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing that you don't know that p 
 
 (3*) If you have no excuse for your irrationality, then you are culpable for it 
  
 (4*) Therefore: it is not possible to non-culpably believe that p whilst knowing that 
 you don't know that p, without an excuse 
 
 (5*) Therefore: it is not permissible to believe that p when you don't know that p 
 
(1*) applies the 2nd permissibility principle to the case of believing that p without knowing 
that p. (2*) is the antecedent of premise (4). (3*) will, I take it, be uncontroversial if the 1st 
permissibility principle is correct, since it is surely not permitted, from the epistemic 
perspective, to believe in an epistemically irrational manner. (4*) follows from (1*), (2*), and 
(3*), and (5*) - which is the consequent of premise (4) - follows from (1*) and (4*). 
 
Thus, if the 2nd permissibility principle is correct, then, given the uncontroversial assumption 
that it is impermissible, from the epistemic perspective, to believe irrationally, premise (4) of 
the master argument holds, and we can simply run the master argument to the conclusion that 
it is permissible to believe only what one knows. 
 
§1.3.3. When ignorance justifies 
 
Alas, arguing for premise (4) isn't that straightforward. The 2nd permissibility principle is 
false. Sometimes not knowing you are Φ-ing doesn't excuse - as it does for Anne-the-poisoner 
and Tom-the-killer-cop - but rather justifies, at least in the restricted sense that there are many 
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cases in which you must act on the balance of probabilities even though you don't know what 
the objectively right thing to do is, but were you to have known more, you would have been 
culpable for acting in the way that you did. To see this, consider a version of Parfit's (2011) 
miners case: 
 
 Miners case 
 
  There are two groups of miners trapped down two different mines - mine A and mine 
 B. You only have the resources to save one group. If you dedicate your resources to A, 
 then the miners in A will be saved and the miners in B will perish. Vice versa if you 
 dedicate your resources to B. You know that one mine has 5 miners in it, and the other 
 100. Unfortunately you don't know which is which. However, your total evidence 
 makes it rational for you to have a .95 credence that the 100 are in mine A, and this is 
 the credence you have. Time is running out, all the available evidence is in, and if you 
 don't act soon, both sets of miners will perish. What should you do? 
 
Plausibly, you are permitted - indeed, obligated - to dedicate your resources to mine A. And 
this remains true even if the 100 are in fact in mine B. Suppose that the 100 are indeed in B. 
In such a case, you are permitted to Φ, where Φ-ing = saving the 5 rather than the 100. Notice 
however, that had you known that what you were doing was saving the 5 rather than the 100, 
you would have been culpable for you behaviour.  
 
Cases like this can be multiplied. What they bring out is a point long recognised by decision 
theorists and moral philosophers: that what you ought to do is often partly a function of your 
epistemic position. If, instead, your total evidence had made it rational for you to have a .95 
credence that the 100 were in mine B, then you would not have been permitted to dedicate 
your resources to mine A. Rather, you would be obligated to dedicate them to mine B. In an 
uncertain world, often the right thing to do is to go with what the balance of evidence suggests 
is the objectively right thing, even if your evidence doesn't put you in a position to know that 
it is the objectively right thing to do, and even if that evidence is misleading. 
 
Given this fact, the 2nd permissibility principle is too crude, since it delivers the verdict in the 
miners case that you are not permitted to dedicate your resources to mine A. That's the wrong 
result. What is the defect in the principle that leads it astray in cases like this one? The answer 
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is, I think, quite clear. The problem is that the principle does not allow for changes in your 
epistemic position to affect what it is permissible for you to do. It doesn't take into account the 
fact that often an action that is permissible given your epistemic circumstances would not be 
permissible in different epistemic circumstances. Since changes in epistemic circumstances 
manifestly can affect the permissibility of a given action, the principle must be altered to take 
this into account if we are to make sense of the conditions under which ignorance72 excuses 
the impermissible, rather than creating a permission because one must act on the balance of 
probabilities. What we seek is a principle that honors the fact that Φ-ing is permissible iff one 
can non-culpably Φ without an excuse, and honors the fact that ignorance sometimes 
functions to excuse, whilst at the same time honoring the fact that changes in epistemic 
position can affect what actions are permissible. That is, we are looking for a principled 
different between cases in which ignorance justifies, like the miners case, and cases where it 
merely excuses, like the case of Anne-the-poisoner and Tom-the-killer-cop. 
 
What's the difference between cases where ignorance justifies, because you must act on the 
balance of probabilities, and cases where it merely excuses? The important difference, it 
seems to me, is that in cases where ignorance justifies, like the miners case, you can 
permissibly save the 5, rather than the 100, whilst knowing that it is possible that you are 
doing just this, without your needing an excuse in order to not be culpable for your behaviour. 
That is to say: whilst knowing that you don't know that you are doing the objectively right 
thing.73 Not so for Anne-the-poisoner and Tom-the-killer-cop. Had Anne known that she 
didn't know that there wasn't cyanide in the bowl, then she would be culpable for proceeding 
to spoon the substance into Bill's coffee without checking first, unless she had some kind of 
excuse. Similarly, had Tom known that he didn't know that he wasn't shooting an innocent 
man - that is, had he known that he didn't know whether or not the man was a genuine armed 
robber, rather than an actor - he would (other excusing conditions aside) have been culpable 
for his behaviour. This difference suggests that the right way to adapt the principle in order to 
reflect the distinction between cases where ignorance justifies because one must act on the 
balance of probabilities, and cases where ignorance merely excuses because merely having 
the balance of probabilities isn't enough, is as follows: 
  
                                                 
72 Here, and throughout, by 'ignorance' I mean not knowing. So S is ignorant of whether p iff S does not know 
whether p. 
73 In this section we understand epistemic possibility as being determined by a subject's knowledge. So it is 
possible for S that ~p iff S does not know that p. 
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 3rd Permissibility principle: Φ-ing without knowing that Φ-ing is objectively 
 right is permissible for S iff were S to know that she did not know that Φ-ing is 
 objectively right, it would nevertheless be possible for S to non-culpably Φ without an 
 excuse 
 
This principle is somewhat difficult to parse, so let me state clearly what it says:  
 
 It is permissible for S to Φ when S does not know that Φ-ing is objectively 
 right iff the following subjunctive conditional is true:  
 
  Were S to know that S does not know that Φ-ing is objectively right,  
  then it would be possible for (1)-(3) to be jointly true: 
 
   (1) S Φ's 
   (2) S is not culpable for Φ-ing 
   (3) S has no excuse for Φ-ing 
 
To illustrate, we can look at what the principle says about the miners case. Recall, the rational 
credence for you to have given your total evidence is that it is .95 likely that the 100 miners 
are in mine A, and the 5 miners in mine B, and this is the credence you have. So you don't 
know that dedicating your resources to mine A is the objectively right thing to do; for all you 
know the objectively right thing to do is to dedicate your resources to mine B. The question 
we are interested in is this: in these uncertain circumstances, where you don't know what the 
objectively right thing to do is, can you be permitted to dedicate your resources to mine A? 
The 3rd permissibility principle says that the answer is 'yes' iff it is possible for (a)-(c) to be 
jointly true when you know that you don't know that dedicating your resources to mine A is 
the objectively right thing to do 
 
 (a) You dedicate your resources to mine A  
 
 (b) There is nothing that would serve to excuse you for dedicating your resources to 
 mine A were it impermissible to do so. 
 
 (c) You are not culpable for dedicating your resources to mine A. 
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If it is possible for (a)-(c) to be jointly true in these circumstances, then you are permitted to 
dedicate your resources to mine A without knowing that this is the objectively right thing to 
do. If it is impossible for all of (a)-(c) to be jointly true, then you are not permitted. 
 
Why think that the 3rd permissibility principle is true? As I see it, there are (at least) two 
reasons. Firstly, the principle delivers the correct verdict in the miners case, and, it seems to 
me, all relevantly similar cases - that is, cases where you permitted to Φ despite the fact that 
you do not know that Φ-ing is the objectively right thing to do. As we saw above, In the 
miners case we get the correct verdict - that you are permitted to save the 5, rather than the 
100 - since it is possible for you to non-culpably save the 5, rather than the 100 whilst 
knowing that it is possible that you are doing just this, without any other excusing conditions - 
intoxication, duress, etc. - being in place. The situation you face in the miners case is a 
common one: you must act on the balance of the probabilities, in the face of the possibility 
that you are not doing the objectively right thing. In such situations, it seems to me, it is 
always possible for you to act without an excuse, without lapsing into culpability. And this 
includes the excuse of not knowing the risks. Thus, I see no obvious counterexamples to the 
principles from the direction of cases where ignorance justifies. That is, I see no obvious cases 
where intuitively Φ-ing without knowing that Φ-ing is the objectively right thing to do is 
permissible, but it is impossible for conditions (a)-(c) above to be jointly satisfied. 
 
Moreover, it seems to me that there are no obvious counterexamples to be found from cases 
where ignorance excuses. As we saw above, the obvious difference between you in the miners 
case, and the cases of Anne-the-poisoner and Tom-the-killer-cop is that, whilst you can 
permissibly, non-culpably, dedicate your resources to mine A whilst knowing that it is 
possible, given your epistemic circumstances, that you will thereby be saving the 5, rather 
than the 100, had Tom known that he didn't know whether or not he was shooting an innocent 
man, and had Anne known that she didn't know whether she was spooning cyanide or sugar 
into Bill's coffee, Tom and Anne would (other excuses aside) have been culpable for the 
behaviour. In these cases, having the balance of probabilities isn't good enough. The only 
reason that Anne and Tom aren't culpable is because they are blamelessly ignorant of their 
epistemic circumstances. In that case, their lack of knowledge only serves to excuse, rather 
than justify, their actions. Plausibly, the same is true of other such cases where ignorance 
excuses, rather than justifies. So, I see no obvious counterexamples to the principles from this 
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direction either. That is, I see no obvious cases where intuitively Φ-ing without knowing that 
Φ-ing is objectively right is not permissible for S, but it is possible for conditions (a)-(c) to be 
jointly satisfied.74 
 
The absence of obvious counterexamples to the principles either from cases where ignorance 
justifies, or from cases where ignorance excuses, is a reason to accept the 3rd permissibility 
principle. A defeasible reason, but a reason nonetheless. 
 
The second motivation for the principle is that there are theoretical reasons to expect it to be 
true. To see this, recall that, as we have already seen, if excuses exhaustively fill the gap 
between wrongdoing and culpability, then if Φ-ing is permissible, it must be possible to non-
culpably Φ without having an excuse. That's what the 1st permissibility principle states. Now, 
sometimes you don't know what the objectively right thing to do is, but you must act, and so 
you are permitted to act on the balance of probabilities. This is what's going on in the miners 
case, and similar cases. In such cases, what you are permitted to do is partly a function of 
your epistemic circumstances - what things you know, what things you are ignorant of, what 
credences your total evidence makes rational, and so on. But once the issue of what you are 
permitted to do given your epistemic circumstances has been settled - that is, once your 
epistemic circumstances have been 'factored in' to the set of considerations that determine 
whether it is permissible for you to Φ - then, given that excuses exhaustively fill the gap 
between wrongdoing and culpability, it should be possible for you to proceed to do the 
permissible thing non-culpably without the need for an excuse. And that means without, 
amongst other things, your non-culpability being a result of your ignorance of your epistemic 
circumstances. 
 
Why? Because if you are permitted/not permitted to Φ without knowing that Φ-ing is the 
objectively right thing to do, then considerations about what epistemic circumstances have to 
obtain in order for you to be permitted/not permitted to Φ have already been taken into 
account, and it has been determined that you are permitted/not permitted to Φ without 
knowing that Φ-ing is the objectively right thing to do. Given this, if it turned out that the only 
reason you were non-culpable for Φ-ing without knowing that Φ-ing is objectively right is 
because of a particular kind of ignorance on your part - namely ignorance of your epistemic 
                                                 
74 You might think that, provided that it was sufficiently probable on Anne and Tom's evidence that they were 
doing the right thing, they could non-culpably act as they do without an excuse. I will address this concern in §3.  
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circumstances (as is the case with Anne and Tom) - then it must be that your epistemic 
circumstances weren't circumstances in which Φ-ing without knowing that Φ-ing is the 
objectively right thing to do was permitted in the first place, and the best you can hope to get 
from your ignorance is an excuse. But by the 1st obligation principle and the 1st permissibly 
principle, if you are permitted to Φ, then it is possible to non-culpably Φ without an excuse. 
Therefore: it must be possible to non-culpably Φ without knowing that Φ-ing is the 
objectively right thing to do whilst knowing that you don't know whether Φ-ing is the 
objectively right thing to do. And this is just what the 3rd permissibility principle states. 
 
From the epistemic perspective, believing that p is the objectively right thing to do if p is true, 
and the objectively wrong thing to do if p is false (as it is often noted: a belief is correct iff 
true). Given this, with the 3rd permissibility principle in hand we are now in a position to 
motivate premise (4) of the master argument. The argument is parallel to the one given in 
§1.3.2, but with the 3rd permissibility principle replacing the flawed 2nd permissibility 
principle: 
 
 (1**) By the 3rd permissibility principle, if believing that p is true without 
 knowing that p is true is permissible, then it is possible to non-culpably believe that p 
 is true  whilst knowing that you don't know that p is true, without an excuse 
 
 (2**) It is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing that you don't know that p 
 
 (3**) If you have no excuse for your irrationality, then you are culpable for it 
  
 (4**) Therefore: it is not possible to non-culpably believe that p whilst knowing that 
 you don't know that p, without an excuse 
 
 (5**) Therefore: it is not permissible to believe that p when you don't know that p 
 
(1**) applies the 3rd permissibility principle to the case of believing that p whilst not 
knowing that p, where believing that p is objectively right iff p is true. (2**) is the antecedent 
of premise (4). (3**) is uncontroversial if the 1st permissibility principle is correct, since it is 
surely not permitted, from the epistemic perspective, to believe in an epistemically irrational 
manner. (4**) follows from (1**), (2**), and (3**), and (5**) - which is the consequent of 
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premise (4) - follows from (1**) and (4**). 
 
With premise (4) in hand, we are now in a position to run the master argument: 
 
 (1) It is irrational to believe 'p & I don't know that p'75 
 
 (2) If one knows that p, one rationally believes that p  
 
 (3) Therefore, it is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing that one does not know 
 that p 
 
 (4) If it is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing that one does not know that p, 
 then it is not permissible to believe p when one does not know that p 
 
 (5) Therefore: it is permissible to believe only what one knows. 
 
So if it is irrational to believe 'p, but I don't know that p', then knowledge is the norm of belief 
in the sense that it is permissible to believe that p only if one knows that p. Since the claim 
that knowledge that p is sufficient for permissible belief that p is almost universally accepted 
by epistemologists, this can uncontroversially be strengthened to a biconditional: 
 
 Knowledge norm of belief: One is permitted to believe that p iff one knows that p. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75 You might think that, just as it is irrational to believe 'p, & I don't know that p', it is also irrational to believe 'p, 
& I can't be certain that p'. If you think that, you might worry that this kind of argument overgenerates, since 
then an argument parallel to this one could be run to show that one is permitted to believe that p only if p is 
certain - and this is too strong. I address this concern, and related concerns, in §3. 
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§II. Why Is Knowledge The Norm Of Belief? 
 
 
 
§2.1. The 'why?' question 
 
 
In §1 I argued that if it is irrational to believe conjunctions of the form 'p, and I don't know 
that p', the knowledge is the norm of belief in the sense that it is epistemically permissible to 
believe that p iff you know that p. Since I think that it is irrational to believe conjunctions of 
the form 'p, and I don't know that p', I think that knowledge is indeed the norm of belief. 
 
 Here I address a further question. Why is knowledge is the norm of belief? Why knowledge, 
rather than something else? The question is an interesting one for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
and most obviously, because an answer to it will deepen our understanding of the epistemic; 
for epistemologists this is a question worth exploring for its own sake. Secondly, because 
supposing that, as was suggested at the outset of this essay, the fact that knowledge is the 
norm of belief explains why it is rational to believe that p, when it is, then answering the 
question will also give us a more complete understanding of rational belief. 
 
One might think that it is simply a brute fact about our epistemic system that knowledge is the 
norm of belief. I think that's rather implausible. It is natural to think that we have this norm, 
rather than some other norm, of permissible belief because conforming to a normative system 
in which it is permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p serves our needs and interests 
in some way. Now, this might ultimately turn out not to be the case; perhaps the knowledge 
norm serves no particular need or interest of ours. But the hypothesis is one that is worth 
investigating.76  
 
I think we can say some plausible things about why knowledge - rather than something else - 
                                                 
76 The project of this section shares some affinities with Edward Craig's project in 'Knowledge and the State of 
Nature' (1990) insofar as it seeks to shed light on epistemological issues by considering the general needs and 
interests of human beings. The projects differ in some respect however. For example, whereas Craig is primarily 
interested in why we have the concept KNOWLEDGE, I am more interested in why we care about believing 
only what we know. 
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is the norm of belief. In this section I sketch out an answer to the 'why?' question. However, 
no pretense is made here that the account offered is either exhaustive or definitive. The 
account put forward here is perfectly compatible with there being additional reasons why 
knowledge is the norm of belief beyond those suggested, and much of what is said in this 
section is put forward in the spirit of speculative conjecture, rather than conclusive argument. 
The reader is asked to bear these facts in mind when reading what follows. This is only a 
tentative proposal. 
 
Of course, just how one will wish to answer the 'why?' question depends to a significant 
extent on one's views on the nature of knowledge. My preferences are for a fallibilist 
conception of knowledge, whereby S can know that p even though S could have been wrong 
about p, and a safety conception of knowledge whereby knowledge is simply safe belief - that 
is, S knows that p iff S could not have easily been wrong about p. I will have more to say 
about these conditions shortly. Both, of course, are controversial (particularly the safety 
conception). I won't argue for them here, for my goal in this section is to offer an account of 
how one might explain why knowledge is the norm of belief given these assumptions about 
the nature of knowledge. I do so without apology; conditional inquiry is a valuable enterprise 
even though its conclusions are not categorical. 
 
 
§2.2. An Overview 
 
 
I begin with an overview of the account and then go on to spell out and motivate some of the 
details. 
 
In slogan form, my suggestion is that knowledge is the norm of belief because a belief is fit to 
be relied on in decision making when, and only when, it is an item of knowledge. More 
specifically the thought (roughly stated) is this. If knowledge is fallible safe belief, then S 
knows that p iff S could not have easily have falsely believed that p, but it is not required that 
there was no possibility of S falsely believing that p. Belief is a functional kind that has 
constitutive connections with decision making dispositions. In particular, it is a necessary 
condition on S believing p that S is disposed to treat p as certain for the purposes of decision 
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making in normal circumstances. Due to cognitive and epistemic limitations, we have a need 
to employ a heuristic of treating propositions as epistemically certain for decision making 
when they are in fact epistemically uncertain. Taking uncertainties as certain for decision 
making introduces a kind of epistemic risk to the actions that result from such decision 
making. Lest the epistemic norms of belief license foreseeably unhelpful decision making 
procedures, we should expect there to be restrictions on when it permissible to take an 
uncertainty as certain for the purposes of decision making. Conforming to a rule that states 
that one is permitted to believe that p iff one knows that p is, I want to suggest, a good policy 
to have given these needs and limitations. And this explains (at least in part) why we have a 
rule that it is permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p. 
 
Obviously there is a lot to elucidate and motivate here. We will begin with some elucidation 
of the assumptions and then move on to so see how the account might be motivated given 
them. There is no scope here to argue for the central assumptions here. For example, I will 
take it as a given that knowledge is fallible safe belief, that belief is a functional kind with the 
kind of constitutive connections to action described, and that we employ the heuristic of 
taking uncertainties as certain in decision making. Arguing for these claims here would only 
amount to rehearsing already familiar points from debates in epistemology, decision theory, 
and the philosophy of mind. Instead, the reader will be directed to the work of others in which 
these claims have been argued for. What I will argue is that when they are put together, these 
assumptions offer us a promising explanation of why knowledge is the norm of belief. 
 
 
§2.3. Some Assumptions 
 
 
We begin with fallibilism. There are a number of way to conceive of the fallibility of 
knowledge. Some (e.g. Fantl & McGrath 2009, et al) do so in terms of epistemic probabilities. 
The claim being that S can know that p even though p has an epistemic probability of less 
than 1 for S. Our conception will be somewhat different. As we will understand it, to hold that 
fallible knowledge is possible is to hold that it is possible to know that p even though the 
method by which one formed one's belief that p could have led one to a false belief that p. Or, 
to put it in the framework of possible worlds: there is at least one possible world in which S 
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forms her belief that p by method M and p is false. That knowledge is fallible in this way is a 
very widely held view in epistemology. And with good reason; denying the possibility of 
fallible knowledge seems to lead to skepticism about the possibility of knowledge.77 
 
The view that knowledge is simply safe belief will be understood as follows: S knows that p 
iff the method by which S formed her belief that p could not have easily led her to a false 
belief that p. In the possible worlds framework: there is no nearby possible world in which S 
falsely believes that p.78 That safe belief is a necessary condition on knowing is a fairly 
popular view.79 That safe belief is necessary and sufficient for knowledge is much more 
controversial.80 It will nevertheless be taken as an assumption here.81  
 
That belief is a functional kind is a dominant view in the philosophy of mind, and 
functionalists often take its functional role to be partly constituted by its connections to 
action. On this view it is commonly thought that S believes that p only if S is disposed to treat 
p as certain for the purposes of decision making in normal circumstances82 83, where to treat p 
as certain for decision making is to ignore ~p possibilities in one's decision making. Stronger 
                                                 
77 Matters are made more complicated here if, as Williamson (2000) argues, one's evidence consists of all and 
only those propositions one knows to be true ('E=K'). If E=K is true, then the probability of p on one's evidence 
is always 1 when one knows that p (because p is part of one's evidence, and the probability of p on p is 
necessarily 1). If epistemic probabilities are understood as probabilities on one's evidence, then it follows that 
there is a sense in which knowledge is infallible. In that case much of what is argued in this section would need 
to be re-thought. E=K is not assumed here however (I argue against it in Hughes (2014)), and even were it to be 
accepted, further argument would be needed to motivate the thought that we should treat the kind of epistemic 
probability relevant to decision theory as probability on one's evidence.  
78 Some refinements will be needed here to deal with knowledge of necessary truths. Since there is no possible 
world in which necessary truths are false, on the current interpretation of the safety condition, anyone who 
believes a necessary truth also knows it. But this is too generous, for there are surely possible cases where S 
believes that p, and p is a necessary truth, but S does not know that p. For the relevant refinements, see Pritchard 
(2012). I will ignore this issue here for ease of exposition. 
79 Williamson (2000), Sosa (1999), and Pritchard (2005) all develop variations on this idea. It is not entirely 
uncontroversial though. For objections see Kelp (2009), Baumann (2008), Comesana (2005), and Neta & 
Rohrbaugh (2004). 
80 Williamson seems to be sympathetic to the view, and it is defended from objections by Lasonen-Aarnio 
(2010), but rejected by a number of epistemologists. For example, all those who reject the necessity direction in 
the last footnote, amongst others. Bonjour's (1980) clairvoyance cases are often thought to cause troubles for the 
sufficiency direction. 
81 It is worth noting that, given that it is a desiderata on a theory of knowledge that it is able to account for the 
value of knowledge, it may be thought that the account offered in this section provides us with a motivation for 
the safe belief view insofar as it can account for the value of knowledge. I won't push this line of thought here 
though. 
82 Ross & Schroeder (2014), Frankish (2004, 2009), Smithies (2012), Bratman (1987), and Wedgewood (2008) 
all endorse variations of this claim. 
83 But not necessarily all circumstances - for example, on the view we are interested in, one may count as 
believing that p even if one is not willing to take p as certain in a situation in which the stakes are very high and 
one has a great deal to lose if one is wrong about p. Obviously we will want to know more about what 'normal' 
circumstances are here. Unfortunately this issue is beyond the scope of the essay. 
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views are possible: that being disposed to take p as certain for decision making in normal 
circumstances is necessary and sufficient for believing p, or that being disposed to take p as 
certain for decision making in circumstances C is necessary for believing that p in C.84 We 
only assume the weaker view here. 
 
Ross and Schroeder (2014) explain why we should expect that, due to their cognitive and 
epistemic limitations, people have a need to employ a heuristic of treating propositions that 
are uncertain as certain for the purposes of decision making: 
 
 "The need to treat uncertain propositions as true has long been acknowledged by 
 decision theorists. Leonard Savage makes this point very clearly. According to his 
 formulation of decision theory, decision problems are defined by a table in which 
 ‘consequences’ (i.e., outcomes) are assigned to pairs consisting of acts and states of 
 nature. Thus, the agent can calculate the expected utility of her possible acts (about 
 whose actual utility she is uncertain) in terms of the actual utilities of the possible 
 consequences of these acts, multiplied by the probabilities of the states of nature in 
 which these acts would have these consequences. The general problem is that for any 
 given act, an agent will typically have nonzero credence in vastly many possible 
 consequences of this act. And so if she were to associate a given consequence with a 
 given act-state pair only if she were certain that the act-state pair would have this 
 consequence, then she would need to employ a vast partition of ultrafine-grained 
 states of nature, and the resulting computational task would be unmanageable. Thus, 
 Savage concludes that, inevitably, act-state pairs with “actually uncertain 
 consequences [must] play the role of sure consequences” Savage [1972, p. 84]. 
 Similar considerations apply, as James Joyce [1999] has shown, on other formulations 
 of decision theory" (2014: 266) 
 
Cast in simpler terms, the point is this. For almost every proposition one should, and typically 
will, have a non-zero credence that it is true, since there is almost nothing that we can be 
completely certain is false. If we were to factor all of these non-zero probabilities into our 
decision making, then coming to a decision about how to act would very often be an 
unmanageably complex task for creatures, like ourselves, who have limited cognitive 
                                                 
84 Weatherson 2012 seems to hold this latter view. 
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capacities and often need to engage in decision making in time-pressured circumstances. Thus 
we have a need to simplify our decision making procedures in various ways. One way in 
which we do so is by sometimes treating uncertain propositions as certain, thereby 
simplifying decision making, and lightening the cognitive load, by eliminating the need to 
factor these uncertainties into the decision making task. Call this phenomenon of treating 
uncertainties as certain the 'uncertainty-certainty heuristic'. A moment's reflection will confirm 
that we do indeed employ this heuristic, at least in our conscious practical reasoning. 
 
 
§2.4. The Argument 
 
 
My suggestion is that if we put the view that knowledge is fallible safe belief together with 
the functionalist theory of belief and the uncertainty-certainty heuristic, we are availed of a 
plausible explanation for why knowledge is the norm of belief. 
 
We begin with some entailments. First off, notice that if belief has the kind of constitutive 
connection to action suggested, then: 
 
 (a) It is permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p 
 
entails: 
 
 (b) It is permissible to take p as certain in decision making in normal 
 circumstances iff one knows that p85 
 
And if knowledge is fallible safe belief, then (b) entails: 
                                                 
85 This principle is similar to a number of 'knowledge-action principles' that have been proposed recently. For 
example, Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) argue that "Where one's choice is p-dependent, it is appropriate to treat 
the proposition p as a reason for acting iff you know that p". (b) differs from most of these proposals by not 
claiming that knowing that p is always sufficient for being in a strong enough epistemic position to treat p as 
certain in decision making. For example, it is compatible with (b) that when the stakes are very high one needs a 
stronger epistemic relationship to p than knowledge to permissibly treat p as certain in one's decision making. 
Arguably this is an advantage of (b) over Hawthorne and Stanley's proposal. As Brown (2008) and Reed (2010) 
have pointed out, where there is a great deal at stake about whether one is right about p, intuitively knowing that 
p is not good enough for one to permissibly treat p as certain. (b) does not face this problem. Knowledge-action 
principles like the one endorsed by Hawthorne and Stanley have been used to argue that knowledge is 
pragmatically encroached upon. No such argument can be run using (b).  
 142 
 
 (c) It is permissible to take p as certain in decision making in normal 
 circumstances iff one could not have easily have falsely believed that p. 
 
If we employ the uncertainty-certainty heuristic, it follows that: 
 
 (d) It is permissible to take an uncertainty as certain for the purposes of decision 
 making in normal circumstances iff one could not easily have falsely believed that p. 
 
I think there is a good explanation available for why (d) is true, and that this explains - at least 
in part - why it is permissible to believe that p iff you know that p. 
 
The argument, enthymematically expressed, is this: 
 
 (1) Taking uncertainties as certain in decision making introduces epistemic risk to  the 
 actions that result from the decision procedure. 
 
 (2) Norms of decision making that allow for too much epistemic risk in action are 
 unhelpful 
 
 (3) If (1) and (2), then we should expect to have a risk-reducing rule restricting when 
 it is permissible to take uncertainties as certain in decision making 
 
 (4) Three desiderata on such a rule are: 
 
  a. It must reduce risk 
  b. It must not be too demanding so as to be unattainable 
  c. It must be cognitively cheap 
 
 (5) The knowledge rule fulfills these three desiderata very well. 
 
So why is our epistemic system one in which it permissible to believe that p iff you know that 
p? Because a policy of believing that p iff you know that p is one that does a good job of 
enabling us to simplify decision making in a cognitively cheap way whilst preventing 
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excessively risky actions resulting from the simplification.  
 
The claims of this argument will be argued for in turn. Beginning with (1), it should be 
obvious that treating uncertainties as certain in decision making results in riskier actions than 
only treating certainties as certain. The following example demonstrates this. 
 
Suppose that S is playing roulette on a table that is rigged so that the ball is guaranteed to land 
red, and S is deciding whether to bet on red or black. Now suppose that S has super-reliable 
inside information that the table is rigged, and so it is epistemically certain for S that the ball 
will land red on the next spin and S knows this. Suppose that S reasons as follows: 
 
 (1) The ball will land red 
 (2) So, if I bet red I'll double my money, and if I bet black I'll lose my money 
 (3) I would prefer to double my money than lose my money 
 (4) So, I should bet red 
 
And suppose that she proceeds to bet red. 
 
Compare S to S*. Like S, S* is playing roulette on a table that is rigged so that the ball is 
guaranteed to land red, and is deciding whether to bet on red or black. Unlike S, S* as no 
evidence suggesting that the table is rigged. As such, it is just under .5 epistemically probable 
for her that the ball will land red. Suppose that S* reasons as follows: 
 
 (1) The ball will land red 
 (2) So, If I bet red I'll double my money, and if I bet black I'll lose my money 
 (3) I would prefer to double my money than lose my money 
 (4) So, I should bet red 
 
Ignore the fact that S*'s reasoning is defective in that she should not be relying on (1), and 
focus on the following question: whose action is more risky? Clearly the answer is S*. And 
that's true even though the ball will in fact land red in both cases. The risk that S* runs is 
epistemic. Why is S*'s action more risky? Because there is a significantly higher chance, 
given her epistemic situation, that she will lose her money than there is for S. But S and S* 
reached their decisions in exactly the same manner. The only difference between S and S* is 
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that, unlike S, S* took an uncertainty as a certainty. Thus, the case demonstrates that the 
riskiness of acting on the basis of a decision making procedure is greater when one takes an 
uncertainty as certain than when one only take a certainty as certain.86 
 
(2) claims that norms of decision making that allow for too much epistemic risk are unhelpful. 
Again, this should be obvious. Reasoning about how to act, rather than simply acting, is 
useful because it allows us to figure out which courses of action are better and which worse, 
given our preferences and information. The norms of decision making exist to guide you to 
better courses of action, and it is in virtue of their ability to do this that they have their 
normative force. If the norms of decision making were very lax when it came to the tolerance 
of epistemic risk, then conforming to them would often result in reasoners performing highly 
risky actions. Given the nature of high risk actions, this would often result in unwanted 
outcomes. Thus, were the norms of decision making to be very lax when it came to epistemic 
risk, they would fail to live up to their raison d'etre of guiding us towards better courses of 
action and away from worse ones. So we should expect them not to be too lax. 
 
Why think that if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) will also be true? Because if taking  
uncertainties as certain introduces epistemic risk to the actions that result from decision 
making, and allowing for too much risk results in the norms of decision making failing to be a 
guide to the best course of action, then if the norms of decision making are to serve their 
purpose of guiding decision makers towards better courses of action, we should expect there 
to be rules governing the conditions under which it is permissible to take an uncertainty as 
certain in decision making that place restrictions on the level of epistemic risk that it is 
acceptable to take on in taking an uncertainty as certain. If there were no such rules, then the 
norms of decision making would not serve their purpose. 
 
                                                 
86 Of course, it is also possible to end up doing something stupidly risky, not as a result of having a poor 
epistemic position with respect to the propositions you rely on in decision making, but rather because of your 
preferences. Imagine S**, who is in the same situation as S*, but reasons as follows: 
  
 (1) It is just under .5 likely that the ball will land red 
 (2) So there is a significant risk that if I bet all my money on red I'll lose all my money 
 (3) I want to run a significant risk of losing all my money 
 (4) So, I should bet all my money on red. 
 
S** runs just as great a risk as S*, but the source of her risk is different. Her problem is not with the epistemic 
position that she bears to the propositions that she relies on in her decision making (we can suppose that each of 
them is epistemically certain for her and she knows this), but rather with her risk-loving preferences. 
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So we should expect there to be a risk-reducing rule (or set of rules) on when it is permissible 
to take uncertainties as certain in decision making. There will be at least three desiderata on a 
risk-reducing rule for it to be well suited to its task. Firstly, and most obviously, it must be one 
where the conditions to be met for permissibly taking an uncertainty as certain actually do 
reduce risk. Otherwise the rule will clearly not be fit for purpose. 
 
Secondly, the conditions set down by the rule must be conditions that we human decision 
makers, with our limited epistemic abilities, can regularly meet. That is to say: they must not 
be too demanding. A rule that demanded that one take p as certain in decision making iff p is 
no more than 1/1 trillion epistemically likely to be false would certainly avoid the pitfall of 
allowing too much risk into decision making, but it would be useless on the plausible 
supposition that there is very little that is less than 1/1 trillion epistemically likely to be false 
for us, for it would be a rule that would be ill-suited to meet our needs. It would say, 'yes', 
there are conditions under which you can simplify your decision making by treating an 
uncertainty as certain, but unfortunately for you these are conditions that almost never obtain. 
The result would be that we would only very rarely be allowed to simplify decision making in 
the relevant way, and hence that the uncertainty-certainty heuristic would be next to useless at 
serving its purpose of making otherwise unmanageably complex decision making tasks 
tractable for creatures, like ourselves, who have limited cognitive and epistemic capacities 
and often need to make decisions in time-pressured circumstances with limited information. 
 
The third desideratum is that the rule must be cognitively cheap. By this I mean that the 
conditions laid down in the rule must be such that it is not a cognitively laborious task to 
establish whether they have been met. The reason for this desideratum is that the purpose of 
the risk-reducing rule is to allow decision makers to turn what would otherwise be a 
cognitively intractable decision making task into a manageable one by allowing them to treat 
uncertainties as certain whilst not taking on board too much risk. A rule that met the risk-
reducing and achievability criteria would nevertheless be ill-suited to this role if it turned out 
to be a laborious cognitive task to establish whether the conditions laid down by the rule had 
been met on any given occasion, since this would vitiate the purpose of having a rule that 
simplifies decision making tasks in such a way that they can be undertaken in time-pressured 
circumstances with limited cognitive resources. 
 
If it is permissible to believe that p iff you know that p, and belief has the functional role that 
 146 
we are assuming it to have, then the risk-reducing rule is this: it is permissible to take an 
uncertainty as certain for the purposes of decision making in normal circumstances iff you 
know that p. That is to say: the condition laid down by the risk-reducing rule is that one must 
know that p. That the condition is knowledge, rather than something else, is, I want to argue, 
no surprise, since if knowledge is fallible safe belief, then it appears to fulfil our desiderata on 
a risk-reducing rule very well. And this is what explains (at least in part) why knowledge, 
rather than something else, is the norm of belief.87 
 
Here's why the knowledge rule fulfils the desiderata well. First of all, notice that the first two 
desiderata will interact with one another. The need to avoid taking on excessive epistemic risk 
in the actions that result from decision making will put pressure on us to have a risk-reducing 
rule that requires one to be in a fairly good risk-avoiding epistemic position with respect to p 
in order to permissibly treat it as certain in decision making. That is to say, the need to avoid 
epistemic risk will push the required epistemic standards to be met upwards. But the need to 
have a rule whose conditions can be met by creatures such as ourselves will push the required 
epistemic standards downwards. If the standard to be met is too high, then it will be a standard 
that we can only rarely - if ever - meet, and as we have seen we need a standard that can be 
met by normal human epistemic agents on a regular basis. Given this upwards-downwards 
push and pull, we should expect the risk-reducing rule to be one that requires us to be in a 
strong, but nevertheless easily achievable, epistemic position to satisfy. If knowledge is 
fallible safe belief, then the knowledge rule of risk-reduction suits these demands very well. 
Knowledge in the image of fallible safe belief does not require that one could not have 
possibly falsely believed that p, but does require that one could not have easily falsely 
believed that p. This is a standard that we can, and do, achieve on a regular basis in our 
everyday lives. But it is also a standard that brings with it a good deal of risk-reduction. When 
one acts on a belief that could not have easily been false, one acts with a 'safety buffer' against 
the risk of a bad outcome. By contrast, when one acts on a belief that could have easily been 
false, one runs an uncomfortable level of risk, even if one's belief is both true and well 
supported by the evidence. To see this different, we can contrast the level of risk run by a 
subject who knows that p with the level of risk run by a subject who merely has a Gettiered 
rational true belief that p. 
                                                 
87 I do not mean to suggest that no other rule could fulfill the desiderata. The questions of what other rules could 
fulfill them and why these aren't the norm of belief are beyond the scope of this essay. They are questions for 
further work. 
 147 
 
Our example is borrowed from Brown (2008). Suppose, in the knowledge case, that S has 
arranged to meet her partner for lunch. S needs to take the train to meet him, and in the course 
of planning what time to leave the office, she consults the timetable on the train company's 
website. The timetable says there is a 12.15 express train that will get her to lunch on time. S 
thereby comes to know that there is a 12.15 express, and, on the basis of information, leaves 
the office shortly before 12.15, catches the train, and meets her partner on time. 
 
In this case it would be rather odd to suggest that S ran a substantial risk of missing her lunch 
date in this case - what would the source of the risk be? Contrast this with a Gettier version of 
the situation. As before S has arranged to meet her partner for lunch. She needs to take the 
train to meet him, and in the course of planning what time to leave the office, she consults the 
timetable on the train company's website. The timetable says there is a 12.15 express train that 
will get her to lunch on time. On the basis of this information S leaves the office shortly 
before 12.15 in order to catch the train. Unbeknownst to S however, a hacker has accessed the 
train company's website and replaced this year's timetable with last year's timetable for a joke. 
Luckily for S, although the two timetables are very different, this year's timetable just happens 
to be the same as last year's when it comes to lunchtime express trains, so S makes the train 
and meets her partner on time.  
 
Here, in contrast with the knowledge case, it is natural to think that in relying on an unreliable 
source of information, and thus a belief, which could have easily been false, that there is a 
12.15 express train, S ran (albeit unwittingly) a substantial and undesirable risk of a bad 
outcome - namely missing the train and her lunch date. What this contrast between the 
knowledge case and the Gettier case demonstrates is that a safety condition on knowledge has 
the result that conforming to the knowledge rule ensures that one does not run an excessive 
level of risk in the actions that result from one's decision making and transgressing it involves 
placing oneself at substantial risk. 
 
If knowledge is fallible safe belief then it does a good job of meeting the first two desiderata 
on a risk-reducing rule. It also does well on the third desiderata. It is a striking fact about 
knowledge attribution that it is a fairly effortless task. Consider the difference in the 
experience of trying to calculate '652 x 77 = ' with that of judging whether a subject in a given 
situation knows that p or not. The former is a slow, effortful, consciously transparent, 
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cognitively burdensome, task. In the parlance of dual-process theory, it is a System 2 process. 
By contrast, the latter is a quick, effortless, intuitive, and cognitively cheap, task that is not 
open to conscious inspection. The process of knowledge attribution has many of the hallmarks 
of a System 1 process. Accordingly, a knowledge rule of risk-reduction is well suited to meet 
the requirement of cognitive cheapness required by the third desiderata on a risk-reducing 
rule. The knowledge rule, unlike many other possible rules,88 is one that can be applied in 
time-pressured circumstances by agents with limited cognitive resources. 
 
That the knowledge rule on risk-reduction does a good job of fulfilling these three desiderata 
provides us, I want to suggest, with a good explanation for why knowledge is the norm of 
belief. To see this it will be helpful to recap the argument just given. We saw that if belief is a 
functional kind with the constitutive connections to decision making that we are assuming it 
has, then part of what it is to believe that p is to be disposed to treat p as certain for the 
purposes on decision making in normal circumstances. Thus, if it is permissible to believe that 
p iff you know that p, then it is permissible to treat p as certain for the purposes of decision 
making in normal circumstances iff you know that p. Given that people need to employ the 
uncertainty-certainty heuristic in order to make decision making procedures cognitively 
tractable, it follows that you are permitted to treat an uncertainty as certain for the purposes of 
decision making in normal circumstances iff you know that p. Treating uncertainties as certain 
brings with it epistemic risk, and we will have a need to avoid taking on too much risk. As a 
result, we will have a risk-reducing rule that fulfils the three desiderata of reducing risk, being 
achievable, and being cognitively cheap. The knowledge rule fulfils these three criteria very 
well, and that is why it should come as no surprise to us that the epistemic norm of belief is 
knowledge rather than something else. Or to put it more succinctly: part of what it is to 
believe is to often treat propositions as certain when they are uncertain. A good policy of 
taking uncertainties as certain will fulfil certain desiderata. The knowledge rule fulfils these 
desiderata very well, and this explains why it is permissible to believe that p iff you know that 
p. More succinctly still: a belief is fit to be relied on in decision making when, and only when, 
it is an item of knowledge. 
 
                                                 
88 Consider, for example, a rule saying: treat p as certain iff p is at least n epistemically probable for you (where 
n<1). It's not easy to know how epistemically probable a proposition is for you. Establishing it will often involve 
marshalling a great deal of evidence, and even then you will often only be in a position to give a rough estimate. 
Accordingly, this rule would fail to meet the third desiderata and would thus not be a plausible candidate to be 
the risk-reducing rule. 
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As I said earlier, no pretence is made here that the argument of this section is conclusive. It 
relies on a number of assumptions, some of which - in particular the claim that knowledge is 
simply safe belief -  are controversial. And it will stand or fall with those assumptions. Nor is 
any pretence made that this account exhaustively explains why knowledge is the norm of 
belief. It is perfectly compatible with everything that I have said that there are further reasons 
- perhaps more important or fundamental reasons - why our epistemic system is one in which 
it is permissible to believe that p iff one knows that p. Nevertheless, I suggest that the account 
sketched here represents a promising starting point in the project of answering the 'why?' 
question. 
 
 
 
 
§III. Objections and Replies 
 
 
 
 
We have covered a lot of ground, and there are many points in my arguments that one may 
object to. It is, of course, not possible to reply to every possible objection. Here I reply only to 
what I take to be the most pressing objections. Due to limitations of space, the focus will be 
on objections to the argument of §1 - that knowledge is the norm of belief - since this is the 
main claim that I want to defend. 
 
Objection: You claim that were Anne to know that she didn't know whether there was cyanide 
or sugar in the jar, then she could not non-culpably spoon the substance into Bill's coffee 
without an excuse. And you claim that were Tom to know that he didn't know whether the 
man he has trained his gun on was a genuine armed robber or in fact innocent, then he could 
not non-culpably shoot the man without an excuse. The claim in these cases is that Anne and 
Tom can only permissibly Φ if they know that Φ-ing is the objectively right thing to do. 
Whilst this has some prima facie plausibility, it overlooks the fact that Anne and Tom could 
find themselves in situations in which, whilst they don't know that Φ-ing is the objectively 
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right thing to do, it is overwhelmingly likely given their evidence that Φ-ing is the objectively 
right thing to do. And in such circumstances it is plausible that they would be permitted to Φ, 
despite not knowing that Φ-ing is the objectively right thing to do. Accordingly, the cases of 
Anne and Tom don't support your argument. 
 
Reply: I rather doubt that Anne and Tom can non-culpably Φ without an excuse solely on the 
basis of the probabilities involved, without knowing that Φ-ing is the objectively right thing to 
do. But if you are unhappy with these cases, the following adaptation of the Cyanide Coffee 
case ought to bring out the point that there are some actions which one can only permissibly 
perform when one knows that they are objectively right. Suppose that there are two jars side 
by side in Anne's kitchen, and that, as before, she wants to spoon sugar into Bill's coffee. 
Suppose that Anne knows that jar A contains sugar. Suppose that Anne does not know that jar 
B contains sugar rather than cyanide, but that it is highly probable on her evidence that it 
contains sugar; a lottery was run by Anne's housemate to determine whether to fill jar B with 
sugar or cyanide, and as the lottery was set up there was .99999999 chance that the jar would 
be filled with sugar, and a .00000001 chance that it would be filled with cyanide. Anne knows 
about the lottery, but doesn't know what the result was. Nevertheless, she knows that it is 
.99999999 likely on her evidence that jar B contains sugar. Which jar should Anne choose to 
fill Bill's coffee from? Clearly the answer is jar A. And were she instead to choose jar B, we 
would surely hold Anne culpable for needlessly putting Bill at risk (unless she had an excuse). 
Anne is not permitted to choose jar B. Notice however, that had Anne known that jar B 
contained sugar, she would have be permitted to choose jar B, and could have non-culpably 
done so without an excuse. In Anne's situation, where she has the option of choosing between 
a course of action that she knows is objectively right (selecting jar A) and a course of action 
that she does not know is objectively right, despite the high probability of it being so 
(selecting jar B), it is not permissible for her to take the course of action that she does not 
know to be objectively right. So if you are unhappy with the original Anne and Tom cases, 
simply replace them with this case. 
 
Objection: Here's a reason to think that the 1st permission principle is false. Some acts are 
permissible, but ill advised. When someone performs a permissible but ill advised act, they 
are often properly criticisable. For example, it may well be that you are permitted, as an adult, 
to eat junk food all the time, if that's what you want to do. But you shouldn't expect not to be 
criticised by your family for doing so. Given that permissible but ill advised acts have the 
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property of being properly criticisable, it can be argued that, contrary to your claims, 
believing without knowing is permissible, since it can be argued that believing without 
knowing is permissible, but ill advised, and this explains why you are criticisable when you 
believe that p whilst knowing that you don't know that p. Why shouldn't we think this is what 
is going on?  
 
Reply: We should draw a distinction between being permitted-but-criticisable and being 
culpable-because-not-permitted-without-an-excuse. Believing 'p, but I don't know that p' 
belongs in the latter camp. Not believing 'p, but I don't know that p'' is a requirement of 
rationality, not a recommendation. When Φ-ing is merely recommended, rather than required 
we typically are in a position to concede that, 'yes, it's up to you, even if I think it's a bad 
idea.' Not so with 'p, but I don't know that p'. If you believe 'p, but I don't know that p' you've 
fallen into irrationality of a kind that it not merely ill advised, but straightforwardly 
prohibited, from an epistemic perspective. When we say to someone who has just 
acknowledged that they don't know that p - 'well, you shouldn't outright believe that p then' - 
the force of the 'shouldn't' here is not one of recommendation, but rather prohibition. 
 
Objection: You've argued that ignorance can excuse impermissible acts, and so render the 
person who performs them non-culpable. That's true, but there is a flipside to it that you 
haven't mentioned, and it causes problems for your argument. Just as there can be blameless 
transgressions, so to can there be reckless adherences - that is, situations where Φ-ing is 
permissible, but your evidence suggests that it isn't, where you nevertheless go ahead and Φ. 
For example, suppose that the speed limit on the road is 70mph, and you are doing 65mph. In 
that case, you are driving at a permissible speed. But all your evidence suggests that you are 
actually doing 100mph. In that case you recklessly adhere to the speed limit, and intuitively 
you are culpable unless you have an excuse. The same goes for believing. If you are in fact 
permitted to believe that p, because you know that p, but all of your evidence suggests that 
you don't know that p, then you are culpable for your risk-taking qua epistemic agent. If so, 
then the 1st permissibility principle is false - for here we have a case where Φ-ing is 
permissible, but you cannot non-culpably Φ without an excuse. Once we see the possibility of 
such states-of-affairs, your argument collapses, because you either have to deny the 
permission principles that your argument appeal to - in which case the knowledge norm is 
unmotivated - or you keep the principles, but are then forced to infer that one is permitted to 
believe only if you know that you know that p. But that's too strong. Knowledge is sufficient 
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for permissible belief. So if you keep the principles, your argument overgenerates. Either way, 
your argument fails. 
 
Reply: I think that believing when you know but it is unlikely that you know isn't culpable 
risk-taking. Anti-risk conditions are built in to the permissibility conditions for moral and 
epistemic norms. The speeding case is misleading. In the speeding case, you are legally 
permitted to do what you do, and not legally culpable for your behaviour. But that doesn't 
mean you're not morally culpable for it. Morally speaking, sticking within the speed limit is 
not sufficient for permissible driving (even if it is sufficient for legally permissible driving). 
You are not permitted to recklessly adhere to the speed limit. The same goes for other such 
cases. And similarly for believing. The anti-risk condition is built in to the permissibility 
conditions for belief. As we saw in §2, it is plausible that it is for this very reason that you 
have to know that p, rather than merely have a true belief in order to permissibly believe that 
p. But it is not required that you be safely non-risky in your believing (or, as we may put it, 
'non-riskily non-risky'). And as such, you are not culpable for believing that p in the case 
where you know that p, but your evidence suggests that you don't know that p. The fact that 
you could easily have acted riskily is not relevant to the assessment of whether you are 
blameworthy. Why, then, does it appear as though you are culpable for believing in such 
improbable knowledge cases? One suggestion, to which I am sympathetic, is that the 
possibility of improbable knowledge is highly counterintuitive, and so we tend to treat cases 
of improbable knowledge as though they were cases of non-knowledge (Williamson (2009)), 
and so as cases of culpably risky believing. So I see no problem in holding on to both the 1st 
permissibility principle and the claim that knowledge is sufficient for permissible belief. 
 
Objection: According to the 3rd permissibility principle Φ-ing without knowing that Φ-ing is 
objectively right is permissible for S iff were S to know that she did not know that Φ-ing is 
objectively right, it would nevertheless be possible for S to non-culpably Φ without an excuse. 
On the standard Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of subjunctive conditionals they are true whenever 
the antecedent is impossible. It follows that whenever it is impossible to know that one does 
not know that Φ-ing is objectively right, one is permitted to perform every possible Φ without 
knowing that Φ-ing is objectively right. That would be highly implausible, since there clearly 
are actions that one is not permitted to perform unless one knows that they are objectively 
right. Moreover, it would deliver the result that it is permissible to believe that p without 
knowing that p, which is exactly what you want to argue against. The problem for you is that 
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there are situations in which it is impossible to know that you don't know whether Φ-ing is 
objectively right. Two such circumstances are: 1. borderline cases of knowing whether Φ-ing 
is objectively right, and 2. cases where you rationally believe, without knowing, that Φ-ing is 
objectively right. The upshot of this is that the 3rd permissibility principle has absurdly 
implausible consequences about what is and isn't permissible. So it, and the argument for the 
knowledge norm of belief that rests on it, should be rejected. 
 
Reply: I accept the Lewis-Stalnaker analysis of subjunctive conditionals, but I deny that this 
causes the kind of problem for my view that the objection claims. With respect to the point 
about borderline cases of knowledge being unknowable, it is crucial to recognise that, as 
Srinivasan (forthcoming) has emphasised, luminosity failure is a contingent feature of a 
subject that is the result of the limited discriminatory capacities of that subject. There could, 
in principle, be a subject with perfect discrimination, and so for whom every condition, 
including knowledge, is luminous. In assessing the subjunctive conditional: 'were S to know 
that she did not know that Φ-ing is objectively right she could have nevertheless non-culpably 
Φ'ed without an excuse', nothing forces us to keep fixed S's discriminatory capacities. Thus, 
we can imagine an idealised version of S when assessing the conditional. The thought is that 
whilst, for normal-Bob, who has average human discriminatory capacities, there may be 
situations in which Φ-ing is permissible despite the fact that Bob does not know that Φ-ing is 
objectively right, but Bob is not in a position to know that he does not know that Φ-ing is 
objectively right since he is unable to discriminate between the case where he doesn't know 
and a similar case where he does know, the same is not true of idealised-Bob, who has perfect 
discriminatory capacities, since idealised-Bob can discriminate between the situation where 
he does not know that Φ-ing is objectively right and a similar case where he does know. Thus 
we can sensibly judge whether normal-Bob is permitted to Φ by asking whether idealised-Bob 
could non-culpably Φ without an excuse. As a result, I don't think that borderline cases cause 
the kind of problem for my view that the objection claims. 
 
This response isn't available in the rational-believe-without-knowledge case; if rationally 
believing that p is incompatible with knowing that you don't know that p, then no matter how 
good your discriminatory capacities are, it will not be possible to know that you rationally 
believe that p and know that you don't know that p. Nevertheless, rational-believe-without-
knowledge cases also fail to imperil the view. The objection is that it is impossible to know 
that you don't know that p when you rationally believe that p, and as such the subjunctive 
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conditional will be necessarily true in this circumstance. However, whilst it is true that it is 
impossible for you to know that you don't know that p whilst you rationally believe that p, it 
is only impossible when it is held fixed that you rationally believe that p. But nothing requires 
us to hold this aspect of your circumstances fixed in assessing the conditional, and it is of 
course possible to acquire new evidence that puts you in a position to know that you don't 
know that p. Of course, once you have acquired this evidence it will no longer be rational for 
you to believe that p, but this is exactly what we should expect if the 3rd permissibility 
principle is true and it is irrational to believe that p whilst knowing that you don't know that p. 
 
Objection: Your argument departs from the assumption that it is irrational to believe that p if 
you know that you don't know that p, and that, it is claimed, derives from the fact that it is 
irrational to believe 'p, and I don't know that'. But the former follows from the latter only on 
the assumption that rational belief is closed under conjunction. What is irrational is believing 
the conjunction p, but I don't know that p', not believing p and also believing that you don't 
know that p. And rational belief isn't closed under conjunction. Just because S rationally 
believes that p, and rationally believes that q, it doesn't follow that S rationally believes p&q 
(or even believes p&q). So the assumption that the argument for the knowledge norm of belief 
departs from - that it is irrational to believe that p if you know that you don't know that p, 
does not follow, as you claim, from the irrationality of believing 'p, but I don't know that p'. 
So your argument stands in need of further support. 
 
Reply: There are two main arguments for rejecting the claim that rational belief is closed 
under conjunction - one stemming from a Lockean theory of belief, and the other from the 
preface paradox. Neither, I think, causes trouble for my argument. One motivation for 
thinking that rational belief isn't closed under conjunction stems from a Lockean theory of 
belief whereby S believes that p iff S has a credence in p above a threshold that stands 
somewhere short of 1, since the joint probability of p&q is less than the individual 
probabilities of p and q if the probability of p is <1 and the probability of q is <1. I reject this 
view of belief for a number of reasons, which I won't go into here. More importantly however, 
it is anyway anathema to my starting assumption - that it is irrational to believe 'p but I don't 
know that p' - since it can surely be rational to have a arbitrarily high credence in p whilst 
knowing that you don't know that p - I take it that lottery cases show just this. So if you think 
rational belief isn't closed under conjunction, then you should think that the inference from 
the irrationality of believing p, but I don't know that p' to the irrationality of believing that p 
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when you know that you don't know that p, is the least of my worries - you should reject my 
starting assumption that it is irrational to believe 'p, but I don't know that p', since it is, I take 
it, possible to know that you don't know that your lottery ticket has lost, prior to the draw, 
even when the probability that it has lost is arbitrarily high short of 1. 
 
Another motivation for denying the closure of rational belief under conjunction comes from 
the Preface Paradox: it seems plausible that an author could rationally believe all of the 
assertions in her book, yet also rationally believe that the book contains at least one false 
assertion. If so, then rational belief isn't closed under conjunction. However, even if this is 
correct, notice that the preface paradox derives its plausibility from the fact that the 
conjunction is very long, and so likely to contain at least one error. But the irrationality of 
believing 'p, but I don't know that p' involves only two conjuncts, so the kinds of failures of 
closure of rational belief under conjunction that the preface paradox motivates do not concern 
my argument. 
 
So I don't think that any of the main motivations for denying that rational belief is closed 
under conjunction trouble my argument. 
 
Objection: just as it is irrational to believe 'p, and I don't know that p', so it is irrational to 
believe: 
 
 - p, and I can't be certain that p 
 - p, and I can't be sure that p 
 - p, but it is possible that not p 
 
And we could run arguments parallel to the one you gave for the knowledge norm of belief, 
using these conjunctions, to get the conclusion that you are permitted to believe that p only if 
you can be certain that p/can be sure that p/it is not possible for you that not p. But that's far 
too strong. Knowledge is fallible, and knowledge is sufficient for permissible belief. So the 
kind of argument you give overgenerates, since, if it is accepted, it motivates demands on 
permissible belief that are too strong. 
 
Reply: As Williamson (2000) points out, people are generally reluctant to let the contextually 
set standards for knowing come apart from those of being epistemically certain, having a right 
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to be sure, and it's being possible that not p. 'He knows that p, but he can't be certain', 'He 
knows that p, but he isn't sure that p', and 'He knows that p, but it's possible for him that not p' 
all sound bad. We are happy to attribute epistemic certainty, the right to be sure, and the 
impossibility of being wrong when strictly speaking they are not present. We do so when the 
subject knows. This is not surprising, given the notion of outright belief that knowledge is 
normatively necessary and sufficient for is one that constitutes a kind of contextual certainty. 
 
Objection: Even if your response to the stronger Moorean conjunctions objection - that 
people don't let the contextually set standards for knowledge and certainty come apart - is 
accepted, there is another group of Moorean sounding conjunctions that cause problems for 
you. Namely: 
 
 - p, but I don't know whether I know that p 
 - p, but I don't know that I know that p 
 - p, but it's possible I don't know that p 
 - p, but it's unlikely that I know that p 
 
The worry is this. These sound Moorean in much the same way that 'p, but I don't know that p' 
sounds Moorean. If so, then oughtn't we conclude that it is irrational to believe them? And if it 
is, then we can run an argument parallel to your argument to the conclusion that it is 
permissible to believe that p only if you know that you know that p. But again, that's too 
strong. So your argument overgenerates. 
 
Reply: My response here is flat-footed. It is rational to believe what you know, even if it is 
unlikely that you know it. So I do not think that it is irrational to believe these conjunctions. 
Rationality, just like any other condition, isn't luminous. That's something we have to learn to 
live with. 'p, but it's unlikely that it's rational for me to believe that p' sounds just as bad, but 
we have to accept that it's possible to rationally believe even when it is unlikely that it is 
rational to believe, otherwise we commit ourselves to a tolerance principle, and with it, 
scepticism about the possibility of rational belief. 
 
Objection: You are still not out of the woods with Moorean conjunctions. One can know that 
p even though it is very improbable on one's evidence that one knows that p. Similarly, one 
can rationally believe that p, even though it is very improbable on one's evidence that one 
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rationally believes that p. Given this it can be rational to have a high credence in the following 
conjunctions: 
  
 - p, and my evidence doesn't support that p 
 - p, and my evidence supports ~p 
 - p, and it is not rational for me to believe that p 
 
- But these are just as bad - arguably worse - than 'p, and I don't know that p'. So why should 
we accept your starting assumption that it is irrational to outright believe 'p, but I don't know 
that p', if it can be rational to believe these kinds of Moorean conjunctions? 
 
Reply: My starting assumption was that it is irrational to outright believe Moorean 
conjunctions, not that it is irrational to have a high credence in them. But as we saw in §2.5 of 
essay 4 ('Excuses and Epistemic Norms'), the primary argument for the possibility of 
improbable rational belief does not support the conclusion that it can be rational to outright 
believe that one does not rationally believe that p. Accordingly there is no present reason to 
think that one could rationally outright believe these conjunctions. As such, I do not think 
they cause problems for my view. 
 
 
 
 
§IV. Conclusion 
 
 
 
It is irrational to believe 'p, but I don't know that p'. This fact, I have argued, implies that 
knowledge is the norm of belief in the sense that it is permissible to believe that p only if you 
know that p. Why? Because if it is irrational to believe 'p, but I don't know that p', then it is 
only possible to non-culpably to believe that p without knowing that p when you have the 
excuse of not knowing that you don't know that p, and were it permissible to believe that p 
without knowing that p, then you would not need an excuse in order to non-culpably do so. 
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Since it is uncontroversial that it is permissible to believe that p if you know that p, this can be 
strengthened to the claim that knowledge is the norm of belief in the sense that it is 
permissible to believe that p iff you know that p. Why is knowledge the norm of belief in this 
sense? One reason, I have suggested, is because a belief is fit to be relied on in decision 
making when, and only when, it is an item of knowledge. 
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